WITTGENSTEIN AND ETHICS

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the relationship of Wittgenstein's philosophy to ethics. Wittgenstein's early ethical remarks are examined and some internal relationships are discussed. In addition, the dissertation attempts to show that there is no basis for dividing Wittgenstein's ethical remarks into early and late periods. Although the early remarks display a quasi-Kantian type transcendental ethic which is considered to be inexpressible in language and the later remarks suggest the possibility of a linguistically formulatable ethic, it is argued that these differences do not necessarily represent a radical shift in attitude and approach because of Wittgenstein's concessions to linguistically formulatable ethics in the early writing and the absence of any explicit or implicit rejection of the earlier transcendentalism in the later period.

In the second part of the dissertation the possibilities of Wittgenstein's work is examined. It is argued that Wittgenstein's examination of logical necessity, justification and rule-governed activity opens the way for a similar approach in ethics. A distinction between decision and judgment is drawn which parallels the distinction between discovery

and justification in science. An investigation of the actual thought process in chess decision provides the basis for a new account of ethical decision. In this account it is maintained that rules are used as training devices early in the training of the individual and later as part of the process of justification, and that they do not in most cases play a role in the actual decision process. It is claimed that early study of rules provides the basis for decision but that the rules are transformed into perceptual and emotional factors which provide the structure for what superficially appears to be empirical investigation during the actual decision process. This account suggests that various ethical theories such as emotivism, intuitionism, and ethical rationalism are in need of drastic revision if they are to conform with natural human thought procedures.

In the third part it is argued that Wittgenstein was much closer to the positions of Part II than might previously have been supposed. This relationship is established by comparing Wittgenstein's handling of perception in his early and later work with the view developed in Part II. This part in addition prepares the groundwork for a new interpretation of Wittgenstein unifying his work in terms of perception.

VITA

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A Dissertation

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ABBREVIATIONS

BL   Ludwig Wittgenstein. The Blue Book from The Blue and Brown Books. Followed by page number.

BR   Ludwig Wittgenstein. The Brown Book from The Blue and Brown Books. Followed by paragraph number.

dG   Adriann D. de Groote. Thought and Choice in Chess. Followed by page number.

E   Paul Englemann. Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein with Memoir. Followed by page number.

F   Ludwig Wittgenstein. "Bemerkungen Ueber Frazers The Golden Bough." Followed by page number.

LE   Ludwig Wittgenstein. "A Lecture on Ethics." Rhees, Rush. "Some Developments in Wittgenstein's View of Ethics." Followed by page number.

LC   Ludwig Wittgenstein. Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief. Followed by page number.

LWMP   K. T. Fann, ed. Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Man and His Philosophy. Followed by page number.

ML   G. E. Moore. "Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-1933." Followed by part and page number.

MM   Norman Malcolm. Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir. Followed by page number.

NB   Ludwig Wittgenstein. Notebooks: 1914-1916. Followed by page number.

SD   Ludwig Wittgenstein. "Notes for Lectures on 'Private Experience' and 'Sense Data.'" Followed by page number.

O   Ludwig Wittgenstein. Letters to C. K. Ogden. Followed by page number.

OC   Ludwig Wittgenstein. On Certainty. Followed by paragraph number.

PB   Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophische Bemerkungen. Followed by paragraph number.

PG   Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophische Grammatik: Teil I und II.
Followed by part and paragraph number.

PI   Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations. Part I
followed by paragraph number. Part II followed by page number.

RFM   Ludwig Wittgenstein. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics.
Followed by part and paragraph number.

TLP   Ludwig Wittgenstein. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Followed
by paragraph number except for preface and introduction which
are followed by page number.

vF   Ludwig Wittgenstein. Briefe an Ludwig Wittgenstein. Followed
by page number.

WWK   Friedrich Waisman. Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis. Followed
by page number.

Z   Ludwig Wittgenstein. Zettel. Followed by paragraph number.

PREFACE

Wittgenstein is well known for his work in logic, the foundations of mathematics and the philosophy of language. His work has been an inspiration to and has been interpreted as logical positivism, linguistic analysis and the recently announced conceptual analysis. What is little known, however, is that Wittgenstein had an intense interest in ethics, and considered much of his early work to be ethical in nature. When Wittgenstein was trying to get the Tractatus published, he wrote to Ludwig von Ficker telling him not to be misled by the actual content of the book and that the sense of the book was an ethical one. Wittgenstein maintained that the relation of his book to ethics could be seen once one looked at the preface and the conclusion of the book and realized how much had been left unsaid because it couldn't be written in words (vF 35). In the Tractatus itself the ethical aspect was referred to as "the mystical" and it was the one part which met with the most scepticism. Russell in his introduction to the Tractatus points out to the reader that, even though Wittgenstein's mystical views prove untenable, most of the theory (the good part) would remain untouched. The positivists of Vienna like Russell found the mysticism incomprehensible though they found inspiration in the rest of the book. Although the positivists themselves knew almost from the beginning that Wittgenstein's approach was not consistent with their own, the association of the Tractatus with positivism and, as a result, the deemphasis of the mystical remarks in many philosophical circles, caused Wittgenstein's philosophy to be

incorrectly thought of as positivistic as well and the ethical point of the _Tractatus_ was entirely disregarded. It is only in the last few years, about fifty years after the publication of the _Tractatus_, that the ethical aspect of Wittgenstein's work is beginning to get some attention.

The publication of the _Notebooks 1914-1916_ has revealed about twenty pages of ethically related material, selections of which were used in the final pages of the _Tractatus_. A lecture on ethics which Wittgenstein gave upon returning to Cambridge has been published. Paul Engelmann has permitted his letters from Wittgenstein to be published and has written a memoir with regard to Wittgenstein's earlier career which is an excellent companion to the Malcolm memoir covering his later life. Ethical remarks were found recorded in the notes of the positivists now available in _Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis_. A book by Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin, _Wittgenstein's Vienna_, has also recently appeared which discusses Wittgenstein's intellectual background and reconsiders the _Tractatus_ in accordance with Wittgenstein's intentions as well as they can be reconstructed.

This dissertation is an attempt to continue the recent historical investigations into Wittgenstein's philosophy which the publication of these notes, lectures, remarks and books have begun. It is divided into three parts. The first chapters review Wittgenstein's ethical writings and remarks and attempt to explain why Wittgenstein concluded that ethics is inexpressible and why he did not attempt to develop an ethic in his later writings which seem to open up some possibilities for one. If we are to believe the personal accounts of Wittgenstein, few philosophers were ever more intensely concerned with ethical and

moral issues; yet, Wittgenstein produced no ethical theory and did not even advocate any particular ethical principles. Hopefully, Part I will help provide at least part of the answers. The second part is a speculative attempt to develop an ethical account consistent with the later philosophy, but one which Wittgenstein did not in fact hold. These chapters should have some value in terms of contemporary ethical theory and should in addition provide some insight into Wittgenstein's own position by showing one of the possibilities inherent in his position. The third and final part gives a tentative account of Wittgenstein as a perceptual analyst. The purpose is twofold. First of all, it attempts to show that Wittgenstein held or came close to holding a perceptual doctrine which is required in the speculative ethical account given in Part II. Secondly, it shows how this perceptual doctrine can be interpreted in such a way that it gives Wittgenstein's philosophy more unity than it has previously been thought to have. I am of the opinion that the changes which Wittgenstein made in his philosophy throughout his life are less significant than the elements of continuity. It may be that the interpretation of Wittgenstein's work as a positivist, linguist and conceptual analyst may have less to do with Wittgenstein's philosophy and intentions than the philosophy and intentions of those who have admired him. While I may also be open to the same criticism, I can only say in defense that my interpretation of Wittgenstein offers more unity to his work than the others can provide though that of course does not mean that it is the correct interpretation.

Of the three parts, I consider the second part to be the most important. Wittgenstein sometimes compared himself to Galileo. The comparison is not altogether mistaken. Galileo, though not the best

physicist, mathematician or astronomer, was recognized as competent in all three. He was thus able to relate the fields together through his personal insight and feel for each field in a way which very likely could not have been accomplished by a committee of representatives from each field who did not understand each other's disciplines. Thus, although Galileo's proofs for the Copernican theory are now considered false by modern science, his claims, as a result of his recognized stature, and his powerful vision, permitted a marriage of physics, mathematics and astronomy which has proved useful for over three hundred years. Wittgenstein, like Galileo, came to be philosopher of recognized competence and stature in several fields, logic, mathematics and the philosophy of language. As a result, he was able to have a critical effect on the course of philosophy in the twentieth century. His personal and professional efforts to deemphasize the role of mathematics and logic and his eventual scorn for attempts to create ideal languages has contributed to a shift away from a view of mathematics as the absolute model for philosophy and science exemplified by the logical positivist movement but dating back to pre-Socratic times. Unfortunately, however, despite the value of this shift, it is apparent that this accomplishment was not a major aim in Wittgenstein's philosophy. His major though rather secret aim was to show the relationship of ethics to logic, mathematics and language. It was an aim which he never accomplished; however, I feel that he was much closer than he or others would have imagined. I believe that Wittgenstein's analysis of logical and mathematical necessity and what it means to follow a rule provides the possibility of a reexamination of ethics in a way which has not previously been tried. I do not believe my second part is the ethical

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work which, as Wittgenstein put it in his lecture on ethics, will destroy all other ethical books, but it does show what Wittgenstein might have accomplished had he taken one more small step. I think that my presentation in the second part, sketchy though it is, may further help to show the value of Wittgenstein's work for modern philosophy.

With regard to the speculative chapters concerning a Wittgensteinean ethical position in terms of the later philosophy, a few remarks might be in order about matters which do not occur in the position in detail as it is presented. The position is intended to help answer the question "What ought I to do?" which I take to be the fundamental problem of ethics and one which makes ethics primarily a practical matter. The position does not endorse any normative principles in answering this question. It does not do so because the author is interested in describing those elements of the practical decision process which will be common to most if not all societies. Hopefully the conclusions drawn will be correct in all human societies regardless of the diverse ethical principles they may hold. I personally consider ethical principles to be dependent on the particular societies in which they are found. I recognize that such principles do change and my account of how they change would be of the sort given by Stephen Toulmin in Human Understanding. Even if I should be wrong and there are some fundamental and universal principles of ethics, I believe that what I am trying to accomplish will still be valid. Secondly, I consider man to be an animal which owes much of its social and mental behavior to quasi-biological sources. I consider this position in line both with Wittgenstein and Hume. Hence, what applied for man may well apply to a

chimpanzee or a squirrel as well. Finally, though I consider the human thought process of primitive animal (biological) nature, at the same time, I also consider it more complex and sophisticated than that of our computers. It may well be that if the position given in Part II is correct that the cyberneticists are wrong about the potential of computers to duplicate human thought and behavior. I am of this opinion though I am not able to demonstrate it conclusively. Descartes established two principles by which he maintained machines (and animals since they too were machines) could be distinguished from humans: (1) by linguistic ability and (2) by the multiplicity of human capability. If these distinguishing criteria are to be overthrown, I feel it is more likely to be by an ethologist training a chimpanzee than by a cyberneticist programming a machine. I do not feel that these remarks are essential to the position given in Part II but they may be of interest to the reader and illuminate to some extent how the author would proceed in matters beyond the scope of the present inquiry.

What I am attempting in this dissertation is not completely new and many philosophers are beginning to work in the same area. Michael Polanyi, who shares a common Viennese tradition with Wittgenstein, approaches the position very closely. Philosophers like Hanson, Toulmin and Kuhn have been dealing with parallel issues in the philosophy of science for twenty years. My own introduction to the problem in ethics came through my investigation of the Toulmin-Hare controversies after having read some of the philosophy of science books, particularly those by Hanson and Toulmin. On a personal level, I am indebted to Professor Emeritus Donald Oliver of the University of Missouri who shaped my philosophical perspective as an undergraduate to a degree which I

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

This dissertation is divided into three parts. At first glance
the relationships between the parts may not be readily apparent. The
dissertation is primarily an examination of Wittgenstein's ethical
views and the possibilities inherent in these views. The first part
reviews Wittgenstein's ethical remarks. The second part develops an
ethical position in terms of the later philosophy which was not in fact
held by Wittgenstein. The final part offers a new interpretation of
Wittgenstein's work as a perceptual analyst. The first part is sup-
portive of the second and third parts. Wittgenstein's ethical remarks
are too sketchy to be developed into an ethical position. The first
part, therefore, serves only to catalog the sorts of things Wittgenstein
himself was concerned with in ethics. The ethical position developed
in the second part is the primary feature of the dissertation. Although
Wittgenstein did not hold the position, he easily could have. Thus,
in addition to being a contribution to contemporary ethical theory, the
part also helps to illustrate the possibilities for ethical theory in
Wittgenstein's philosophy. The position as it is presented relies
heavily on perception, which has not been considered a major element
in Wittgenstein's philosophy, early or late. The third part examines
the role of perception in Wittgenstein's philosophy and argues that it
is a primary feature of Wittgenstein's work throughout his career. The
dissertation is unified by its concern for Wittgenstein as a historical

philosophical figure. In addition it is a critique and evaluation of
the ethical features of Wittgenstein's work.

PART I

WITTGENSTEIN'S ETHICAL REMARKS

CHAPTER I

WITTGENSTEIN'S ETHICAL VIEWPOINT

Introduction

When the <u>Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus</u> was published, it was
considered to be an important book by Russell and the positivists of
the Vienna Circle. They believed it to be a major contribution to
logic, philosophy of language and philosophy of science. There were
some unusual remarks about ethics and mysticism at the end of the book,
but these were overlooked as unimportant idiosyncratic remarks which
if ignored did not detract from the important parts of the book.
Speaking of Wittgenstein's mysticism in his introduction to the
<u>Tractatus</u>, Russell says:

> The totalities concerning which Mr Wittgenstein holds that it
> is impossible to speak logically are nevertheless thought by
> him to exist, and are the subject-matter of his mysticism.
> The totality resulting from our hierarchy would be not merely
> logically inexpressible, but a fiction, a mere delusion, and
> in this way the supposed sphere of the mystical would be abol-
> ished. Such an hypothesis is very difficult, and I can see
> objections to it which at the moment I do not know how to
> answer. Yet I do not see how any easier hypothesis can escape
> from Mr Wittgenstein's conclusions. Even if this very difficult
> hypothesis should prove tenable, it would leave untouched a
> very large part of Mr Wittgenstein's theory, though possibly
> not the part upon which he himself would wish to lay stress.
> (TLP xxii)

Russell has so little regard for Wittgenstein's mysticism that he chooses
to point out that most of the book (the theory of logic) is uneffected
even if the mystical hypothesis is tenable, instead of a more sympathetic
stance that the theory of logic would be unaffected even if the mysticism
is untenable. Russell's interest in the book is very different from

that of Wittgenstein, as Russell notes when he states that Wittgenstein

might want to lay stress on other parts of the book. Wittgenstein was

interested in the mysticism and Russell in the logic. Russell's com-

ments in the introduction attempt to dissociate the mysticism from the

logic (even if the mysticism is tenable) so that the logic may receive

the attention it deserves without the mysticism prejudicing its reception.

The logical positivists of the Vienna Circle in reading the Tractatus

also saw little importance in the mystical remarks. It was only later

when Wittgenstein met with them that they began to see that the mysticism

was important to Wittgenstein. Carnap writes in his autobiography:

> Earlier, when we were reading Wittgenstein's book in the Circle,
> I had erroneously believed that his attitude toward metaphysics
> was similar to ours. I had not paid sufficient attention to the
> statements in his book about the mystical, because his feelings
> and thoughts in this area were too divergent from mine. Only
> personal contact with him helped me to see more clearly his atti-
> tude at this point. (LWMP 36)

When the positivists did become aware of the significance of the mysticism

to Wittgenstein, they, like Russell, continued to disregard it. Only

Schlick paid any attention to it and this interest was not approved of

by the other members of the circle. Carnap writes:

> Schlick himself was very strongly influenced by Wittgenstein both
> philosophically and personally. During the subsequent years, I
> had the impression that he sometimes abandoned his usually cool
> and critical attitude and accepted certain views and positions of
> Wittgenstein's without being able to defend them by rational
> arguments in the discussions of the circle. (LWMP 36-37)

The disregard shown by Russell and the positivists for those parts of

the Tractatus which Wittgenstein considered most important has been

the source of much misunderstanding about Wittgenstein's early philosophy.

As a result, Wittgenstein was erroneously viewed as a positivist by most

of the philosophical community despite the fact that many of the

philosophical views he held to be most important were inconsistent with positivism and were the conclusions he intended to be drawn from the Tractatus itself.

Engelmann, a close friend of Wittgenstein during his early period, notes in his memoir the difference between Wittgenstein and the positivists.

> A whole generation of disciples was able to take Wittgenstein for a positivist because he has something of enormous importance in common with the positivists: he draws the line between what we can speak about and what we must be silent about just as they do. The difference is only that they have nothing to be silent about. Positivism holds--and this is its essence--that what we can speak about is all that matters in life. Whereas Wittgenstein passionately believes that all that really matters in human life is precisely what, in his view, we must be silent about. When he nevertheless takes immense pains to delimit the unimportant, it is not the coastline of that island which he is bent on surveying with such meticulous accuracy, but the boundary of the ocean.
> (E 97)

This difference in the value of the inexpressible removes Wittgenstein's philosophy completely from the realm of positivism because Wittgenstein holds as most valuable that which the positivists are trying to discard.

Wittgenstein in a letter to Ludwig von Ficker, from whom Wittgenstein was seeking help in getting the Tractatus published, makes a similar point. Wittgenstein writes

> . . . it will perhaps be a help to you if I write a few words to you about my book: You will not--as I firmly believe--get all too much out of the contents. Then you will not understand it; the stuff will appear completely strange to you. In reality it is not strange to you, for the sense of the book is an ethical one. I once wanted to include in the preface a sentence which in fact is not there now, but which I will now write for you, because it will perhaps be the key for you: I wanted to write namely that my work consists of two parts: the one which is presented here and the other which I have not written. And it is precisely the second part which is the important one. My book draws the limits of the ethical from within as it were; and I am convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing those limits. In short, I believe that where many others today are just

gassing I have in my book firmly put everything into place by being
silent about it. And therefore unless I am very much mistaken the
book says much which you yourself want to say, but perhaps you will
not see that it is said in the book. I would now recommend that
you read the preface and the conclusion because these most directly
express the sense of the book. (vF 35)

Wittgenstein was aware that the Tractatus could easily be misunderstood

as his instructions to von Ficker indicate. Wittgenstein was disturbed

about these misunderstandings but seems to have been unable to do much

about it. Wittgenstein disliked Russell's introduction so much that

he seriously considered not publishing the Tractatus at all (E 31-33).

Wittgenstein soon relented but the disagreement was the beginning of

serious personal and philosophical antagonism between them. When

Wittgenstein met with the Vienna Circle, both sides initially thought

the other crazy (E 118). Eventually Wittgenstein refused to meet with

any of the members of the circle except for Schlick and Waismann

(LWMP 36).

In the first chapters of this dissertation I shall investigate the

ethical matters which Wittgenstein told von Ficker were the sense of the

Tractatus. In addition to the Tractatus I shall examine a number of

other sources of ethical remarks. There are a number of pages of ethical

remarks in the Notebooks 1914-1916 (NB 72-91) which deal with the topics

found at the end of the Tractatus. Most of the remarks in the Tractatus

are selections of this material. There are a few remarks from Wittgen-

stein's discussions with the Vienna Circle (WWK 68-69, 92-93, 115-118).

There is a lecture on ethics given in England sometime in 1929 or 1930

(LE 3-12). There are some notes made by Moore from Wittgenstein's

lectures 1930-1933 in England (ML III 16-21, 26-27) and finally a few

remarks in the Investigations (PI I 77, 119, 304). The discussion shall

be divided into two parts acknowledging the standard distinction between
an early and late Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's remarks in the Notebooks,
Tractatus, and the Vienna Circle's notes shall be considered the early
period. Moore's notes and the remarks in the Investigations shall be
considered the later period. The lecture shall be considered as a
transition between the early and later periods.

Background

Before beginning an examination of Wittgenstein's ethical remarks,
it should be helpful to explain what the ethical sense of the Tractatus
is which Wittgenstein spoke of to von Ficker (vF 35). In other words,
why was Wittgenstein trying to draw the conclusions found at the end of
the Tractatus? The answer to this question is to be found in an exami-
nation of the intellectual climate of Vienna at the turn of the century.
The key philosophical figure is Fritz Mauthner, an Austrian philosopher
who attempted a critique of language. Mauthner is an interesting blend
of Kant, Schopenhauer and Hume. He was a student of Ernst Mach.
Mauthner's enterprise was essentially Kantian in nature, an examination
of language being substituted for an examination of transcendental
principles. In his critique, Mauthner concluded that man is trapped
in a metaphorical description of the world, that true knowledge is
impossible and that even the scientific laws of nature are social
phenomena.[1] Mauthner drew these conclusions because he felt he had
demonstrated that we are limited in what we can know and understand

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[1]Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin, Wittgenstein's Vienna (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1973), p. 132.

by the metaphorical nature of language. A critique of language, according to Mauthner, must furthermore lead to mysticism. Mauthner's mysticism embraces all of what is beyond the limits of language and cannot therefore be spoken of. Wittgenstein's final conclusions in the Tractatus are similar to those of Mauthner. His critique of language also leads to mysticism. The connection with Mauthner is undeniably made in the closing remarks where Wittgenstein says:

> My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them--as steps--to climb beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)
> He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. (TLP 6.54)

This remark is reminiscent of a similar remark by Mauthner on the first page of his most important work.

> If I wish to ascend in the critique of language, which is the most important business of thinking mankind, then I must destroy language behind me, before me and in me from step to step, then I must destroy every rung of the ladder once I step upon it.[1]

The similarity of these remarks and the Mauthnerian conclusions about mysticism could only serve to identify Wittgenstein's work with Mauthner's in the mind of a Viennese intellectual of that time.

The similarity between the philosophical conclusions of Mauthner and Wittgenstein brings up a new question. Why did Wittgenstein write a book to show the same conclusions that Mauthner had already drawn in his own work? Part of the answer can be found in the Tractatus. Midway

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[1]Fritz Mauthner, Beitraege zu einer Kritik der Sprache (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1969), pp. 1-2.

in the <u>Tractatus</u> Wittgenstein says:

> All philosophy is a 'critique of language' (though not in Mauthner's sense). It was Russell who performed the service of showing that the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real one. (TLP 4.0031)

I take this remark to be saying that philosophy is a critique of language but that Mauthner's critique is not the correct one. Insights by Russell permit a new critique which draw approximately the same conclusions though by new arguments. In other words, Wittgenstein was in substantial agreement with the conclusions of Mauthner but not with the means by which he drew them.

Janik and Toulmin have described in detail the intellectual climate which caused Wittgenstein to seek a new critique of language to replace Mauthner's. They maintain that in nineteenth century German-speaking philosophy a separation between fact and value had been drawn. This distinction could be traced from Kant to Schopenhauer to Kierkegaard and finally into Viennese intellectual society through Tolstoy's stories and the writings of Karl Kraus, a personal friend of Wittgenstein's. The Viennese were attempting to establish the exact relationship between fact and value for this relationship would also be the relationship between science on the one hand and ethics, religion and art on the other. Janik and Toulmin write:

> Mauthner, with his <u>Critique</u>, had made a first attempt to provide such a general philosophical analysis, and up to a point the result was impressive enough. By exploring the ramifications of his nominalist principles, his final <u>Sprachkritik</u> certainly ended by supporting the core ethical position held in common by Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard and Tolstoy--namely, the view that the "meaning of life" is not a matter for rational debate, cannot be given "intellectual foundations," and is in essence a "mystical" matter. But it supported this proposition only at a steep price. For, according to Mauthner's arguments, it was not merely the "meaning of life" which ceased to be a

> possible object of knowledge. His principles had compelled him
> to deny, also, the possibility of any genuine knowledge going
> beyond a metaphorical description of the world, even in science
> and logic.[1]

This then was the problem which Wittgenstein set out to solve with the

Tractatus and which the Viennese intellectual community was seeking an

answer to. Wittgenstein's position with regard to Mauthner is not unlike

that of Kant to Hume. Like Kant, Wittgenstein is attempting to save

science while at the same time preserving a place for ethics and

religion.

Although Wittgenstein and Mauthner are in agreement that a critique

of language leads to mysticism, they differ over the status of science.

Gershon Weiler in his book on Mauthner distinguishes Wittgenstein and

Mauthner's points of view nicely.

> In Mauthner's view propositions of science cannot be certainly
> true and so the poetic use of language has the distinct advantage
> of not claiming to express the truth at all. However, these
> differences notwithstanding, both Mauthner and Wittgenstein see
> the critique of language as an inquiry into the limits of what
> can be and what cannot be said. Wittgenstein writes (Tractatus
> 6.53): 'The correct method in philosophy would really be the
> following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propo-
> sitions of natural science. . .' If 'what can be said' means
> 'what can be said truly' then both philosophers can be understood
> as agreeing on the question and only differing in the answer.
> Wittgenstein answers: propositions of natural science, while
> Mauthner answers: nothing.[2]

Wittgenstein's answer while still agreeing with Mauthner's primary

mystical conclusions provides a stronger base for science and logic.

This difference, though substantial, is not too radically different

from Mauthner's own view since he does not hold his mystical conclusions

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[1] Janik and Toulmin, p. 165.

[2] Gershon Weiler, Mauthner's Critique of Language (Cambridge:
University Press, 1970), pp. 301-302.

to imply that science should be abandoned. As Weiler notes earlier,
Mauthner separates science and the mystical.

> Mystics must not put forward theories about the world.
> When engaged in the serious business of philosophy or science,
> mystical inclinations must be resisted. Mysticism can come in
> only later and at a completely different level. There were
> many who had succumbed to mysticism too soon and ended, as a
> consequence, in confusion.[1]

Thus, though differing about the exact distinction between fact and
value, in practice they are less distant than they would at first seem,
and Wittgenstein's position represents a correction, not a refutation,
of Mauthner's position.

The primary disagreement between Wittgenstein and Mauthner rested
not on Mauthner's conclusion about science and mysticism but on the
method by which he drew this conclusion. Janik and Toulmin write:

> The road by which Mauthner had reached this conclusion
> was, however, open to criticism. Instead of mapping the
> scope and limits from within, in an essentially Kantian manner,
> he had followed the example of Mach: basing his analysis on
> general principles external to the subject to hand and so
> giving needless hostages to fortune.[2]

Wittgenstein's critique seeks to map the limits from within as his
letter to von Ficker states (vF 35). In this attempt, he is using the
method of Hertz' _Principles of Mechanics_.[3] Hertz develops a model or
picture theory of language which permits him to show things through
language which cannot be said in language. Wittgenstein adopts this
approach in the _Tractatus_.[4] Thus, by cataloguing what can be said in

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[1]Weiler, p. 292.

[2]Janik and Toulmin, p. 165.

[3]Janik and Toulmin, pp. 139-146.

[4]These matters will be discussed at length as Part III of this
dissertation.

the _Tractatus_, Wittgenstein shows the realm of the mystical, what cannot be said. As Engelmann put it, Wittgenstein drew the outline of an island, not for the sake of the island but rather for the sake of the ocean that surrounded it (E 97). This approach reaches the same conclusions as Mauthner but without being subject to the same criticism that principles were being applied which could not be used because, according to the conclusions, they could not be said.

Wittgenstein told von Ficker that the sense of the _Tractatus_ was an ethical one (vF 35). With this background, it should be possible to see what Wittgenstein meant. Strictly speaking, Wittgenstein's book was not an ethics book because it dealt with matters that were fact, not value; nevertheless, the systemization of the facts serves to show the realm of value and this is the ethical sense of the book. Wittgenstein is offering it as a solution to the question of how fact and value are separated. This conclusion of the _Tractatus_, though an ethical one, however tells us little about Wittgenstein's ethical viewpoint. This viewpoint will be the subject of the rest of Part I.

Limitations

With regard to this subject, it is best to admit right off the limitations and difficulties to be encountered. First of all, the first hand source material is very meager. We are dealing with the ethical philosophy of a man who regarded ethical philosophies to be inexpressible. We are therefore lucky that any source material can be found at all since what can be found is in fundamental conflict with the premise of inexpressibility.

Secondly, we are dealing with a philosopher of great influence who has been interpreted and reinterpreted several times. Seldom has any philosopher been subject to such radical reinterpretation as Wittgenstein and this underscores the difficulty of understanding Wittgenstein even in those areas in which ample source material is available. Interpretations of Wittgenstein's work have often owed more to the interests of the interpreter than to the interests of Wittgenstein as my introduction on Wittgenstein's relation to Russell and the Vienna Circle should have illustrated above. As such interpretations of Wittgenstein's work appear to represent "pictures" (borrowing a term from Wittgenstein) of what Wittgenstein's philosophy might have been and offer no guarantee that they have penetrated to the essence of Wittgenstein's own basic position, whatever it might be. Because of the minimal amounts of source material in the ethical realm, the danger is as great and perhaps greater that an interpretation of Wittgenstein's ethical views may owe more to the problems and interests of the interpreter than to any real position held by Wittgenstein. For this reason, I shall be cautious when presenting Wittgenstein's remarks and shall try to keep my review of Wittgenstein's ethical remarks separate as much as possible from my necessarily speculative conclusions about them.

Thirdly, a major problem exists concerning how to assess the influence of other philosophers on Wittgenstein. There are places where it is clear that Wittgenstein is referring to other philosophers, paraphrasing them and using their terminology. Since Wittgenstein was not preparing his ethical remarks for publication, the remarks are often cryptic and it is not clear whether the references to other philosophers in particular cases are of great or minor importance.

Perhaps they should be taken literally and strong relationships should be drawn. On the other hand, Wittgenstein could just as easily be borrowing in a very limited way and the connection could be very slight. It may well be that my conclusions on these points should be taken with some scepticism. They can only represent a possible ordering of Wittgenstein's viewpoint, one which I might feel is correct, but which can only be substantiated to a very limited degree. Hopefully the ordering will be of some value to the reader even if he should sometimes object to it.

Finally, there is the doctrine of the "early" and "late" Wittgenstein with which I feel very uncomfortable. This doctrine maintains that there were two philosophers named Wittgenstein who shared the same body but otherwise had very little in common, the first being a logical positivist and the second a linguistic analyst. This doctrine which thus denies any unity in Wittgenstein's thought is of dubious value. Wittgenstein was never a logical positivist nor, for that matter, a linguistic analyst though he did share some characteristics with members of both movements.[1] While it cannot be denied that Wittgenstein did change his mind on a number of important matters during his lifetime, it is still possible that there were basic philosophical problems which both the so-called early and late work were attempts to solve and that in this sense his work is unified. If the doctrine is evoked too precipitously, it may systematically falsify Wittgenstein's real views. It may be possible that similar remarks made by the two Wittgensteins may have more in common than the doctrine currently permits. The question of

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[1] I agree with Stephen Toulmin's position on this matter as he presents it in his article, "Ludwig Wittgenstein," _Encounter_, XXXII (January, 1969), pp. 58-71.

whether there is an early and late viewpoint in ethics will be a major issue later in Part I. The remarks will be separated into early and late initially for the convenience of those who honor the doctrine though it is the opinion of the author that this doctrine is of little value particularly in the ethical realm of Wittgenstein's thought.

These difficulties make it highly unlikely that any examination of Wittgenstein's ethical views can be expected to yield unquestionable results. Also, it is doubtful that any major shift in interpretation of Wittgenstein's views can take place based on argument and evidence alone since the evidence is small and the biases are very strong. Changes of interpretation may depend ultimately on persuasion, consistency, usefulness in dealing with contemporary issues (one of the main reasons why Wittgenstein has come to be reinterpreted in the past), and perhaps quite a bit by those largely uncontrollable shifts of perspective and perception which take place when one goes from the duck to the rabbit. Nevertheless, the difficulties notwithstanding, some contributions of significance have been made. Engel has some interesting insights into the relation of Wittgenstein to Kant, Spinoza and Schopenhauer in his book <u>Wittgenstein's Doctrine of the Tyranny of Language</u>. Weiler has clarified the relation of Wittgenstein and Mauthner. Finally, Janik and Toulmin have tackled the problem of the relation of Wittgenstein to the philosophical climate of Vienna at the turn of the century. The success of these investigators suggest that inquiries of this sort are not pointless and that they may, however sketchy they may be in some respects, help provide an improved picture of Wittgenstein's ethical and philosophical position which may contribute to and enrich our understanding of him and his work.

CHAPTER II

WITTGENSTEIN'S ETHICS: 1914-1930

Introduction

In this chapter Wittgenstein's early ethical viewpoint will be
discussed. The period of time from 1914 to 1930 is somewhat arbi-
trarily established but should serve to set the limits within which
ethical remarks can be taken to be related with a high degree of
certainty. The period is taken as having begun with the writing of
the Notebooks, 1914-1916 which contains many ethical remarks. The
period is taken as having ended with Wittgenstein's remarks to the
Vienna Circle on December 17, 1930, his last endorsement of his lec-
ture on ethics given sometime in 1929 or 1930 which still emphasizes
a transcendental, quasi-Kierkegaardian approach. This chapter will be
divided up into subtopics which will catalogue some of the major
features of Wittgenstein's ethical viewpoint. Whether this viewpoint
represents an ethical position is difficult to say. It is certainly
not a personal moral code or a list of ethical or moral precepts or
principles. His remarks do not represent a polished system. The re-
marks are at most only representative of the kinds of ethical pro-
blems which Wittgenstein was willing to deal with. Although his
answers to these problems are not always clear, they suffice to de-
limit the scope of what Wittgenstein considered ethics to be. This
will be the task of the present chapter.

Ethics

No definition of ethics is given in the <u>Notebooks</u> or the <u>Tractatus</u>; however, an interesting characterization of ethics is given in <u>Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis</u> and in the "Lecture on Ethics." In these, ethics is said to be "the thrust against the limits of language." On December 30, 1929, Wittgenstein said:

> Man has the tendency to run against the limits of lan-
> guage. Imagine for example the astonishment that some-
> thing exists. The astonishment cannot be expressed
> in the form of a question, and there is also no answer
> at all. Everything which we would like to say can
> only be nonsense a priori. Nevertheless, we run against
> the limits of language. This thrust Kierkegaard also
> recognized and even described it in the same way (as a
> thrust against paradox). This thrust against the limits
> of language is <u>ethics</u>. I regard it as very important
> to put an end to all the chatter about ethics--whether
> there is knowledge in ethics, whether there are values,
> whether the Good can be defined, etc. In ethics, one
> constantly tries to say something that does not concern
> and can never concern the essence of the matter. It
> is a priori certain that, whatever definition one may
> give the Good, it is always a misunderstanding to sup-
> pose that the formulation corresponds to what one really
> means. (Moore). But the tendency, the thrust, <u>points
> to something</u>. (WWK 68-69).

On January 5, 1930 he said:

> The expressions in ethics have a double meaning: a
> psychological one about which one can speak, and a
> nonpsychological one: "good tennis player", "good".
> In different expressions we always signify the same
> thing.
> Astonishment over the fact of the world. Every at-
> tempt to express it leads to nonsense.
> Man has a tendency to run against the limits of lan-
> guage. This thrust points to ethics. Everything
> which I describe is in the world. In a complete
> description of the world a sentence of ethics never
> occurs, also if I describe a murder. Ethics is not
> a state of affairs. (WWK 92-93).

At the end of the lecture on ethics he said

...I see now that these nonsensical expressions were not nonsensical because I had not yet found the correct expressions, but their nonsensicality was their very essence. For all I wanted to do with them was just to go beyond the world and that is to say beyond significant language. My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it. (LE 11-12).

Finally, on December 17, 1930 he said:

If someone offers something which is a theory, then I would say: No, No! That doesn't interest me. Even if the theory was true it would not interest me--it would never be that which I seek.
The ethical cannot be taught. If I needed a theory to explain the ethical, the ethical would have no value at all.
     I spoke in my lecture on ethics in the first person. I believe that this is something completely essential. Here nothing more can be established; I can only appear as a personality and speak in the first person.
     For me a theory has no worth. A theory gives me nothing. Religion. Is speech essential for religion? I can very well imagine a religion in which there are no doctrines, in which thus nothing is said. The essence of religion can obviously have nothing to do with the fact that speech occurs, or moreover; if it occurs, this itself is a component of religious behavior and not a theory. Thus nothing depends on whether the words are true or false or nonsense.
     The speech of religion is also not figurative; for otherwise one could also express it in prose. The thrust against the limits of language? Language is not a cage.
I can only say: I don't make fun of this tendency in man; I take my hat off to it. And here it is essential that this is not a description of sociology, but, that I speak for myself.

> The facts are unimportant to me. However what
> man means when he says that "the world is here" lies
> close to my heart. (WWK 116-118).

In all of these statements, Wittgenstein continually refers to ethics

as "the thrust against the limits of language." He denies that the

statement has sociological meaning (WWK 117) or psychological meaning

(WWK 92). Although he seems to indicate that it is possible to treat

the statement in these senses, he doesn't want to. Wittgenstein's

conception of ethics characterized by the phrase is, however, closely

associated with religion, mysticism, language, personal viewpoint,

and Kierkegaard's philosophy. Both religion and ethics are ambigu-

ously characterized by the phrase (WWK 117; LE 12). There is a

reference to an astonishment that the world exists. This reference

connects Wittgenstein's ethical conception with mysticism found in

the Tractatus (TLP 6.522), the Notebooks (NG 86) and the lecture on

ethics (LE 1-12). This mysticism is also connected with limitations

to the linguistic expression of thoughts and feelings and with a

rejection of theory. Wittgenstein stresses that he will reject

even a true theory as not capturing what he means by ethics (WWK 117).

His conception of ethics thus goes beyond the limits of language and

the world. It is personal and private. One must speak for himself.

It is finally the same as Kierkegaard's thrust against paradox.

There are two sources for the phrase "the thrust against the

limits of language." The wording of the phrase comes from an aphorism

by Karl Kraus.

> If I cannot get further, this is because I have banged
> my head against the wall of language. Then with my
> head bleeding, I withdraw. (LWMP 101).

Secondly, Wittgenstein makes reference directly to Kierkegaard

(WWK 68). These two sources are interconnected and suggest far more

Kierkegaardian influence than one would suppose at first. In Vienna

at the turn of the century, a Kierkegaardian philosophical revival

was taking place. Theodor Haecker published a book on Kierkegaard

in 1913 which initiated a rediscovery of Kierkegaard. Haecker iden-

tified Kierkegaard with language philosophy and with the Austrian

writer Karl Kraus whom Haecker considered the Viennese embodiment of

Kierkegaard.[1] This connection between Kierkegaard and Kraus was

popularly accepted making it natural for Wittgenstein to use a

Krausian phrase in a Kierkegaardian manner.

The strength of Wittgenstein's self-affirmed relationship to

Kierkegaard can be further estimated by reading a letter to von

Ficker in which Wittgenstein associates his work with that of Haecker.

Haecker was associated with von Ficker and his newspaper Der Brenner.

Von Ficker was involved in the publication of Haecker's book on

Kierkegaard. Wittgenstein writes in his letter that if von Ficker

can publish Haecker's book, then he should be able to publish Witt-

genstein's Tractatus as well (vF 38). In saying this, Wittgenstein

is emphasizing a close philosophical relationship between his work,

Haecker's, and Kierkegaard's.

In calling Wittgenstein's philosophy Kierkegaardian, however,

we must be careful not to go too far. Certainly much of Wittgenstein's

work is not Kierkegaardian at all. Von Ficker, for instance, had

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[1]Janik and Toulmin, pp. 178-179.

difficulty recognizing the connection and needed further explanations

from Wittgenstein. We also know that Wittgenstein did not care for

some of Kierkegaard's work. Malcolm relates that, although Wittgen-

stein was impressed by Kierkegaard's work, Wittgenstein found some of

it over his head. Malcolm writes:

> Kierkegaard he also esteemed. He referred to him,
> with something of awe in his expression, as a 'really
> religious' man. He had read the Concluding Scientific
> Postscript--but found it 'too deep' for him. (MM 71).

Using this remark as a guide, it should be safe to say that Wittgen-

stein identified his philosophical aims with the early Kierkegaard,

who was searching for answers and not finding them, rather than the

later Kierkegaard for whom everything had become clear. It is futile

but admirable searching without finding which is captured in Witt-

genstein's characterization of ethics as the thrust against the

limits of language. Kierkegaard is probably one of those mentioned

in the Tractatus who, after long doubt, saw the world aright and

afterwards could not explain how he did it (TLP 6.521). Unlike

Camus' claim that Kierkegaard committed philosophical suicide in his

later work, Wittgenstein's claim that Kierkegaard's Postscript is too

deep for him does not necessarily denote disapproval. Wittgenstein

considered ethics personal and inexpressible. He may not have been

interested in the particulars of Kierkegaard's solution to the problem

of life simply because it was Kierkegaard's personal vision which

might not be of value to anyone else. Wittgenstein and others might

need a different vision. Also, even if it happened to be valuable,

it probably could not be understood anyway because of the limits of

linguistic expression. Thus, Wittgenstein could without inconsistency

be impressed by Kierkegaard's thrust against paradox, which is common
to all men who are searching, without being interested in Kierke-
gaard's particular, personal, inexpressible solution.

Religion

With regard to the relationship between ethics and religion, it
would be incorrect to say that Wittgenstein thinks of religion and
ethics as identical, even though he uses the same phrases to character-
ize both of them. The "thrust" is an activity which may be either
ethical or religious; however, the ethical is certainly more funda-
mental for Wittgenstein than the religious. In the Notebooks, Witt-
genstein says that "ethics must be a condition of the world, like
logic" (NB 77). Although this remark is not included in the Tractatus
it is implicit. Wittgenstein's letter to von Ficker, which states
that the sense of the Tractatus is ethical, shows that ethics has a
role as important as, if not more important then, logic in the early
philosophical position. No similar claim is made for the importance
of religion. Furthermore, both logic and ethics are inexpressible and
transcendental (TLP 6.13; 6.42-6.421). They are not bodies of doc-
trine and propositions which express them are impossible. Religion,
on the other hand, is not necessarily inexpressible. In Wiener Kreis
Wittgenstein claims only that he can imagine a religion without doc-
trines (WWK 117), a much more modest claim than the claims he makes
concerning logic and ethics which he says have no doctrines. Witt-
genstein's position on religion and ethics is very different from
Kierkegaard's in this respect. Kierkegaard distinguished ethics and
religion as levels of existence and ranked religion as a higher level.

Although Wittgenstein may have considered them levels of existence as well, there is no proof, and even if he had, he would certainly have ranked ethics above religion.

Metaphysics

Although ethics had close ties with religion and very close ties with logic, Wittgenstein's ethics does not have any relationship to metaphysics or a metaphysical urge. Wittgenstein says at the end of the Tractatus that "whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, "we should demonstrate to him that he had failed to give meaning to certain signs in his propositions" (TLP 6.53). This statement treats metaphysics as something which ought to be avoided and discouraged. The ethical urge, on the other hand, is commended (WWK 118; LE 12). Wittgenstein says that he won't make fun of the ethical urge and he says that he takes his hat off to those who have the urge to try to thrust against the limits of language. These remarks suggest that the ethical urge cannot and should not be stopped. The discussion of the metaphysical urge, however, implies that metaphysical speculation can and should be stopped. That after all is the point of the alternative method (TLP 6.53). It is a method recommended to eliminate metaphysics and the tendency to urge to metaphysics in the event that the conclusions of the Tractatus are not completely accepted. Wittgenstein's distaste for a metaphysical urge and his approval of an ethical and religious urge seem to be in part explained by the separation of fact and value which Wittgenstein considered his early work to be demonstrating. Metaphysics in dealing with the world is tampering with the facts and attempting to say

something which is properly expressed through science, according to Wittgenstein's viewpoint. Religion and ethics, however, in referring to value, which is not in the world and which is beyond language, is not in conflict with the facts and science at all.

Wittgenstein's position here is very similar to Kant's. While scorning metaphysical speculation, Kant still tried to establish a place for ethics and religion. Wittgenstein seems to be intentionally making the same kind of move in this respect. Some support for this claim can be found in Wittgenstein's belated adoption of Kant's distinction between "transcendent" and "transcendental" in the Critique of Pure Reason. The transcendental is concerned with establishing the limits of knowledge: "Its purpose is not to extend knowledge, but only to correct it, and to supply a touchstone of the value, or lack of value, of all a priori knowledge."[1] Such a system may be involved either "in extension or merely in limitation of its knowledge."[2] Kant distinguishes between the transcendental and the transcendent. Kant calls principles

> ...which profess to pass beyond these limits, trans-
> cendent. In the case of these latter, I am not re-
> ferring to the transcendental employment or misem-
> ployment of categories, which is merely an error of
> the faculty of judgment when it is not duly curbed by
> criticism, and therefore does not pay sufficient
> attention to the bounds of territory within which
> alone free play is allowed to pure understanding.
> I mean actual principles which incite us to tear
> down all those boundary-fences and to seize posses-
> sion of an entirely new domain which recognizes no

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[1]Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 59.

[2]Ibid.

> limits of demarcation. Thus <u>transcendental</u> and <u>trans-cendent</u> are not interchangeable terms... A principle... which takes away these limits, or even commands us ac-tually to transgress them, is called <u>transcendent</u>.[1]

Kant uses the term "transcendental" with reference to the limits of the understanding. "Transcendent" he treats as a spurious term for attempts to deny or dismiss such limits. The transcendent, in other words, is counter to the very basis of Kant's enterprise. Wittgen-stein affirms his relationship to Kant by stating that ethics is transcendental rather than transcendent. That this is intentional is clear from the change in spelling between the <u>Notebooks</u> and the <u>Tractatus</u>. In the <u>Notebooks</u> Wittgenstein said that ethics was trans-cendent (NB 79). Apparently recognizing his mistake, Wittgenstein corrected it in the <u>Tractatus</u> (TLP 6.421) thereby affirming limits rather than denying them.

Mysticism

Until the publication of Wittgenstein's letters to von Ficker, it was not generally known that Wittgenstein believed the <u>Tractatus</u> had an ethical sense. The conclusions of the book were after all supposed to be mystical. Even knowing that Wittgenstein considered the book ethical still leaves an additional problem. What is the re-lationship between Wittgenstein's mysticism and his ethics? From the text of the <u>Tractatus</u> alone it would seem that the mystical is more important than the ethical since the conclusions at the end of the book are about the mystical, not the ethical; however, before and after

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[1]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 299.

the _Tractatus_, there is little mention of mysticism and the ethical

seems to be more important. Mysticism is only mentioned one time in

the _Notebooks_ (NB 51), not at all in _Wiener Kreis_, and the mystical

remarks discussed in the lecture on ethics are said to have ethical

rather than mystical import. There are two possibilities. First of

all, Wittgenstein may have maintained one viewpoint throughout. If

so, the emphasis on the mystical in the _Tractatus_ is only a terminolo-

gical matter and not a change in position. On the other hand, Witt-

genstein may have been interested in ethics in the _Notebooks_, changed

his mind in the _Tractatus_ in favor of mysticism, and then later

changed his mind again returning to ethics.

Wittgenstein's assessment of the _Tractatus_ in his letter to von

Ficker seems to preclude the second possibility. The assessment

comes at the time Wittgenstein was seeking to publish the _Tractatus_

and only shortly after he had finished writing it. It is unlikely

that Wittgenstein would have already changed his mind so soon after

having written the book. This line of argument brings us back to

the first possibility but still leaves a question unanswered: why did

Wittgenstein wish to emphasize the mystical rather than the ethical if

there was no change in his ethical viewpoint between the _Notebooks_ and

the _Tractatus_?

The answer to this question seems to have already been partially

given in the first chapter during the discussion of the background

purposes of the _Tractatus_. There I argued, along with Janik and

Toulmin, that Wittgenstein was attempting to answer Viennese philo-

sophical problems in a manner which would be superior to the answers

already given by Fritz Mauthner. It was argued that Wittgenstein and others were unsatisfied both with the method of reaching the conclusions and in part with the conclusions themselves. Mauthner had attempted to draw his conclusions by means of general principles from the outside while Wittgenstein, employing a doctrine of showing, reached the conclusions from within. Secondly, Mauthner considered science metaphorical. Wittgenstein's conclusions show that he considered science factual.

Various remarks in the Tractatus suggest Mauthner's work, and Wittgenstein's relation to it. Wittgenstein, it will be remembered, referenced the need for a critique of language (TLP 4.0031) but not one like Mauthner's and used a well-known analogy from Mauthner's work (TLP 6.54) about destroying the ladder as one climbs. Wittgenstein's decision to label his conclusions "mystical" may well have been another attempt to highlight the connection he was drawing between his work and that of Mauthner's. Once the point had been made in the Tractatus Wittgenstein may then have felt free to return to the terminology of "the ethical" with which he seems to have been more comfortable in the Notebooks.

The reference to the mystical in the Notebooks gives some support to this hypothesis. In the Notebooks Wittgenstein writes :

> The urge to the mystical comes of the non-satisfaction of our wishes by science. We feel that even if all possible scientific questions are answered our problem is still not touched at all. Of course in that case there are no questions and that is the answer. (NB 51).

In this paragraph Wittgenstein places the mystical in opposition to science. This is also the case in the Tractatus and in Mauthner's

work. The phrase "the urge to the mystical" seems to be the fore-runner of the phrase "the urge or tendency to thrust against the limits of language." The former, however, is more appropriate in suggesting a relationship to Mauthner and the latter to Kraus and Kierkegaard. The fact that Wittgenstein had little use for this term in the Notebooks (none of his ethical remarks depend on the phrase and it occurs in the notes slightly before and separated from them) gives additional strength to the possibility that the adoption of the term was only to serve as a signpost to indicate the relevance of Wittgenstein's work as a corrective criticism of Mauthner's work.

In any event, the mystical and the ethical can and do coexist in the Tractatus, even though it is hard to determine their exact relationship because of the predominant place of the mystical in the text. Since the mystical covers that which cannot be said (TLP 6.522), the ethical appears to be one kind of thing which cannot be said. Logic, philosophy, poetry, religion, and aesthetics would be others. In this respect, the mystical can be seen as a general term introduced to cover a number of areas with a single term. The term "the ethical" could hardly be used in this manner because of its ordinary connotations. It would be hard, for instance, to place logic under ethics. This would also be inconsistent with the Notebooks where ethics and logic are given equal status: "Ethics must be a condition of the world, like logic (NB 77)." If the mystical is intended as a catch-all term, there is nothing wrong with Wittgenstein saying that there are many things beyond the limits of language, all of them mystical, meaning linguistically inexpressible, and that of these

various things under the mystical, he is most interested in ethics. In this way mysticism can be above ethics without being more important than ethics.

One difficulty with considering the mystical as a general classificatory term is that Wittgenstein also considers the mystical to involve emotion. Wittgenstein emphasizes emotion in his one reference to the mystical in the Notebooks. The mystical arises out of "the non-satisfaction of our wishes by science (NB 51)." He says furthermore that we have an "urge" or tendency towards the mystical and that "we _feel_ that ... _our problem is still not touched at all_" by the solutions science provides. He emphasizes "feel" by italicizing it. The Tractatus contains a reference to the mystical as emotion, Wittgenstein says, "Feeling the world as a limited whole--it is this that is the mystical (TLP 6.45)." The subject also comes up during Wittgenstein's correspondence with the first translator of the Tractatus, C. K. Ogden. Ogden wanted to translate "the mystical" as "the mystical element." Wittgenstein replies:

> 6.44 I don't like "mystical element". I suppose one can(n)'t say in English "the mystical" simply. If so, I would like it better.
> 6.45 Here "mystical element" is wrong! If anything, it must be "mystical feeling" for in _this_ prop(osition) "das mystiche" is an adjective belong to "Gefühl".
> (O 36-37)

These comments indicate that Wittgenstein does not wish the mystical to be considered merely as a general classificatory term. If he had, "mystical element" would have been appropriate. The mystical appears instead to be an emotional state at least in some cases. In other cases it is not. TLP 6.44 and TLP 6.522 are cases where it is not a

feeling. Discussing TLP 6.522 Wittgenstein writes, "'the mystical element'. This is the same case as in 6.44 but <u>not</u> the same as in 6.45 (0 37)." This remark suggests that "the mystical" is being used in two different ways. Wittgenstein's insistence on creating this inclarity may be a desire to maintain some ambiguity in order to permit "the mystical" as both a classification and a feeling, or indecision about the status of these mystical feelings later resolved by discarding the term "the mystical," or another attempt to show his relationship to Mauthner by using Mauthner's terminology. Whatever Wittgenstein's motive, however, mystical feelings are involved and such feelings continue to play a role throughout Wittgenstein's work before he adopts the term and after it is dropped. In the <u>Notebooks</u> there is some indication that they are aesthetic. He writes, "Aesthetically, the miracle is that the world exists. That what exists does exist (NB 86)." In the lecture on ethics, the feelings are ethical rather than mystical. The feeling, thus, are more important than the label. Yet, in the <u>Tractatus</u> he resists the clarifying "mystical feeling" in favor of the more ambiguous "the mystical" leaving it unclear just what he has in mind.

In addition to the influence of Mauthner's philosophy and Wittgenstein's own personal mystical feelings on his conception of mysticism, the mystical as a synonymn for "what cannot be said" has sources which are worth looking at. Engelmann reports that the doctrine of silence was an architectural doctrine of Adolf Loos, a friend of Wittgenstein and Kraus. Speaking of Loos, Engelmann says that it was "<u>his</u> demand: to be silent where one cannot speak (E 127)." Janik and

Toulmin have uncovered the fact that this doctrine was even an official policy of the Hapsburg monarchy, the government refusing to speak of those of whom it did not approve, particularly Karl Kraus and Freud.[1] The doctrine as an unquestioned and fundamental philosophical principle is extremely significant. According to Engelmann, he and Wittgenstein often discussed the truth of the doctrine of silence in terms of poetry and music. Engelmann relates that he sent Wittgenstein a poem which Kraus had said was "so clear that no one understands it (E 82)." After reading the poem, Wittgenstein replied:

> The poem by Uhland is really magnificent. And this is
> how it is: if only you do not try to utter what is
> unutterable then nothing gets lost. But the unutter-
> able will be--unutterably--contained in what has been
> uttered! (E 83)

Englemann gives the impression that such discussions and conclusions were common among Wittgenstein's associates. The doctrine was, in short, an intimate feature of the intellectual beliefs of Wittgenstein's immediate circle of friends. Engelmann considered Wittgenstein's greatest achievement to have been the clear presentation of the group's doctrine. Englemann writes:

> The 'positive' achievement of Wittgenstein, which
> has so far met with complete incomprehension, is his
> pointing to what is manifest in a proposition. And what
> is manifest in it, a proposition cannot also state ex-
> plicitly. The poet's sentences, for instance, achieve
> their effect not through what they say but through
> what is manifest in them, and the same holds in music,
> which also says nothing. (E 83)

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[1] Janik and Toulmin, p. 35.

Wittgenstein's lack of justification of the doctrine may be incomprehensible for most readers until it is realized how strongly it was held by Wittgenstein and his friends. Surrounded by an intellectual group which accepted the doctrine and spoke in terms of it in daily conversation, Wittgenstein would not necessarily need to defend the doctrine, only to clarify it.

Throughout the period of Wittgenstein's life when he publicly supported the doctrine of silence, Wittgenstein did not justify his use of the doctrine by conventional philosophical argument. He writes and speaks rather as if it is intuitively clear. Consider his comments in the Notebooks on July 30, 1916. He writes:

> I keep on coming back to this! Simply the happy life is good, the unhappy bad. And if I now ask myself: But why should I live happily, then this of itself seems to me to be a tautological question; the happy life seems to be justified, of itself, it seems that it is the only right life.
> But this is really in some sense deeply mysterious! It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed!
> But we could say: The happy life seems to be in some sense more harmonious than the unhappy. But in what sense?
> What is the objective mark of the happy, harmonious life? Here it is again clear that there cannot be any such mark, that can be described.
> This mark cannot be a physical one but only a metaphysical one, a transcendental one.
> Ethics is transcendental. (NB 78-79)

What we have here is not an argument that ethics cannot be expressed. A better characterization of the passage would be to say that it is composed of a number of remarks in which Wittgenstein is trying to express something of ethical importance to his views, the nature of happiness, and his inability to find words convinces him that ethics is inexpressible. The remarks can be interpreted as one example of

Wittgenstein himself hopelessly running against the limits of language.

An alternative conclusion could be drawn but was not considered by

Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein could have concluded that he himself was

not capable of expressing ethics but that perhaps someone could and

would some day. The fact that Wittgenstein does not consider this

possibility further demonstrates that he was already at least partially

convinced of the truth of the doctrine even as he attempted to express

the nature of happiness. Wittgenstein held the doctrine on intuitive

grounds for years. He asserts the doctrine as intuitively clear as

late as the lecture on ethics in much the same manner. There he does

consider the specific objection that perhaps some day someone will

succeed in expressing the ethical. He says:

> You will say...that all it comes to is that we have
> not yet succeeded in finding the correct logical analy-
> sis of what we mean by our ethical and religious expres-
> sions. Now when this is argued I at once see clearly,
> as it were in a flash of light, not only that no des-
> cription that I can think of would do to describe what
> I mean by absolute value, but that I would reject every
> significant description that anybody would possibly
> suggest, ab initio, on the ground of its significance.
> That is to say: I see now that these nonsensical ex-
> pressions were not nonsensical because I had not yet
> found the correct expressions, but that their nonsensi-
> cality was their very essence. (LE 11)

This justification relies entirely on special insight. It would not

convince anyone who was not already disposed to see ethics as lin-

guistically inexpressible. This defense serves to support the hy-

pothesis that Wittgenstein in presenting the doctrine of silence was

passing on a doctrine which he had picked up from his Viennese in-

tellectual friends and not as the result of impartial philosophical

inquiry. I am not necessarily accusing Wittgenstein of doing bad

philosophy (all philosophy begins with assumptions which are un-
questioned because they are considered to be intuitively clear), but
I am saying that this doctrine was a fundamental assumption which
Wittgenstein held a long time. The defense in the lecture on ethics
shows an unqaivering adherence to the doctrine more than thirteen
years after Wittgenstein first adopted it. It is not demonstrable
in fact that he ever gave it up. Such dedication and intensity of
conviction do not arise out of a vacuum and they show how much Witt-
genstein was a product of his time and how central the inexpressi-
bility doctrine was to his philosophical and ethical viewpoint.

Aesthetics

Wittgenstein asserts a strong relationship between ethics and
aesthetics in his early philosophy. He says that ethics and aesthetics
are one. Wittgenstein writes in the Tractatus:

> It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.
> Ethics is transcendental.
> (Ethics and aesthetics are one.) (TLP 6.421)

In the Notebooks the same remark is made in a slightly different
context.

> Ethics does not treat of the world. Ethics
> must be a condition of the world, like logic.
> Ethics and aesthetics are one. (NB 77)

The remark that ethics and aesthetics are one is one of the more con-
fusing and cryptic remarks in the Tractatus. Engelmann calls it "one
of the most frequently misunderstood propositions of the book (E 125)."
Engelmann objects to Pears and McGuinness translating the statement
to say that they are "one and the same." Engelmann says, "Surely it
cannot be assumed that this wide-ranging and profound thinker had

meant to say that there is no difference at all between ethics and aesthetics! (E 125)." Unfortunately, Engelmann, though helpful, does not resolve the confusion. Engelmann says that the remark is intended to be passed over in silence, he associates it with a position of Kraus' and finally he says that it "is done in the form of a reminder recalling to the understanding reader an insight which he is _assumed_ to possess in any case (E 125)." Since we don't already share with Wittgenstein the presupposition that ethics and aesthetics are one, the meaning of the remark remains unclear even with Engelmann's clarification. I shall put forward a hypothesis by examining what Wittgenstein might mean by aesthetics.

The most obvious meaning of aesthetics would be something like "theory of art." This meaning is unsatisfactory. First of all, Wittgenstein establishes connections between ethics and art which appear to be independent of the question of aesthetics. Wittgenstein says:

> The work of art is the object seen _sub specie aeternitatis_; and the good life is the world seen _sub specie aeternitatis_. This is the connection between art and ethics. (NB 83)

This relationship can have little to do with the relationship between ethics and aesthetics since ethics and aesthetics are "transcendental" (cannot be expressed) and art is said to be "a kind of expression" (NB 83) and good art "complete expression" (NB 83). Secondly, the remark "ethics and aesthetics are one" does not occur within the context of any reference to art. Rather, it is associated with Wittgenstein's concerns about the structure of the world. In the _Notebooks_ it comes within the context of the remark that "ethics must be a

condition of the world, like logic (NB 77)." This context suggests
that aesthetics may have more to do with logic than art. Engelmann
concurs on this point calling the relationship of ethics to aesthetics
and logic a fundamental connection (E 125). Thus, to construe the
remark "ethics and aesthetics are one" in a narrow sense referring
only to "art" or "theory of art" seems inadequate. It would make
more sense to expect aesthetics to mean something more Kantian or
Kierkegaardian, either a theory of perception or a level of existence.

For Wittgenstein to use the word "aesthetics" in an older sense
(theory of perception) without clearly distinguishing between it and
the modern sense (theory of art) seems to us today to be very untidy;
however, this was not the case at the turn of the century. There was
a controversy between Kant and Baumgartner, the father of modern
aesthetics in the nineteenth century, over whether aesthetics was
the science of perception or the science of artistic perception. This
issue had not been resolved at the time Wittgenstein wrote the Note-
books. George Santayana's The Sense of Beauty written in 1896 dis-
tinguishes between these two meanings and argues persuasively for the
narrow artistic definition.[1] In 1922 Eduard Spranger in his book
Lebensformen (from which Wittgenstein took the term "forms of life")
still speaks of aesthetics in a way which implies both a broad and a
narrow sense. Spranger says, "Aesthetic significance consists in the
impression-expression character of a sensible concrete phenomenon."[2]

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[1]George Santayana, The Sense of Beauty (New York: Dover Publi-
cations, Inc., 1955), p. 4.

[2]Eduard Spranger, Types of Men, trans. by Paul J. W. Pigors
(Halle: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1928), p. 37.

While this definition can be applied to art, it is not so narrow that it applies only to art. Spranger also informs his readers that "it is customary, especially among the followers of Kant, to rank the moral with the logical and the aesthetic."[1] It is not, therefore, unusual that Wittgenstein associates ethics with aesthetics. Wittgenstein in doing so could easily be reflecting the philosophical doctrines and terminological usage of his time.

We have already noted a strong connection between Kantian and Wittgensteinean transcendental philosophy. The evidence for this connection includes Wittgenstein's search for transcendental limits, his attempt at saving both ethics and science, and specifically his belated adherence to Kant's distinction between "transcendent" and "transcendental." A Kantian interpretation of the remark "ethics and aesthetics are one" is not conclusive but is the most interesting one. If aesthetics is taken in the broad sense in the Tractatus, then the doctrine of silence, that some things can only be shown but not said, could be taken as a doctrine of aesthetics. Ethics, as something which can be shown but not said, would in this sense fall under the scope of aesthetics. Ethics would be a matter of perception or aesthetics. More support for this interpretation will be given indirectly in my interpretation of Wittgenstein as a perceptual analyst in Part III.

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[1] Ibid., p. 249.

Fact and Value

Wittgenstein throughout his early philosophical period maintained a radical separation of fact and value. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein writes:

> The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and every-thing happens as it does happen: in it no value exists--and if it did exist, it would have no value. (TLP 6.41)

In the lecture on ethics Wittgenstein says:

> Suppose one of you were an omniscient person and there-fore knew all the movements of all the bodies in the world dead or alive and that he also knew all the states of minds of all human beings that ever lived, and suppose this man wrote all he knew in a big book, then this book would contain the whole description of the world; and what I want to say is, that this book would contain nothing that we would call an ethical judgment or anything that would logically imply such a judgment. It would of course contain all relative judgments of value and all true scientific propositions and in fact all true propositions that can be made. But all the facts described would, as it were, stand on the same level. There are no propositions which, in any absolute sense, are sublime, important, or trivial. Now perhaps some of you will agree to that and be reminded of Ham-let's words: "Nothing is either good or bad, but thinking makes it so." But this again could lead to a misunderstanding. What Hamlet says seems to imply that good and bad, though not qualities of the world outside us, are attributes of our states of mind. But what I mean is that a state of mind, so far as we mean by that a fact which we can describe, is in no ethical sense good or bad. If for instance in our world-book we read the description of a murder with all its details physical and psychological, the mere description of these facts will contain nothing which we could call an ethical proposi-tion. The murder will be on exactly the same level as any other event, for instance the falling of a stone. Certaintly the reading of this description might cause us pain or rage or any other emotion, or we might read about the pain or rage caused by this murder in other people when they heard it, but there will simply be facts, facts, and facts but no Ethics. (LE 6-7)

In <u>Wiener Kreis</u> Wittgenstein says:

> Everything which I describe is in the world. In a com-
> plete description of the world a sentence of ethics never
> occurs, also if I describe a murder. The ethical is not
> a state of affairs. (WWK 93)

In all three of the statements above, there is a complete separation
of fact and value. The dividing point is the world. If what is being
described is in the world, psychologically or physically, then it is
fact and not value. If it is value, then it is outside the world and
it cannot be described at all (since only facts can be described).
Wittgenstein is careful not to draw his distinction in terms of mind
and matter. The psychological and the physical are both fact and not
value.

Wittgenstein's remark in the <u>Tractatus</u> that if there is value in
the world, then it would have no value (TLP 6.41) may at first seem
puzzling. If the remark can be taken as a criticism of Moore's ethical
position, however, then the confusion disappears. Moore maintained
that objects in the world in addition to natural properties, such as
red and heavy, etc., also have non-natural properties such as good or
bad. This view makes value a part of the world as properties of objects
in the world. Wittgenstein's position in the <u>Tractatus</u> provides no
room for such value properties. All properties (including value pro-
perties) are factual since they are in the world. Wittgenstein gives
the following argument for his position.

> If there is any value that does have value, it
> must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and
> is the case. For all that happens and is the case is
> accidental.
> What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within
> the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental.
> It must lie outside the world. (TLP 6.41)

Wittgenstein considers all facts (what happens and what is the case) to be accidental or contingent. For Wittgenstein, value, as he is using the term, signifies something which is non-accidental--i.e., unchanging, eternal, permanent, absolute. A Moorean value cannot fit Wittgenstein's conception of value since the fact that the value is in the world as a property of an object makes it accidental (the very opposite of Wittgenstein's conception of value).

In the lecture on ethics Wittgenstein recognizes a specific sense in which value is present in the world. Wittgenstein distinguishes between absolute and relative value. Absolute value is outside of the world and beyond language. At most it can only be metaphorically represented in language. Relative value which he also calls trivial value is in the world and can be expressed in language. In the relative sense something is said to be good when it meets a certain predetermined standard (LE 5). Such values, however, according to Wittgenstein, are merely disguised facts. He says:

> Every judgment of relative value is a mere statement
> of facts and can therefore be put in such a form that
> it loses all the appearance of a judgment of value:
> Instead of saying "This is the right way to Granchester,"
> I could equally well have said, "This is the right way
> you have to go if you want to get to Granchester in the
> shortest time"; "This man is a good runner" simply means
> that he runs a certain number of miles in a certain num-
> ber of minutes, etc. (LE 5-6)

Wittgenstein is not saying that one particular standard can be given for good or right--that is, that good always means being able to run so many miles in so many minutes. Wittgenstein will certainly permit other standards for other kinds of races and that is what is meant by the "etc." at the end of the explanation. The point Wittgenstein is

making is that saying "he is a good runner" is a shorthand way of making the assertion that the runner is able to perform at a predetermined level of competence. The assertion that the runner performs at this level is a statement of fact. Although such translation is not suggested in the Tractatus, it is a possible way in which Wittgenstein could have expanded his remarks in the Tractatus that value in the world could have no value. Wittgenstein's treatment of relative value is consistent with his position in the Tractatus even though he might not have held the position on relative value at that time.

The Self and the World

The distinction between value and fact is supported by a complicated and somewhat incomplete and confused metaphysical account of the relation of the self and the world. The world is that of which facts are predicated. The world is "all that is the case (TLP 1)" and this means "the totality of the facts, not things (TLP 1.1)." The self is a transcendental or metaphysical entity as opposed to a phenomenal entity.[1] The transcendental self is Kantian in that it is used to provide a place for ethics. Ethical attributes are properly predicated of the transcendental self. It is not Kantian in that only the transcendental self, and not a noumenal world, is presupposed and the transcendental self is not an exact correlate of the phenomenal self. The phenomenal self is part of the world and the world, with the phenomenal self as only a small part of this totality, parallels the transcendental self.

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[1]For a fuller account of this distinction than will be presented here see Jeremy Walker, "Wittgenstein's Early Theory of Will: An Analysis," Idealistic Studies, III (May, 1973), pp. 179-205.

Wittgenstein obscures his position with an enormous amount of terminology most of which refers to the transcendental self. Wittgenstein does not use the term "self." The German word is "ich" which is translated variously as "I," "self," and "ego." He also does not use the term "transcendental self" using "philosophical I" and "metaphysical subject" instead. The basic distinction between the transcendental self and the phenomenal self is made in the following paragraph found in both the Tractatus and the Notebooks.

> The philosophical I is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world--not a part of it. (TLP 5.641)

In this paragraph Wittgenstein separates the philosophical I or the metaphysical subject from the human being, human body and the human soul. The former are the transcendental self and the latter the phenomenal self in various forms. Wittgenstein makes clear in this paragraph that it is the phenomenal self with which psychology deals. In the Notebooks it is stated slightly differently. There it is said that the human souls, human being, or human body is the entity with psychological properties (NB 82). Combining the two versions we may say that the entity which possesses psychological properties and with which psychology deals is a phenomenal self. (In the paragraph "human being," "human body," and "human soul" are alternative names for the same entity since the terms are connected by "or" and in an ordinary sense all can be said to possess psychological properties.) The distinction between transcendental and phenomenal is also made in one other place. Near the end of the Tractatus Wittgenstein writes:

It is impossible to speak about the will in so far
as it is the subject of ethical attributes.
And the will as a phenomenon is of interest only
to psychology. (TLP 6.423)

This paragraph is especially useful in clarifying the distinction be-

cause it uses the word "phenomenon" and associates it with an entity,

here called "will," with which psychology deals. The subject of

ethical attributes is neither a phenomenon nor a subject of psychology.

The relation between the transcendental self and the transcen-

dental will is unclear. Perhaps they are the same or perhaps one is a

condition for the other. Wittgenstein is ambiguous. For the purposes

of this summary of Wittgenstein's remarks I shall consider as an

equivalent term for transcendental self any term which is said to re-

present "the bearer of good and evil," "the bearer of ethics," "the

bearer of ethical properties," or is said to be "good or evil." Here

are the pertinent remarks.

...my will is good or evil. (NB 73)
I will call "will" first and foremost the bearer
of good and evil. (NB 76)
Good and evil only enter through the subject.
(NB 79)
...it is not the world of Idea that is either
good or evil; but the willing subject. (NB 79)
...good and evil are predicates of the subject,
not properties in the world. (NB 79)
If the will did not exist, neither would there
be the centre of the world, which we call the I, and
which is the bearer of ethics. (NB 80)
What is good and evil is essentially the I, not
the world. (NB 80)
It is impossible to speak of the will in so far
as it is the subject of ethical attributes. (TLP 6.423)

On the basis of these remarks and the alleged fundamental connection

of the terms used in them with value, the following terms may be said

to be alternate terms for the transcendental self: "will," "subject,"

"willing subject," and "the I." One remark seems to suggest that the will is a condition for the I or subject (NB 80), and that hence they are separate; however, the assertion that the will is "first and foremost the bearer of good and evil (NB 76)" and the claim that "good and evil enter only through the subject (NB 79)" suggest a narrowness in the use of good and evil that might well be contradictory if the will and subject are not the same thing.

In the list of synonyms the term "willing subject" appears. Wittgenstein distinguishes this willing subject from other sorts of subjects and this separation also reinforces the distinction between transcendental and phenomenal. Wittgenstein says, "The thinking subject is surely mere illusion. But the willing subject exists (NB 80)." Similarly, he says, "It is true that the knowing subject is not in the world, that there is no knowing subject (NB 86)." There are even grounds for believing that Wittgenstein would dismiss a wanting subject since wanting is treated as a form of thinking in the Notebooks (NB 77). In the Tractatus he writes:

> There is no such thing as the subject that thinks
> or entertains ideas.
> If I wrote a book called The World as I found it,
> I should have to include a report on my body, and should
> have to say which parts were subordinate to my will, and
> which were not, etc., this being a method of isolating
> the subject, or rather showing that in an important
> sense there is no subject; for it alone could not be
> mentioned in that book. (TLP 5.631)

The remarks given here are easily open to misinterpretation. One might incorrectly suppose that the thinking subject must be the transcendental self since the remark in the Tractatus says that the thinking subject is not in the world. This interpretation would create a contradiction

since we know that the willing subject is the transcendental self and the willing subject is distinguished from the thinking subject in the Notebooks. The answer is that the emphasis is at all times on the term "subject." The term refers only to the transcendental self outside the world and not to the phenomenal self in the world. In the Notebooks Wittgenstein makes this plain by saying that "the subject is not a part of the world but a presupposition of its existence (NB 79)." Thinking, however, continues to be considered a part of the world. It is not a property of the subject. Wittgenstein makes this point in another remark in the Notebooks. He writes, "Is thought a kind of experience? All experience is world and does not need a subject (NB 89)." Thinking remains as an experience in the world. It is not an experience of a subject (a presupposition of the world's existence which does not have experiences), but rather of a human being, human body or human will. With this separation of subject from world established, it is possible to give a simple account of Wittgenstein's remarks that only a willing subject and not a knowing or thinking (or wanting) subject exists. Knowing, thinking and wanting are experienced as phenomena of the world and belong to a phenomenal world and a phenomenal self (the human being, human body, human will). They exist phenomenally but not transcendentally. Only the will exists transcendentally as the willing subject. "Will" does exist both phenomenally (as human will) and transcendentally as a willing subject; however, since wanting is considered thinking to Wittgenstein, the human will in so far as it is appetites and desires will have nothing in common with its transcendental counterpart.

At this point, some characterization of the transcendental self should be attempted. The following may be said: (1) it is not alive, (2) it is not an object and cannot be objectified, (3) it is the boundary of the world, and (4) it is powerless to affect the world. I shall move through these one at a time citing appropriate references.

The transcendental self is not alive because life is part of the phenomenal world. Wittgenstein makes this point in a lengthy remark to himself in the Notebooks about whether a living person is required for ethics to exist. He writes:

> Can there be any ethics if there is no living being but myself?
> If ethics is supposed to be something fundamental, there can.
> If I am right, then it is not sufficient for the ethical judgment that a world is given.
> Then the world itself is neither good nor evil. For it must be all one, as far as concerns the existence of ethics, whether there is living matter in the world or not. And it is clear that a world in which there is only dead matter is in itself neither good nor evil, so even the world of living things can in itself be neither good nor evil. (NB 79)

The paragraph begins with the question of whether any living being besides Wittgenstein himself is necessary for ethics and concludes that the existence of living matter does not concern the existence of ethics at all. This conclusion is not surprising in view of Wittgenstein's remark that "the world and life are one (TLP 5.621)." If the world has nothing to do with ethics, and the world is life, then life has nothing to do with ethics either. The same sort of point is also made in terms of what Wittgenstein calls his psycho-physical parallelism in the Notebooks (NB 85). The parallelism is the mind/body or mind/matter distinction. The psychological half of the parallelism may be

considered representative of life at least for human beings and most animals. This psychological life is part of the phenomenal world and has nothing to do with the transcendental self.

Wittgenstein's argument that the self is not an object super- ficially follows a Humean style position. Wittgenstein makes the I analogous to an eye and the world to a visual field (TLP 5.633; NB 80). Just as the eye cannot see itself and cannot, therefore, be considered part of the visual field, so, Wittgenstein argues, the I cannot be considered part of the world. Wittgenstein says:

> You say that it is just as it is for the eye and
> the visual field. But you do not actually see the eye.
> And I think that nothing in the visual field
> would enable one to infer that it is seen by an eye.
> (TLP 5.633)

Likewise, nothing in the world sees the I (the transcendental subject) and no fact in the world permits it to be inferred. Wittgenstein concludes:

> The I, the I is what is deeply mysterious!
> The I is not an object.
> I objectively confront objects. But not the I.
> (NB 80)

The argument, though Humean in appearance, is markedly different in that it depends on a conception of subject or the I as a condition of the world existing as a boundary outside of it which is incompatible with Hume's position. It is also different from an existential or phenomenological position which maintains that although the self is not a phenomenal "object", it is still phenomena worthy of attention on its own terms. Wittgenstein's notion of subject as exclusively transcen- dental does not permit such a conclusion.

Wittgenstein maintains that the subject is a boundary of the world. As a boundary of the world, he further asserts, it is not itself part of the world but something outside of it. This means that it is a transcendental or metaphysical entity. The subject as a boundary appears to have two purposes: (1) to provide a metaphysical backdrop for the world and (2) to provide a place for ethical attributes. In the first sense, the subject seems to be a sort of transcendental container for the world. It is essential to the world in that "the subject is not a part of the world but a presupposition of its existence (NB 79)." Wittgenstein, however, seems to have a limited interest in the self in this sense for, if he had really wanted a full-blown conceptual-metaphysical support for the world we would probably have developed something more like a noumenal world with things-in-themselves supporting particular physical objects in the world. Wittgenstein's psycho-physical conception of the phenomenal world seems to settle these sorts of problems for both living and dead matter without reference to the Kantian noumenal world. The subject is also not the equivalent of a Kantian noumenal will. Since the transcendental will is not parallel to the phenomenal human will, the transcendental realm is not expected to fulfill Kantian type supportive functions for the phenomenal will. Thus, the primary purpose of the self seems to be the second sense. Wittgenstein speaks of ethical properties, attributes and predicates in this way in a number of remarks (TLP 6.423; NB 73, 76, 79-80). In this respect Wittgenstein's transcendental self serves as a pin cushion for ethical attributes. Ethical attributes cannot be attributed to the world. Instead, the transcendental subject

provides the means of tacking these predicates onto the metaphysical structure of the world rather than the world itself. Even happiness and unhappiness can be predicated of the transcendental self in this way (NB 79).

To correctly understand what Wittgenstein means by the subject as a boundary, care must be taken to separate the sense in which the subject is the boundary of the world and the sense in which language is the boundary of the world. Wittgenstein says in a famous remark: "The limits of my language means the limits of my world (TLP 5.6)." The limits or boundaries of the world cannot be the same kind of boundary as the subject's boundary because the subject's boundary is a transcendental boundary and language is not transcendental. Language is the medium, or at least one of the mediums for thought, and thought, it will be remembered, is in the world (NB 89). Furthermore, Wittgenstein says early in the Tractatus that "everyday language is part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it (TLP 4.002)." As a part of the human organism which is a phenomenal being, language must also be phenomenal (TLP 5.641; 6.423). This may seem at first in conflict with the claim that logic is transcendental. Logic is said to be transcendental (TLP 6.13) but no similar claim is made for language. Logic and language are not equivalent. Although it may seem strange to have both transcendental and phenomenal boundaries, there is, nevertheless, a place for both the subject and language as limits. The two kinds of limits complement each other. The subject is a transcendental-metaphysical limit with the liability that, according to Wittgenstein's theory, it cannot be spoken about. By being transcendental,

it is beyond language and is therefore inexpressible. Limits in terms of language are not expressible either as such but, according to Wittgenstein's doctrine of saying and showing, they can be shown. Wittgenstein says, "A proposition shows its sense (TLP 4.022)" and "What can be shown, cannot be said (TLP 4.1212)." This is what Wittgenstein meant in his letter to von Ficker about mapping the limits from within (vF 35). Language does not say what the limits are but shows them. The limits of language display the transcendental limits which would otherwise be inexpressible and unshowable.

In looking at this relationship between the limits of the subject and the limits of language one cannot help but admire the mental and intellectual gymnastics which permitted its creation; however, in other respects the parallel between language and the subject is less commendable and deserves criticism. Wittgenstein follows out his relationship between the two to the point that the subject appears to become a transcendental substitute for language as far as ethics is concerned. When Wittgenstein speaks of good and evil as predicates of the subject (NB 79), he certainly has stretched the durability of the relationship to the breaking point. The conclusion that a transcendental subject can have predicates like good and evil (and happiness and unhappiness) while subjects of sentences cannot seems a strange and even indefensible view in the mid-twentieth century.

Another problematic area in Wittgenstein's conception of world limits is his remark that "I am my world. (The microcosm.) (TLP 5.63)." This remark is essential to establishing a parallelism between the transcendental and phenomenal worlds. Since Wittgenstein has rejected

a parallelism between the transcendental self and the human being, he needs a conception of the world as self in order to tie his mysticism to the transcendental. These remarks, however, have been mistakenly considered an endorsement of some form of solipsism. Wittgenstein writes in the Tractatus:

> The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which I alone understand) mean the limits of my world.
> (TLP 5.62)

Wittgenstein prefaces this paragraph with a remark that "what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest (TLP 5.62)." These remarks have suggested to some scholars that Wittgenstein was embracing some kind of solipsism; however, in the Notebooks the fuller expansion of these remarks appears to be an attack on solipsism. Wittgenstein's remarks there are of value for our purposes because he not only distinguishes himself from solipsism but also discusses an additional conception of the relation of world and will, the "world-will", which he appears to commend as a viable conception at some higher level. The argument is given in its entirety between NB 82 and NB 85. Wittgenstein maintains that the solipsist confuses the transcendental and phenomenal selves. Wittgenstein says:

> The philosophical I is not the human being, not the human body or the human soul with psychological properties, but the metaphysical subject, the boundary (not a part) of the world. The human body, however, my body in particular, is a part of the world among others, among animals, plants, stones, etc., etc.
> Whoever realizes this will not want to procure a pre-eminent place for his own body or for the human body.
> He will regard humans and animals quite naively as objects which are similar and which belong together.
> (NB 82)

These paragraphs are obviously a criticism of a solipsist who wants to give his own body a special status above other objects in the world. This is one half of the solipsist's mistake. The other half is the identification of this particular human body with the transcendental self. Since Wittgenstein unlike Kant does not consider the transcendental self to parallel the human body, placing it rather in opposition to the totality of the world, the transcendental self (at least according to Wittgenstein) has little to offer the solipsist if he correctly understands what the transcendental self is. Wittgenstein suggests this in the following remark:

> Here we can see that solipsism coincides with pure realism, if it is strictly thought out.
> The I of the solipsist shrinks to an extensionless point and what remains is the reality co-ordinate with it. (NB 82)

Such a co-ordinate reality may be adequate for Wittgenstein, who only wishes to conceptualize the transcendental self as a presupposition for the existence of the world and as the bearer of ethics, but it is not enough for the solipsist who wants it as an additional element of his world-self. Wittgenstein gives both sides of his argument in the following remark expanding its implications to idealism as well as solipsism.

> This is the way I have travelled: Idealism singles men out from the world as unique, solipsism singles me alone out, and at last I see that I too belong with the rest of the world, and so on the one side nothing is left over, and on the other side, as unique, the world. In this way idealism leads to realism if it is strictly thought out. (NB 85)

The "nothing" which is left over on one side is the transcendental self. This self is inadequate for the solipsist's purposes. The remainder is

the world. This is more than the solipsist wants. According to Witt-
genstein, if the solipsist identifies himself with the world as a
world-will, then he cannot give special status to his own body, but
must accept that the spirit of the snake, lion, elephant, fly and wasp
is just as much his "self" as the particular human body he is pheno-
menologically housed in (NB 85). Although Wittgenstein considers this
conception of a world-will unusuable for the solipsist, he shows some
sympathy for it himself. He says:

> And in this sense I can also speak of a will that
> is common to the whole world.
> But this will is in a higher sense my will. As
> my idea is the world, in the same way my will is the
> world-will. (NB 85)

It may well be this world-will which expresses the mystical. The mysti-
cal is defined in the Tractatus as feeling the world as a limited whole
(TLP 6.45). The world-will may, therefore, be an essential intermediate
between the transcendental and human wills. But this move is itself
not without problems. It is not clear whether the world-will is an al-
ternative to Wittgenstein's conception of transcendental self versus
the world or whether it is just another level. If the former, it would
do serious damage to Wittgenstein's distinctions between self and world
and fact and value in the event that it opened the door to ethical pre-
dication within the world. It may be in this way that happiness be-
comes a predicate of both the transcendental and phenomal worlds.

Even dispensing with the problem of the world-will, there is still
another problem with the transcendental self which defies unravelling.
This is the problem of how the transcendental self affects the world.
Early in his remarks in the Notebooks Wittgenstein says "that my will

penetrates the world (NB 73)." How it penetrates is never explained.
Instead, Wittgenstein begins discussing the powerlessness of the will.
He writes:

> I cannot bend the happenings of the world to my
> will: I am completely powerless.
> I can only make myself independent of the world--
> and so in a certain sense master it--by renouncing any
> influence on happenings.
> The world is independent of my will.
> Even if everything that we want were to happen,
> this would still only be, so to speak, a grace of fate,
> for what would guarantee it is not any logical connexion
> between will and world, and we could not in turn will the
> supposed physical connexion.
> If good or evil willing affects the world it can
> only affect the boundaries of the world, not the facts,
> what cannot be portrayed by language, but can only be
> shown in language.
> In short, it must make the world a wholly dif-
> ferent one.
> The world must, so to speak, wax or wane as a whole.
> As if by accession or loss of meaning. (NB 73)

Wittgenstein argues that the will is powerless because there is no
logical connection to guarantee a physical connection. As a result,
the will cannot affect the facts of the world. When it affects the
world at all (through willing good or evil) Wittgenstein says, the will
must affect the whole of the world. In doing so, the will will create
completely different worlds and these worlds will be changing into one
another as if waxing and waning. This picture of the will's effect on
the world seems consistent at first. Since the transcendental self is
in opposition to the whole world and not just a phenomenal human self,
it seems natural that the transcendental self would affect the whole
of the world and not just a part. It also seems alright to say that
the transcendental will cannot affect the facts of the world especially
if it is conceded that the human body and human will as part of the

world can do so. The difficulty with the view can be found in the re-
mark that the transcendental self must renounce the world and make it-
self independent of it. This remark seems strange for an entity which
is supposed to be a boundary of the world and a bearer of ethical
attributes. It sounds more like the sort of thing that a phenomenal
self might try to do, not a transcendental self of the kind Wittgen-
stein has spoken of so far. Furthermore, it is puzzling to try to
determine what sort of action the will is performing when it renounces
the world's influence. Wittgenstein makes it clear elsewhere that an
act of will is not an experience, a part of the phenomenal world
(NB 89), but rather an attitude (NB 87). Wittgenstein says:

> It is clear, so to speak, that we need a foothold
> for the will in the world.
> The will is an attitude of the subject to the
> world.
> The subject is the willing subject. (NB 87)

This remark in its effort to provide a foothold for the transcendental
will appears to blur the separation of the transcendental will from the
phenomenal will. A phenomenal will seems capable of an attitude but
the idea of a transcendental will having an attitude seems incongruent
in the light of the limited metaphysical background Wittgenstein
develops for it. Yet, Wittgenstein seems to need a connection between
the transcendental and phenomenal wills if he is to be able to give
any account of ethical action. According to Wittgenstein's position,
the phenomenal will as part of the world can have nothing to do with
the ethical and the transcendental will can have nothing to do with
actions and events in the world. As we shall see in the final section
of this chapter, the ethical actions Wittgenstein prescribes

inconsistently lend themselves more to a phenomenal and psychological interpretation than a transcendental one.

Ethical Action

Wittgenstein does not provide any specific normative ethical principles in his remarks. In one place in the Notebooks he states that such ethical principles may have the opposite effect for which they are intended. He says, "When a general ethical law of the form 'Thou shalt...' is set up, the first thought is: Suppose I do not do it? (NB 78)." At most Wittgenstein endorses only one ethical impera- tive and that is to live happily: "It seems one can't say anything more than: Live happily! (NB 78)." Wittgenstein finds it hard to ex- plain what happiness is. He says that it is "fulfilling the purpose of life" and equates it with contentment (NB 73). He calls it "agree- ment with the world (NB 75)." It is difficult to attain: "Man cannot make himself happy without more ado (NB 76)." It is not the result of consequences of actions nor is it an event though it is involved in action (NB 78). Wittgenstein says that it comes when the problem of life disappears: "The solution of the problem of life is to be seen in the disappearance of this problem (NB 74)." How the problem of life disappears cannot be explained as is clear from the fact that "men to whom the meaning of life had become clear could not say what this meaning consisted in (NB 74)." The solution involves intellectually giving up philosophical problems as the conclusion of the Tractatus attests. The solution, however, is not only intellectual but also emotional. The mystical which one comes to see and experience is a mystical feeling (0 36-37). Emotionally, the problem of life is solved

by "living in eternity and not in time (NB 74)." By eternity, Wittgenstein means, "not infinite temporal duration but nontemporarily" and "a man lives eternally if he lives in the present (NB 75)." Living out of time is required for happiness: "Only a man who lives not in time but in the present is happy (NB 74)." Being happy also requires overcoming fear: "A man who is happy must have no fear. Not even in face of death (NB 74)." Death need not be feared because "for life in the present there is no death (NB 75)." If a person fears death then he is leading a bad life. Wittgenstein says, "Fear in the face of death is the best sign of a false, i.e. a bad life (NB 75)." Living in the present and not fearing come together: "Whoever lives in the present lives without fear and hope (NB 76)."

In looking at these remarks, it is clear that Wittgenstein is not advocating the performance of particular actions in the world but rather the attainment of a particular mental state of happiness and contentment. In this mental state one no longer sees problems in life, has no sense of the duration of time, and has no feelings of fear or hope. This state also applies to the transcendental self and to the whole of the world. Wittgenstein says:

> The world of the happy is a different world
> from that of the unhappy.
> The world of the happy is a happy world.
> (NB 78)

It is not the individual human alone who is happy but the entire world. In this sense the happiness apparently belongs to the world-will. From the standpoint of the transcendental self, the happiness is transcendental for "the willing subject would have to be happy or unhappy, and happiness and unhappiness could not be part of the world (NB 79)."

Transcendentally, the emergence of happiness is by means of good and evil willing and the resultant waxing and waning of the world as a whole (NB 73). Phenomenally, Wittgenstein suggests in one place it is a matter of perception. He remarks:

> And it is also clear that the world of the happy is a
> different world from the world of the unhappy.
> Is seeing an activity? (NB 77)

The evidence is slight, but it is difficult not to think of the happiness Wittgenstein is talking about in the world as something not too different from the emergence and disappearance of the duck and the rabbit in the duck-rabbit configuration (PI II 194). Such a shifting, which would color the world either happy or unhappy, seems to give some order to these cryptic remarks. If this is so, then we have a phenomenal experience happiness controlled in a Gestalt like manner by a transcendental self. The discussion of perception in Part III may convince some readers that this is what Wittgenstein had in mind.

CHAPTER III

ETHICS: 1931-1951

Introduction

In the last chapter Wittgenstein's early ethical viewpoint was examined through a number of sections discussing various aspects of Wittgenstein's early ethical remarks. From these it could be seen that Wittgenstein held a transcendental ethical position. He distinguished between a transcendental self with ethical attributes and a phenomenal world full of facts and void of value. This position permitted a metaphysical basis for a radical distinction between fact and value, a distinction which was being sought by Wittgenstein and many of his Viennese intellectual friends. Ethics was characterized as "the thrust against the limits of language." It was identified with a mysticism which while denying the linguistic expression of value permitted emotional expression of it in terms of a happiness attributed to both the transcendental self and the world. In this chapter Wittgenstein's ethical viewpoint shall be examined in terms of his later remarks. We shall consider the possibility that the later remarks are compatible with the early ethical position, investigate why Wittgenstein did not develop a linguistically formulatable ethic in his later period, try to determine the relationship of Wittgenstein's ethical viewpoint to his overall philosophical position and look at Wittgenstein's influence on ethical theory.

The Later Remarks

In this section we shall review Wittgenstein's later ethical re-
marks. Because Wittgenstein had almost nothing to say about ethics in
his later period, it will be difficult to draw many conclusions from
them. Wittgenstein, for the most part, preferred to speak about
aesthetics rather than ethics. He frequently claimed, however, that
ethics could be handled in a way similar to aesthetics with only a few
changes, although he did not always specify what these changes were.
Ethical remarks and quasi-ethical remarks are found only in Moore's
lecture notes, in Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology
and Religious Belief, notes on conversations with Rush Rhees, and in
the Investigations. Wittgenstein's lecture on ethics, though given in
1929 or 1930, will be considered a transitional phase in Wittgenstein's
ethical viewpoint, although it will not be discussed here since it has
already been incorporated into the early position. It will, neverthe-
less, play a pivotal role in the discussion of continuity in Wittgen-
stein's ethical viewpoint in the next section. This section will be
primarily reportive, leaving major interpretation of the remarks until
the next section.

Moore records that although Wittgenstein said in his lectures at
Cambridge from 1930 to 1933 that he had long wished to speak about the
grammar of ethical expressions, he spoke instead of aesthetics saying,
"Practically everything I say about 'beautiful' applies in a slightly
different way to 'good' (ML III 16)." In addition, Moore reports, these
aesthetics discussions were "mingled in a curious way with criticism

of assumptions which he said were constantly made by Frazer in the

Golden Bough, and also with criticism of Freud (ML III 16)." I shall

quote only those sections which clearly relate to ethics.

Wittgenstein begins his discussion of aesthetics and ethics with

remarks about the meaning of words. Moore writes:

> He introduced his whole discussion of Aesthetics
> by dealing with one problem about the meaning of words,
> with which he said he had not yet dealt. He illustrated
> this problem by the example of the word "game," with re-
> gard to which he said both (1) that, even if there is
> something common to all games, it doesn't follow that
> this is what we mean by calling a particular game a
> "game," and (2) that the reason why we call so many dif-
> ferent activities "games" need not be that there is any-
> thing common to them all, but only that there is "a
> gradual transition" from one use to another, although
> there may be nothing in common between the two ends of
> the series. And he seemed to hold definitely that
> there is nothing in common in our different uses of the
> word "beautiful," saying that we use it "in a hundred
> different games"--that, e.g., the beauty of a face is
> something different from the beauty of a chair or a flower
> or the binding of a book. And of the word "good" he said
> similarly that each different way in which a person, A,
> can convince another, B, that so-and-so is "good" fixes
> the grammar of that discussion"; but that there will be
> "gradual transitions," from one of these meanings to
> another, "which take the place of something in common."
> In the case of "beauty" he said that a difference in
> meaning is shown by the fact that "you can say more" in
> discussing whether the arrangement of flowers in a bed
> is "beautiful" than in discussing whether the smell of
> lilacs is so. (ML III 17)

The point of this paragraph is that the aesthetic and ethical expressions

"beautiful" and "good" involve what Wittgenstein later came to call

family resemblances (PI I 67). Ethical and aesthetic words are said to

derive their meaning from the context of the given conversation. The

meaning of "good" is fixed by the way in which the speaker convinces the

person to whom he is speaking that such-and-such is good. Although all

the different meanings of "good" fixed in this manner may have nothing

in common, Wittgenstein claims that there will be gradual transitions from one meaning to the next. In this manner, there will be common elements between different meanings, even though the meanings at one extreme end of the spectrum may have nothing in common with the meanings at the other extreme. This paragraph is one of the earliest discussions and applications of family resemblance. It is interesting that it first occurs in the context of aesthetics and ethics.

After this discussion of the meaning of "good" and "beautiful," Wittgenstein goes on to distinguish aesthetics and (apparently) ethics from psychology. Wittgenstein is quoted as saying that "the one thing we are not interested in is causal connections, whereas this is the only thing we are interested in in Psychology (ML III 18)." What Wittgenstein is concerned with in aesthetics and ethics is giving reasons, a task which he also says both aesthetics and ethics hold in common with philosophy generally. Moore writes:

> What Aesthetics tries to do, he said, is to give reasons, e.g. for having this word rather than that in a particular place in a poem, or for having this musical phrase rather than that in a particular place in a piece of music. Brahms' reason for rejecting Joachim's suggestion that his Fourth Symphony should be opened by two chords was not that that wouldn't produce the feeling he wanted to produce, but something more like "That isn't what I meant." Reasons, he said, in Aesthetics, are "of the nature of further descriptions": e.g., you can make a person see what Brahms was driving at by showing him lots of different pieces by Brahms, or by comparing him with a contemporary author; and all that Aesthetics does is "to draw your attention to a thing," to "place things side by side." He said that if, by giving "reasons" of this sort, you make another person "see what you see" but it still "doesn't appeal to him," that is "an end" of the discussion; and that what he, Wittgenstein, had "at the back of his mind" was "the idea that aesthetic discussions were like discussions in a court of law," where you try to "clear up the circumstances" of the action

> which is being tried, hoping that in the end what you
> say will "appeal to the judge." And he said that the
> same sort of "reasons" were given, not only in Ethics,
> but also in Philosophy. (ML III 19).

In this paragraph aesthetics, ethics, and philosophy are said to be

engaged in an activity called giving reasons. The giving of reasons

has a special sense for Wittgenstein. It involves drawing one's atten-

tion to something, placing things in a particular order and, by this

means, attempting to make another person "see what you see." Unfor-

tunately, Moore does not tell us enough to see how such reasons would

be applied in ethics. The paragraph, however, will appear more signi-

ficant later in the context of the perceptual matters discussed in

Part III.

Concerning the relationship of philosophy to ethics and aesthetics,

another glimpse of what the relationship involves is given at the end

of Moore's notes in a section in which Wittgenstein discusses his new

philosophical method. Moore writes:

> He did not expressly try to tell us exactly what
> the "new method" which had been found was. But he gave
> some hints as to its nature. He said ... that the "new
> subject" consisted in "something like putting in order
> our notions as to what can be said about the world,"
> and compared this to the tidying up of a room where you
> have to move the same object several times before you
> can get the room really tidy. He said also that we
> were "in a muddle about things," which we had to try to
> clear up; that we had to follow a certain instinct which
> leads us to ask certain questions, though we don't even
> understand what these questions mean; that our asking
> them results from "a vague mental uneasiness," like that
> which leads children to ask "Why?"; and that this uneasi-
> ness can only be cured "either by showing that a particular
> question is not permitted, or by answering it." He also
> said that he was not trying to teach us any new facts:
> that he would only tell us "trivial" things--"things which
> we all know already"; but that the difficult thing was
> to get a "synopsis" of these trivialities, and that our

"intellectual discomfort" can be removed by a synopsis
of many trivialities--that "if we leave out any, we still
have the feeling that something is wrong." In this con-
nection he said it was misleading to say that what we
wanted was an "analysis," since in science to "analyse"
water means to discover some new fact about it. e.g.
that it is composed of oxygen and hydrogen, whereas
in philosophy "we know at the start all the facts we
need to know." I imagine that it was in this respect
that he thought that philosophy was similar to Ethics
and Aesthetics. (ML III 26-27)

This account of the new method of philosophy includes the same sort of

talk about putting things in order already found in the earlier discus-

sion of giving reasons, but some new points are made. A mental uneasi-

ness which causes us to ask "Why?" is mentioned and it is said that

this uneasiness can be dispelled by a synopsis of trivial things. Witt-

genstein considered the use of this synopsis common to philosophy,

aesthetics and ethics, and it was in this respect that he considered

them similar, Moore recounts. Like the remarks on reasons, much of

this account must await the examination of perception in Part III. Some

conclusions will be drawn from them, however, in the next section.

These remarks conclude Moore's account of Wittgenstein's ethical view-

point.

There is no further record of Wittgenstein's views on ethics until

1938. In that year, additional ethical remarks from various lectures

and conversations were recorded by Smythies, Rhees, and Taylor and have

appeared as a small book titled Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics,

Psychology and Religious Belief. Of these remarks, only the first

lecture on aesthetics bears directly on the subject of ethics. Witt-

genstein begins in this lecture by claiming that the words "beautiful"

and "good" are often misused. We tend to treat them more seriously than

they deserve to be. Wittgenstein says, "'Beautiful' (and 'good'--R) is an adjective, so you are inclined to say: 'This has a certain quality, that of being beautiful.' (LC 1)." His eventual point is that the words "beautiful" and "good" are, for the most part, superfluous signs of approval which are nearly always replaced by other more technical terms in any serious discussion.

Wittgenstein begins by saying that a philosophy book ought to be written which would deal with such words as "all," "any," "some," "you," "I," etc., with "beautiful" and "good" having a separate chapter (LC 1). Such an analysis, he says, would treat language as a tool chest containing many different words, which, like different tools, have different uses. These different uses are found by studying actual linguistic practice and by looking to see how words are learned. Wittgenstein gives the following example which reveals much about his conception of words like "good" and "beautiful."

> If you ask yourself how a child learns 'beautiful', 'fine', etc., you find it learns them roughly as interjections. ('Beautiful' is an odd word to talk about because it's hardly ever used.) A child generally applies a word like 'good' first to food. One that is immensely important in teaching is exaggerated gestures and facial expressions. The word is taught as a substitute for a facial expression or a gesture. The gestures, tones of voice, etc., in this case are expressions of approval. What makes the word an interjection of approval? It is the game it appears in, not the form of words. (If I had to say what is the main mistake made by philosophers of the present generation, including Moore, I would say that it is that when language is looked at, what is looked at is a form of words and not the use made of the forms of words.) Language is a characteristic part of a large group of activities--talking, writing, travelling on a bus, meeting a man, etc. We are concentrating, not on the words "good' or 'beautiful', which are entirely uncharacteristic, generally just subject and predicate ('This is beautiful'), but on the occasions on which they

> are used--on the enormously complicated situation in
> which the aesthetic expression has a place, in which the
> expression itself has almost a negligible place. (LC 2)

Wittgenstein is saying here that an examination of how we learn and

use the words "beautiful" and "good" reveals that they are of little

importance. They are merely interjections which are learned as sub-

stitutes for various expressions and gestures. In most cases they are

only substitutes for expressions of approval. Furthermore, these

words function as substitutes only because human beings have certain

"games" which involve these substitutions. These games are part of a

large group of activities and part of an extremely complicated human

situation. These activities and the human situation are, in fact, more

important in a study of aesthetics and ethics than the particular words

"good" and "beautiful" which in comparison are of negligible value.

Wittgenstein gives a little defense of his position by comparing

how we would learn what is good and fine in a foreign human society and

in a Martian society. He maintains that in the foreign society we

"would look for smiles, gestures, food, toys (LC 2)." On the other

hand, "if you went to Mars and men were spheres with sticks coming out,

you wouldn't know what to look for (LC 2)." Wittgenstein concludes:

"How far this takes us from normal aesthetics (and ethics--T). We don't

start from certain words, but from certain occasions or activities

(LC 3)."

Wittgenstein goes on to assert that in primitive languages (Ger-

man, English, etc.) questions about "beautiful" and "good" do not

arise. Wittgenstein says, "As far as these primitive languages go,

problems about what these words are about, what their real subject is,

(which is called 'beautiful' or 'good'.--R) don't come up at all (LC 3)." They don't come up because in most cases the words drop out of the conversation once the conversation moves beyond the mere voicing of approval. Wittgenstein gives examples in music and poetry. He says:

> It is remarkable that in real life, when aesthetic judgments are made, aesthetic adjectives such as 'beautiful', 'fine', etc., play hardly any role at all. Are aesthetic adjectives used in a musical criticism? You say: "Look at this transition", or ... "The passage here is incoherent". Or you say, in a poetical criticism, ... : "His use of images is precise". The words you use are more akin to 'right' and 'correct' (as these words are used in ordinary speech) than to 'beautiful' and 'lovely'. (LC 3)

In the same vein, Wittgenstein gives an example of how he came to like the poetry of Klopstock. By altering the meter as he read the poems he ceased to regard the poems with "mild boredom" and instead found them intensely interesting (LC 4). Wittgenstein points out that, although he could have said "This is grand," it was not necessary to do so since "when I read these poems I made gestures and facial expressions which were what would be called gestures of approval (LC 4)." In explaining to others the value of the poems Wittgenstein also did not need to use any aesthetic adjectives. He needed only to say, "Look! This is how they should be read (LC 4)." Wittgenstein concludes, "Aesthetic adjectives played hardly any role (LC 4)." The same is true of the cases in which "good" is used in a non-aesthetic context. Wittgenstein says:

> What does a person who knows a good suit say when trying on a suit at the tailor's? "That's the right length", "That's too short", "That's too narrow". Words of approval play no role, although he will look pleased when the coat suits him. Instead of "That's too short" I might say "Look!" or instead of "Right" I might say

> "Leave it as it is". A good cutter may not use any
> words at all, but just make a chalk mark and later
> alter it. How do I show my approval of a suit?
> Chiefly by wearing it often, liking it when it is
> seen, etc. (LC 5)

Thus, according to Wittgenstein, "good" and "beautiful" and other such words need not be the subject of philosophical discussion. Since they drop out the moment one tries to look into specific aesthetic, ethical or non-ethical matters in any detail, they are not serving any significant function in language and are not being applied to anything of adequate significance to warrant serious philosophical attention.

These remarks do not, of course, represent a particularly remarkable ethical or aesthetic theory, but are of great significance in assessing the compatibility of the later ethical remarks with the later philosophical position. The tool chest analogy, the doctrine of meaning as use, and the particular account which Wittgenstein gives of how we learn value words are all common themes of the later philosophy, particularly in the Investigations. The talk of "games" and "activities" also suggests language games and forms of life. Together with Moore's notes, they represent good evidence for saying that Wittgenstein considered ethics, at least on one level, to be compatible with his later work.

Although the remarks in the aesthetics lecture are the last formal remarks on ethics made by Wittgenstein, there are a few remarks from conversations after 1938. Rhees has recorded two conversations he had with Wittgenstein on ethics in the early 1940's. These remarks are included in an article on Wittgenstein's ethics published in the Philosophical Review together with Wittgenstein's lecture on ethics.

The first conversation in 1942 was a discussion about the nature of
real ethical problems. It began with a remark by Wittgenstein that "it
was strange that you could find books on ethics in which there was no
mention of a genuine ethical or moral problem (LE 21)." Rhees sug-
gested talking about whether the killing of Caesar by Brutus was a
noble act. When Wittgenstein replied that this could not be discussed
because it depended on the mental state of Brutus, which could not be
known, Rhees then offered a case in which a doctor must choose between
giving up his cancer research or giving up his wife. With regard to
this example, Wittgenstein produces a lengthy account of what might
pass through the doctor's mind as he makes his decision. Wittgenstein
says:

> "Such a man's attitude will vary at different times.
> Suppose I am his friend, and I say to him, 'Look, you've
> taken this girl out of her home, and now, by God, you've
> got to stick to her.' This would be called taking up an
> ethical attitude. He may reply, 'But what of suffering
> humanity? How can I abandon my research?' In saying this
> he may be making it easy for himself: he wants to carry
> on that work anyway. (I may have reminded him that there
> are others who can carry it on if he gives up.) And he
> may be inclined to view the effect on his wife relatively
> easily: 'It probably won't be fatal for her. She'll get
> over it, probably marry again,' and so on. On the other
> hand it may not be this way. It may be that he has a
> deep love for her. And yet he may think that if he were
> to give up his work he would be no husband for her. That
> is his life, and if he gives that up he will drag her
> down. Here we have all the materials of a tragedy; and
> we could only say: 'Well, God help you.'
> "Whatever he finally does, the way things then
> turn out may affect his attitude. He may say,'Well,
> thank God I left her: it is better all around.' Or may-
> be, 'Thank God I stuck to her.' Or he may not be able to
> say 'thank God' at all, but just the opposite.
> "I want to say that this is the solution of an
> ethical problem.
> "Or rather: it is so with regard to the man who
> does not have an ethics. If he has, say, the Christian

> ethics, then he may say it is absolutely clear: he has
> to stick to her come what may. And then the problem is
> different. It is: how to make the best of this situa-
> tion, what he should do in order to be a decent husband
> in these greatly altered circumstances, and so forth.
> The question 'Should I leave her or not?' is not a pro-
> blem here." (LE 22-23)

This discussion is interesting in the way that it parallels and differs from Sartre's famous example of the Frenchman who must choose whether to stay with his mother or join the Free French Forces.[1] Unlike Sartre, Wittgenstein seems to hold that advice has some value. On the subject of the principles, he seems more opposed to them than Sartre. If the doctor has a set of principles which form an ethic such as a Christian ethic, according to Wittgenstein, his range of choice will be greatly altered and in the light of these principles the circumstances may appear in such a way that there is very little left to decide. This example will be of importance in both Part II and Part III.

In 1945 Rhees also had a conversation with Wittgenstein over whether the term "the right ethics" has any meaning. Wittgenstein said that although most philosophers have always been seeking such a right ethics, he considered the possibility of such an ethic being found ex- tremely unlikely. For Wittgenstein, to say that an ethic is the right ethic amounts to nothing more than making a judgment of value and on the basis of this judgment "adopting" the ethic in question (LE 24). Beyond this, the term makes no sense. He says:

> "If you say there are various systems of ethics you
> are not saying they are all equally right. That means

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[1] Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and the Human Emotions (New York: Citadel Press, 1957), pp. 24-28.

nothing. Just as it would have no meaning to say that each was right from his own standpoint. That would only mean that each judges as he does." (LE 24)

Rhees interprets such remarks to mean that Wittgenstein thought that no ultimate ethical position was possible. Rhees says:

> These samples ... from his later discussions show parallels with his later discussions of language and of logic and mathematics. There is no one system in which you can study in its purity and essence what ethics is. We use the term "ethics" for a variety of systems, and for philosophy this variety is important. Obviously different ethical systems have points in common. There must be grounds for saying that people who follow a particular system are making ethical judgments: that they regard this or that as good, and so forth. But it does not follow that what these people say must be an expression of something more ultimate. (LE 24-25)

According to this viewpoint, the ethical systems of the world are related on the basis of family resemblances and do not necessarily reflect the something higher which Wittgenstein was so concerned with early in his work. Which one is adopted is a matter of birthplace and personal choice. These conversations with Rhees are the last specifically ethical remarks available.

In Wittgenstein's later writings, there is hardly any mention of ethics at all. Early in the Investigations he mentions "good" as an example of a word which has a difficult meaning (PI I 77). Later "good and evil" are mentioned in a list including "houses," "pains," and "anything else you please (PI I 304)." These remarks imply the possibility of linguistically formulatable ethical predicates, and also the difficulties involved in such predicates. With regard to the higher ethics of the early philosophy only one intriguing, but cryptic, remark occurs.

> The results of philosophy are the uncovering of
> one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that
> the understanding has got by running against the limits
> of language. These bumps make us see the value of the
> discovery. (PI I 119)

This is the only remark in the Investigations which provides a link

with the Kierkegaardian ethical thrust against the limits of language

which he had spoken so much of in the 1920's. These remarks are so

brief and cryptic that little can be learned from them.

Continuity

Three different questions may be asked concerning continuity.

(1) Is there continuity between the later ethical remarks and the later

philosophy? (2) Is there continuity between the early and later ethi-

cal remarks? (3) Is there continuity between the early and later

philosophy generally and are the ethical remarks part of this contin-

uity? The author would like to answer all three of these questions af-

firmatively. The first two of these questions will be discussed in

this section. The third will be the subject of Part III.

Beyond any doubt, there is a high degree of continuity between the

later ethical remarks and the later philosophy. Although no important

discussion of ethics appears in the Investigations or in any of the

other major published works of the later period except for two brief

remarks which imply that ethics can be handled in terms of the later

philosophy (PI I 77, 304), Moore's notes, the lecture on ethics, the

aesthetics lecture and Rhees' conversations with Wittgenstein do provide

firm support for continuity. In Moore's notes we find Wittgenstein

dealing with "good" and "beautiful" in terms of family resemblance

(ML III 17). Wittgenstein even begins with the same illustration, the

meaning of the word "game," used in the Investigations (PI I 66). In

Lectures and Conversations (LC 10) and in Rhees' conversations (LE 24-

25) family resemblance also plays a role. In addition, the aesthetics

lecture (LC 1) applies the tool chest analogy (PI I 11) and the doc-

trine of meaning as use (PI I 43) to ethical and aesthetic words.

Finally, the account which Wittgenstein gives of how we learn ethical

and aesthetic words in the aesthetics lecture (LC 2) is the same ac-

count which Wittgenstein gives in the Investigations for sensation words

like "pain" (PI I 244). These lectures and conversations of the 1930's

and 1940's thus show Wittgenstein actively applying the philosophical

approaches of the later philosophy to aesthetics and ethics at a very

early stage in the development of these new ideas. Wittgenstein's de-

cision not to discuss ethics in the Investigations, therefore, cannot

be taken as an indication that there is any incompatibility between

Wittgenstein's later ethical viewpoint and his general philosophical

viewpoint of the later period at least as far as linguistically for-

mulatable ethics is concerned. The same techniques and methods may be

applied to both ethical and non-ethical terms. Whether Wittgenstein

continued to hold a transcendental ethical position, however, is another

question which will be treated as part of the question of continuity

between the early and later ethical remarks. The answer to this ques-

tion, whether yes or no, in no way affects the compatibility of Witt-

genstein's handling of linguistically formulatable ethics and the later

philosophy already demonstrated here.

The question of continuity between the early and later ethical

remarks is more difficult primarily because it involves showing that

Wittgenstein held a transcendental ethical position in his later philo-
sophical period. There are many difficulties in doing so. We have
only one remark in the Investigations suggesting the earlier ethical
position (PI I 119). There Wittgenstein speaks of the thrust against
the limits of language, a phrase which he had used earlier on many
occasions to characterize his transcendental ethical position; however,
since Wittgenstein also characterized religion in the same way in the
earlier period, the remark is ambiguous and cannot serve as a conclusive
link between his early and later ethical periods. There are some in-
dications that Wittgenstein was attempting to convey something to his
students beyond what he was actually teaching similar to the way in
which the Tractatus was supposed to show something beyond and completely
different from its subject matter. When Wittgenstein was told by Mal-
colm that the British national character was such that no Englishman
could ever attempt to assassinate Hitler, Wittgenstein replied that
Malcolm was obviously not learning anything from the philosophical
training Wittgenstein was giving him (MM 32-33) and Wittgenstein con-
tinued to hold this conversation against Malcolm for six years until
Malcolm finally apologized (MM 40-41). This story could be taken as an
indication that Wittgenstein expected his students to draw conclusions
on vastly different subjects from those which he was actually teaching
and that he was, therefore, using one sort of thing to reveal other
things which were radically dissimilar. The intensity with which Witt-
genstein maintained his grudge would seem to suggest that Wittgenstein
considered Malcolm's position on English character to have a fundamental
relationship to what Wittgenstein was unsuccessfully trying to teach;

however, once again, the incident could merely indicate that Wittgenstein didn't think Malcolm had much common sense. In Wittgenstein's conversation with Rhees in 1945 Wittgenstein stressed that it did not follow that any ethical system expressed "something more ultimate (LE 24-25)." Wittgenstein may have had in mind here the "what is higher" of the early period; however, he might mean that there is nothing more ultimate. I doubt that the latter is the case, but the comment is too brief to be made the basis of a claim of continuity between an early and later transcendental ethic.

We have the opinion of Toulmin, a former student of Wittgenstein, who feels that a division between philosophical and ethical matters of the type found in the early philosophy existed in Wittgenstein's later work. Toulmin writes:

> ... it was more pardonable to overlook the complete unity of Wittgenstein's thought, both philosophical and "ethical." During the 1940's, for example, Wittgenstein himself drew a fairly sharp line between the professional, conceptual questions he discussed in his formal seminars and the deeper, more personal topics he used to raise during his "At Homes." The connections between the two aspects of his thought are fully apparent only now, thanks to the letters and memoir of Paul Engelmann. These resolve some residual puzzles within his formal philosophical writings, and help one to understand his sympathy for men like Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and St. Augustine--a sympathy which would have been surprising in the anti-metaphysical, positivistic "Ludwig Wittgenstein" of popular reputation.[1]

This testimony by Toulmin, however, cannot be considered proof of continuity between the early and later ethics since it is not based on

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[1]Stephen Toulmin, "Ludwig Wittgenstein," Encounter, LXVII (January, 1969), p. 60.

textual evidence but only on Toulmin's insight derived from reading Engelmann's memoir.

There are some strong elements of continuity, but even they are not conclusive. For one thing, Wittgenstein considered himself to be involved in problem-dissolving throughout his entire career. It appears in the Notebooks (NB 74), the Tractatus (TLP 6.521), in Moore's notes (ML III 26-27), in the Blue Book (BL 46), and in the Investigations (PI I 133). Secondly, the dissolving rather than solving is connected with the overcoming of emotional discomfort (NB 74-76; ML III 26-27; BL 26, 59; PI I 133, 412). The urge to thrust against the limits of language may be this same emotional discomfort. It may also be the torment which makes us continue doing philosophy (PI I 133) and want to say something metaphysical (TLP 6.53) which the Investigations and the Tractatus respectively are aimed at quelling. Nevertheless, only the references in the Notebooks are clearly ethical. The others seem to be philosophical rather than ethical. They are not, therefore, conclusive proof of continuity either, but, along with the other points just discussed, they are very suggestive of continuity.

I do not think that a strong case for continuity between the early and later ethical remarks can be made in any direct manner. Wittgenstein does not unmistakably and unambiguously endorse his early ethical doctrines in the later years of his life. Yet, there is a high degree of compatibility between his early and later positions. To see this compatibility and continuity it is necessary to adopt an indirect approach. Normally a philosopher is said to have changed his viewpoint when he specifically attacks his earlier views and adopts new views

which are inconsistent with the earlier views. If we look for documentation for such a change of views in Wittgenstein's writings, lectures and conversations, we do not find it. Rather, we find a philosopher who maintained early in his career that the ultimate matters with which ethics deals are inexpressible and who later said almost nothing at all about ethics. The general absence of ethical remarks in Wittgenstein's later philosophy actually exemplifies the highest degree of consistency and continuity, not the reverse. If there is any inconsistency, it is in the early period where Wittgenstein may have said more about ethics than his doctrines permitted. To see that this is the case, we need only examine the later ethical remarks to see if any of them, beyond any doubt, represent an attack on his earlier ethical views or represent new views clearly inconsistent with the earlier ones.

We may begin this investigation by looking at the relationships Wittgenstein asserts between ethics, aesthetics, philosophy, religion, and mysticism in the early and later periods. Concerning mysticism, it is true that Wittgenstein does not refer to mysticism in his later philosophy but this change took place immediately after the publication of the Tractatus and is, thus, only a change in the early position and not a break with it. Wittgenstein, in fact, only refers to mysticism one time in the Notebooks and not at all after the publication of the Tractatus. As I argued earlier, the absence of anything specifically referred to as mysticism except in the Tractatus may mean simply that Wittgenstein was artificially adopting the term in the Tractatus in order to more closely identify himself with Mauthner. Mystical statements, though not labelled as such, are used as examples as late

as the lecture on ethics and talk of things which go beyond language
and cannot be talked about persist even in the Investigations playing
a fundamental role in the later philosophy. Wittgenstein's discussion
of sensation E (PI I 258-270), which is fundamental to the private
language argument, is completely compatible with Wittgenstein's position
on the linguistic expressibility of mystical experiences since sensa-
tion E could easily be a mystical experience. Mysticism, thus, offers
no block to the assertion of continuity between early and later ethical
viewpoints.

There is only one reference to a connection between ethics and
religion in the later philosophy. It comes in the opening statement
on ethics in Moore's notes where Wittgenstein is quoted as saying, "I
have always wanted to say something about the grammar of ethical ex-
pressions, or, e.g. of the word 'God' (ML III 16)." This remark
strongly suggests remarks in the Notebooks (NB 73-74). Unfortunately,
Moore does not explain the relation of ethics and God in his brief dis-
cussion of the religion. The absence of ethics-religious remarks else-
where may be of significance, since religion was also said to be a
thrust against the limits of language in the earlier period, but it is
difficult to say what exactly the significance is. Ceasing to empha-
size a relationship does not necessarily signify a change of view.

Wittgenstein speaks of the similarity of philosophy to ethics
particularly in Moore's notes (ML III 19, 27). In the Investigations
(PI I119) the thrust against the limits of language appears to be
philosophical rather than ethical; however, the assertion of similarity
and the association of philosophy with an ethical phrase does not

represent a significant change. In the Notebooks, for instance, problem-dissolving is an ethical activity. In the Tractatus and the Investigations it appears to be a philosophical activity. Thus, ethics and philosophy were already ambiguously associated early in the early work and the ambiguity in the later work cannot, therefore, be regarded as a significant change. Aesthetics represents the only big problem. In the early philosophy, Wittgenstein claimed that "ethics and aesthetics are one." In the later philosophy, no similar claim is made. Ethics is only like aesthetics in much the same way that ethics is like philosophy (ML III 19, 27). In chapter two I proposed a hypothesis that in the early philosophy Wittgenstein considered "ethics and aesthetics are one" to mean that the basis of ethics is perception. If my hypothesis is right, then it must be admitted that Wittgenstein has considerably altered his conception of aesthetics in the later period since Wittgenstein's later aesthetics deals primarily with problems of art rather than perception in the later period. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein continues to consider perception to be a major factor in aesthetics, ethics and philosophy as I shall demonstrate in Part III. Wittgenstein may thus have changed his conception of aesthetics without changing the perceptual views which I think he held in the early period. If this is so, the change from a broad conception of aesthetics to a narrow one is an adequate explanation for why Wittgenstein no longer claimed that ethics and aesthetics are one; however, this change does not necessarily represent a change in Wittgenstein's conception of ethics if he still continued to hold the earlier perceptual doctrines even though he no longer called them "aesthetic."

The differences noted above between early and late remarks do not necessarily represent significant change. They may represent slight alterations in viewpoint, a growing tentativeness or perhaps some vague questioning of the early position, but they do not provide adequate grounds for claiming that Wittgenstein changed his early position in any dramatic way in the later years of his life. The best place to find such a change would be in Wittgenstein's remarks concerning the meaning of the term "good." If these discussions were violations of the doctrine of silence, then a significant change would have been demonstrated and the basis for distinguishing early and late ethical periods would be clear. This possibility shall be examined now.

In the early period, Wittgenstein denied the possibility of using "good" as a linguistic predicate since "good" was supposed to be an exclusive predicate of a metaphysical subject which was not part of the world and which could not be spoken of. It could be argued that Wittgenstein's handling of the term "good" in the later period violates this early ethical position. In a strong formulation of the objection, Wittgenstein would be denying in the early remarks what he permitted in the later period. If this position is taken, however, the case could also be made on the same grounds that Wittgenstein violated his doctrine of silence in the early remarks as well. Thus, a kind of continuity remains in that Wittgenstein is then seen as equally inconsistent in all of his ethical writings and remarks, early and late. It could be claimed on the other hand, that a distinction between early and late periods could be made on the basis of grosser violations of the doctrine of silence; this distinction, however, would be difficult

to make because it is difficult to decide what degree of violation should count as the proper division point and, besides, a reasonable interpretation is available which maintains consistency and continuity.

In this alternative interpretation, Wittgenstein is taken to be saying in all periods that "good" as expressed in language cannot have a higher (transcendental) meaning and that, if "good" is to have any meaning in language, it must refer to something in the world which is not higher and which, since it is not higher, is not value in Wittgenstein's sense of the word. This alternative formulation of Wittgenstein's position is possible because of the ambiguity of the remark in the Tractatus about value that is not value. There Wittgenstein says that if value did exist in the world, it would have no value (TLP 6.41). In Chapter two I pointed out that this remark could quite naturally be taken as a criticism of Moore's view that non-natural value properties exist in the world as parts of objects. The remark in this context would mean that if values existed in the world, then they would not be values in Wittgenstein's sense of value, but rather facts in Wittgenstein's sense of that word. This interpretation is consistent with Wittgenstein's opening statements in the Tractatus which maintain that the world is the totality of facts and is determined by the facts alone (TLP 1.1-1.11). This interpretation is supported by Wittgenstein's clear attack on Moore's position on two occasions in the 1920's (WWK 69; LE 4) and by his argument in the lecture on ethics that a linguistically meaningful value predicate is a disguised fact which can "be put in such a form that it loses all the appearance of a judgment of value (LE 6)." This interpretation of Wittgenstein's early position is

compatible with the later remarks. Wittgenstein, of course, does not offer the disguised fact theory in the later remarks, but, in all other respects, Wittgenstein's intent remains the same: to show either (1) the meaning of that the predicate "good" in particular cases is tied to something in the world which is not itself value according to the early position or (2) that the word "good" is being used super-fluously--i.e., has no linguistically formulatable meaning. Although the aesthetics lecture does not speak of disguised facts, it does point out that in most cases "good" can be replaced by other remarks which have nothing to do with value. For instance, the tailor may replace "good" with "a little narrower" (LC 5). The critic might replace "good" with "Look! This is how they should be read (LC 5)," or "His use of images is precise (LC 3)." "Good" becomes simply a replacement for more technical non-value terminology and a substitute for natural expressions and gestures of approval (LC 2), and these, in terms of the Tractatus, are still facts, and the method of translation is much the same as that used in the lecture on ethics. While there might be some slight changes in how Wittgenstein goes about presenting his position, the intent and result remain consistent with the view that linguisti-cally meaningful value predicates derive whatever meaning they may have from natural phenomena which are facts, not values. In the lecture on ethics, Wittgenstein permitted linguistically formulatable value pre-dicates which were equivalent to facts while still maintaining higher values which were not expressible because they were transcendental. There is no reason to suppose that Wittgenstein's later examples of translation of pseudo values into facts represent a significant change

upon which to base a distinction between early and late periods just because he did not note after each example that there were still transcendental values in his position. The absence of statements about transcendental values cannot by itself be the basis for distinguishing two ethical periods and neither can remarks about non-transcendental values which are handled in a way consistent with Wittgenstein's theory of transcendental values and his doctrine of silence. The translation approach in the lecture on ethics is consistent with Wittgenstein's transcendental position. Any later remarks similar to that approach can also reasonably be assumed to be consistent with the transcendental position. In this way, no violation of the doctrine of silence appears either in the early or later periods.

The division of Wittgenstein's ethical viewpoint into early and later periods was made at the beginning of this dissertation because it is customary to divide Wittgenstein's philosophy into periods. While there is some basis for making the distinction in Wittgenstein's non-ethical philosophy, there is no similar basis for making the distinction in his ethical philosophy. No significant changes can be discerned which adequately justify the distinction. Thus, the assertion of such a distinction must rest on non-ethical philosophy and such an assertion is a more complicated and tenuous hypothesis than one which denies any significant change between early and late philosophical periods. The lecture on ethics is the biggest complication. In it we find, on the one hand, elements of the early remarks, the thrust against the limits of language, the mysticism, and the inexpressibility doctrine, and, on the other hand, a theory of linguistically formulatable

value predicates which is similar to most of Wittgenstein's later remarks on linguistically formulatable value predicates. In this lecture, all the major elements of the so-called early and late periods are to be found. There is no indication in the lecture that Wittgenstein considers these so-called early and later elements to be in conflict and, likewise, there is no reason to believe when the later remarks appear by themselves that they represent a new position different from the one given in the early period of Wittgenstein's philosophical career.

Reasons for Continuity

The most obvious reason for continuity in Wittgenstein's ethical viewpoint is that Wittgenstein continued to hold his transcendental ethical position. The only direct evidence of this possibility is the conversation with Rhees in 1945 in which Wittgenstein claimed that it did not necessarily follow that a (linguistically formulatable) ethic was an expression of something ultimate (LE 24-25) and the one reference to the thrust against the limits of language (PI I 119)and this evidence, of course, is not enough; nevertheless, there is some strong indirect evidence. As noted in the last section, Wittgenstein did not renounce his earlier transcendental position. This is more significant than it might seem at first. Wittgenstein's behavior with regard to other problems which puzzled him shows that he seldom abandoned a problem until he had resolved it. Zettel and the notes on sense data bear testimony to the struggles which he engaged in with philosophical problems which bewitched him. Furthermore, when Wittgenstein gave up an idea (as, for instance, atomism) or when he was confused about

something, (as, for instance, "Sinn" ML II 296), he normally admitted it. If his transcendental position had troubled him, it seems likely that he would have struggled with it. If he had given up the position, it seems likely that he would have said so. There is no evidence for either being the case. In short, the intensity of Wittgenstein's early interest in ethics, his unusual strength of character, and his profound intellectual and moral honesty make it extremely unlikely that Wittgenstein quietly lost interest in his transcendental position and abandoned it without a word. Rather all this indirect evidence suggests that Wittgenstein did not speak of his transcendental position because he was completely happy with it and because it offered no problems from his point of view and, as such, it therefore, represents one of the best reasons why Wittgenstein did not develop a linguistically formulatable ethic in the later period.

Another reason almost as obvious is that Wittgenstein may have continued to hold his earlier doctrine of silence on into the later period. Even if he did give up the transcendental position, he could still have continued to hold this doctrine in some form and there are a number of indications that he did so. According to the doctrine in its original form it is possible to show things which cannot be said. This "showing," of course, also requires "seeing." Wittgenstein's emphasis on "seeing as" and "seeing an aspect" and his continuing use of "picture" as a basic technical term may in this way be a natural continuation of the earlier doctrine of silence. Although pains, for instance, make themselves manifest, we are limited in what we can say about them. Furthermore, Wittgenstein's continual tinkering with his

remarks to try to improve them may be another indication of his adherence to the doctrine. He may have been trying with these remarks to show things which cannot be said. In this sense, Zettel and many of his remarks on sense data would be miscast pictures, which, though not showing what Wittgenstein wanted, showed something which continued to hold his attention enough for him to keep them. A point often overlooked is the fact that Wittgenstein's mysticism, of which the doctrine of silence was an intricate part in the early period, leads very naturally into Wittgenstein's position on private experience in the Investigations. Mystical feelings were things which could not be spoken of except nonsensically in the Tractatus, in the conversations with the positivists, and in the lecture on ethics. Wittgenstein adopts a similar position with regard to pain when he calls it not a "something," but not a "nothing" either (PI I 304). The mystical was referred to in a similar way in discussions with the Vienna Circle. There he says that the thrust points to "something" with the implication that it is not a "something" in an ordinary sense (WWK 69). In addition, the sensation E of the Investigations (PI I 258), a key example in the private language arguments, could easily be a mystical feeling of the type described in the lecture on ethics. It would, in fact, be difficult to build a case for Wittgenstein's mysticism and his doctrine of silence not being part of the general framework upon which the private language arguments came to be built. Thus, the natural relationship between his mysticism and his inexpressibility doctrine and one of his major theses in the later period suggest that the early doctrine of silence was carried on into the later period in some form.

Adherence to this doctrine, therefore, is plausible and it in turn provides an excellent explanation of why we find no linguistically expressible ethic.

A third reason may well be a continued identification with nineteenth century ethical problems. Aside from the remarks which served only to establish the radical separation of fact and value, most other early ethical remarks made by Wittgenstein were attempts to deal with nineteenth century ethical problems of such philosophers as Schopenhauer, Spinoza, Kant, and Kierkegaard. For instance, Wittgenstein's concern over whether only "not wanting is the only good (NB 77)" is a puzzle which is derived from Schopenhauer. His division of the world into will and idea and his claim that good and evil do not belong to the world is also Schopenhauerian, as he himself notes (NB 79). His discussion of eternity, living in the present, and the overcoming of fear and hope (NB 74-76) is Spinozistic. His emphasis on limits and his efforts to separate and safeguard both science and ethics are Kantian. His "thrust against the limits of language" is Kierkegaardian. Such examples show a great interest in nineteenth century ethical approaches even when they were not essential to his own theory. This also seems to be the case in his later philosophical period. There is a radical difference between the topics discussed in Wittgenstein's classes (language, logic and mathematics) and those discussed at his "At Homes" (Kierkegaard, St. Augustine, Heidegger, etc.). This difference suggests that Wittgenstein may have continued to have been fascinated with "ethical" matters in a broad sense which he kept

separate from his official philosophy.[1] The reason for this separa-
tion may also be the same in both periods. Wittgenstein's methods in
the Tractatus were twentieth century ones derived from Russel and
Frege, but they were employed to protect an ethical position which was
strictly nineteenth century in its viewpoint. The very nature of
Wittgenstein's early position prevented these twentieth century methods
from affecting his nineteenth century ethical views. The same sort of
thing may have been operating in the later period as well. His ethical
views may have been similarly insulated against influence from his
official philosophy in such a way that he was free to dwell on nine-
teenth century ethical problems and non-analytic phenomenological pro-
blems from the continental Europe without conflict with his classroom
positions.

A fourth reason may be that Wittgenstein continued to feel that
ethics was personal and subjective. Wittgenstein pointed out in the
1920's that there were (1) ethical matters with regard to which one
could only speak for himself and (2) philosophical matters about which
one could speak for others (WWK 117). Both the early and late official
philosophy are entirely devoted to the latter. The Tractatus employs
an ontology which includes the existence of other human beings from the
very beginning. The first personal pronoun is "we" and "I" appears only
within the context of it (TLP 2.0121). The official early philosophy,
thus, is not operating from a personal viewpoint at all, but rather
from a group viewpoint. As a result, there is an objectivity from the
beginning in the early work (since it applies to everyone) similar to
that found in the later work which in dealing with forms of life and

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[1]Toulmin, "Wittgenstein," p. 60.

agreement among people also provides standards of objectivity (PI I 242). If Wittgenstein continued to hold that ethics was a personal, subjective enterprise, then there could have been no place for it in his major early or late work which explicitly examines the common and objective and not the individual and subjective.

Finally, Wittgenstein may have thought that the study of normative ethical principles would undermine practical ethics. In the Notebooks Wittgenstein says that both ethics and logic are conditions of the world (NB 77). The Tractatus is in large part an examination of the logical conditions for the world. No similar examination of the ethical conditions is ever attempted. There is only one remark other than remarks on the doctrine of silence in the early philosophy which could serve as an explanation for why such an examination was not undertaken. Wittgenstein says, "When a general ethical law of the form 'Thou shalt...' is set up, the first thought is: Suppose I do not do it? (NB 78; TLP 6.421)." This remark suggests that the conscious examination of ethical principles may cast doubt on the validity of the ethical. The examination of the logical conditions of the world, on the other hand, could not have similar effects for, though these conditions are of value to science and philosophy, they are in no way relevant to practical ethical action, whereas ethical conditions are. In On Certainty Wittgenstein speaks of common sense propositions which cannot be doubted and which, similarly, thus serve as conditions of the way we see the world. Ethical principles, which could appropriately have been discussed by Wittgenstein within this context, are notably missing. A fear that examination of such ethical principles might call

them into doubt is a reasonable, though unsupported, explanation of Wittgenstein's hesitancy in On Certainty.

In Wittgenstein's discussion of the doctor's decision to leave his wife or stop investigating cancer another possible reason is given. There Wittgenstein claims that a person who adopts a formal set of ethical principles such as the Christian ethic loses much of his ability to make ethical decisions since adherence to the ethical principles may cause an ethical agent not to see alternatives and, thereby, severely limit or even eliminate the possibility of decision-making in particular cases. Concern that ethical principles will rob one of his decision-making powers and concern over the frailty of ethical principles are not necessarily incompatible and may be two sides of the same coin. These concerns are not unlike Wittgenstein's concerns about "pictures." Some pictures hold us captive and we must seek re-lease from them. Others hold little power over us, and we can use them or discard them as we like. Wittgenstein may have been interested in the development of an ethical attitude or set in the individual. Atten-tion given to particular ethical principles might have the detrimental effect of either undermining the ethical set by casting doubt on part of its structure or, on the other hand, causing distortion of the ethi-cal set, by the emphasis given it in the examination, which might hold the ethical agent captive and rob him of his decision-making power. These represent additional reasons for the absence on an ethical posi-tion.

These reasons, of course, are in large part speculative; however, they do show that Wittgenstein could have had good reasons for

continuing to maintain his early ethical position. Of the reasons I
have proposed, the first two, adherence to the transcendental position
and the doctrine of silence, seem the most likely to me. The third,
involvement in nineteenth century problems, is also likely because of
Wittgenstein's division of his philosophical activity into two kinds
of subject matter, one kind for the classroom and one for "At Home."
The fourth, the subjective-objective distinction, is probably another
way of making the same division drawn by the first three. The last
one, though little documented, is possible and, if true, helps explain
Wittgenstein's concern about pictures holding us captive. As it hap-
pens, we need not choose between them for it would not be inconsistent
for Wittgenstein to have had all of them in mind since none of them
conflict. It is doubtful that any similar listing of reasons could
be provided for the contrary position that Wittgenstein quietly lost
interest in ethics and abandoned all of his views about it. They,
thus, help present a more plausible and richer picture of what Wittgen-
stein was doing in the later period than can be presented by an abandon-
ment theory.

Wittgenstein's Influence on Ethics

Because of Wittgenstein's hesitancy about publishing his work and
his reluctance to speak about ethics, it is hard to assess Wittgen-
stein's influence on ethical philosophy. Yet, undeniably Wittgenstein's
personal ethical viewpoint as described in the first three chapters of
this dissertation has had almost no influence at all. Nevertheless,
Wittgenstein has had considerable influence in ethics particularly in
the last twenty years through his non-ethical philosophy and this

influence has exhibited itself in ways which are not always immediately discernible even to the ethical writers themselves.

Moritz Schlick is perhaps the first ethical writer to be influenced by Wittgenstein. Like Wittgenstein, Schlick is interested in showing that ethics is not concerned with a linguistic analysis of the word "good." Schlick asserts that ethics is not involved in discovering the definition of "good." In this respect, like Wittgenstein, he strongly opposes the position of G. E. Moore.[1] Schlick acknowledges that "good" is strictly speaking indefinable, but claims that meaning can be given to it which is not "a definition in the strictest sense of the word."[2] Moore's position on intrinsic value is also discarded. Schlick says, "The question of whether something is desirable for its own sake is no question at all, but mere empty words."[3] Schlick's own position is that "good" may be regarded in such a way that statements containing the word "good" are taken as facts. Schlick says, "When I recommend an action to someone as being 'good,' I express the fact that I desire it."[4] This position is very similar to Wittgenstein's claim that "good" is an expression of approval. In both cases the point is that "good" may be treated factually. Schlick also treats norms as facts. He says:

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[1] Moritz Schlick, Problems of Ethics, trans. by David Rynin (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1961), pp. 5-10.

[2] Ibid., p. 8.

[3] Ibid., p. 19.

[4] Ibid., p. 12.

> The common characteristics which a group of "good"
> acts or dispositions exhibits can be combined in a rule
> of the form: A mode of action must have such and such
> properties in order to be called "good" (or "evil").
> Such a rule can also be called a "norm." Let it be un-
> derstood at once, however, that such a "norm" is nothing
> but a mere expression of fact; it gives us only the con-
> ditions under which an act or disposition or character
> is actually called "good," that is, is given a moral
> value.[1]

This approach is compatible with Wittgenstein's discussion in the lec-

ture on ethics of how "trivial" or "relative" value may be translated

into facts. Wittgenstein apparently thought so too for he did not

criticize this aspect of Schlick's ethic when he discussed it with Vienna

Circle members on December 30, 1930 (WWK 115). Since part of Schlick's

first chapter was discussed, and since this position is also developed

in the first chapter, it is reasonable to assume that Wittgenstein was

aware of the position Schlick was taking on the translation of value

to fact and showed approval by not criticizing it.

Influence on later ethical writers of the last twenty-five years

is also readily apparent; however, since Wittgenstein's Investigations

was not published until after some of them published their first books

on ethics, the connections are not always clear. Wittgenstein, for

instance, is undoubtedly the originator of "good reasons" ethics (ML

III 19) made famous later by Toulmin and others. Toulmin's analogy

of a language-map, which he attributes to Wisdom,[2] is also ultimately

derived from Wittgenstein (PI I 18) as well as Toulmin's discussion of

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[1]Ibid., pp. 14-15.

[2]Stephen Toulmin, An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics
(Cambridge: At the University Press, 1964), p. 37.

limiting questions[1] which is an offshoot of Wittgenstein's claim that justification must come to an end (PI I 485). Wittgenstein's lectures at Cambridge made these sorts of things part of the intellectual atmosphere of Cambridge. The absence of published works by Wittgenstein obscured the relationship of Wittgenstein to these ideas for a time and his influence is only now beginning to be realized.

R. M. Hare, though in less agreement with Wittgenstein's approach than Toulmin, has also been influenced by Wittgenstein. Hare's discussion of meaning and criteria is heavily influenced by Wittgenstein as he himself notes.[2] Hare in addition cites Wittgenstein and his followers on some logical matters.[3] In his later work, Hare recognizes the value of Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance.[4] Although Hare owes more to Sartre than to Wittgenstein, he is careful not to violate Wittgenstein's philosophical positions.

Julius Kovesi and Iris Murdoch, closer to Wittgenstein than Hare, show unmistakable signs of Wittgenstein's influence. Although Kovesi does not speak of himself as a follower of Wittgenstein[5] and claims to be doing something more radical than Wittgenstein,[6] Kovesi is far more

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[1] Ibid., pp. 205-211.

[2] R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 92.

[3] Ibid., p. 24; p. 32.

[4] R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 7.

[5] Julius Kovesi, Moral Notions (New York: Humanities Press, 1967), p. 6.

[6] Ibid., p. 22.

indebted to Wittgenstein than he admits as the following quotation will illustrate. He writes:

> To presume that our notions reflect anyone's views
> because we are such people, or because we are fair,
> is to presume that our language is a private language
> which is turned by our benevolence into a public lan-
> guage. But the very notion of fairness is a notion
> that can exist only in our public language.[1]

The ideas of language operating publicly and not privately and of our moral notions being dependent on public language come directly from Wittgenstein's arguments against private language in the Investigations. Likewise, Iris Murdoch, although differing from Wittgenstein in some respects, maintains a position which is also derived in part directly from the arguments against private language.[2]

These examples serve to illustrate that Wittgenstein has had a significant influence on ethical theory, though perhaps not an influence which he would have approved of. Wittgenstein's influence on ethics stems not from his personal transcendental ethical viewpoint but rather from the general position he held in his later period as presented in the Investigations and from his remarks prior to the Investigations on linguistically formulatable ethics. Although he considered such ethics trivial and did little with it himself, his later philosophy has pro-vided the basis for many new positions of that type.

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[1] Ibid., p. 111.

[2] Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), pp. 11-12.

Implications of Ethical Viewpoint

Wittgenstein's personal ethical viewpoint has not played any
major role in ethical theory of the twentieth century. His ethical
stance was largely unknown until very recently. It is doubtful that
even with the recent publication of his ethical remarks and lectures
that it will ever greatly influence the course of ethical theory. Thus,
since Wittgenstein's ethics has little theoretical value, if it is to
have any value at all, it must be in helping us to understand Wittgen-
stein as a historical philosophical figure. In this respect, it has
great potential. Wittgenstein has in recent years become the subject
of much historical reaearch. It is, in fact, this research and the
desire to more fully understand the actual philosophical viewpoint of
a very influential, complex and confusing philosopher which has brought
the ethical material to the surface. Because of widespread contra-
dictory interpretations of Wittgenstein's philosophy, which have
spawned warring philosophical schools, study of Wittgenstein's ethics
and other related materials is a necessary for Wittgensteineans. When
adopting the philosophical position of another philosopher and develop-
ing it, it is always helpful to understand what that originator had in
mind when he created the position. Because Wittgenstein has been so
strongly identified with both positivism and linguistic philosophy,
and perhaps because Wittgenstein himself called his private philosophical
speculations "ethical," much which is not specifically ethical has been
labelled as such.[1] In this section I shall sketch what this "ethical"

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[1]Toulmin, "Ludwig Wittgenstein," p. 60.

material may contribute to our picture of the historical Wittgenstein.
Here I shall be making use of some material which has not been speci-
fically introduced previously because it was not part of Wittgenstein's
ethics in the narrow sense.

The first point that needs to be made is that Wittgenstein was
not a Kantian in any but the most limited sense. Neo-Kantianism was
a major philosophical school in German-speaking countries at the turn
of the century.[1] Wittgenstein, however, held little in common with
this Neo-Kantianism. Wittgenstein's claim that there is no knowing
or thinking subject is in fundamental conflict with the Neo-Kantian
position that there is a transcendental thinking subject.[2] Wittgen-
stein does speak of limits to the world, but these limits, in so far as
they are the limits of a transcendental subject, are ethical limits,
and, in so far as they are the limits of knowledge and thought, are
limits of language, which are empirical, not transcendental. Further-
more, Wittgenstein provides no metaphysical support for science in
terms of a noumenal world of things-in-themselves. Wittgenstein agrees
with the Kantians that ethics needs such a support, but he sees no
problem for science if it operates through language on a purely empi-
rical and phenomenal basis.

Secondly, Wittgenstein holds much more in common with the Euro-
pean existentialists and phenomenologists than has ever been previously
supposed. Although Wittgenstein was not favorably disposed towards

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[1]Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen, Contemporary German Philosophy and
its Background (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1973), pp. 9-
10.

[2]Ibid., p. 10.

Husserl; he did speak favorably of Heidegger saying "I can well imagine what Heidegger means by Being and Fear (WWK 68)." The remark appears as the opening line in the section which speaks of the thrust against the limits of language and associates Wittgenstein's thrust against the limits of language with Kierkegaard's thrust against paradox. The remark shows that Wittgenstein did read phenomenologists and was not altogether unsympathetic towards them. There are some common elements particularly between Wittgenstein and Heidegger. Heidegger is often praised for his innovative use of "da" as in "Dasein" which avoids a linguistic trap involving the subject-object dualism. Wittgenstein makes the same move for the same reasons when he replaces "Vorstellung" with "Darstellung" in his early philosophy.[1] Wittgenstein's later talk of forms of life is also not too far distant from Heidegger's handling of the "they world." Their major disagreements would seem to begin over how much can be said about the emotional aspects of man.

The influence of Kierkegaard which Wittgenstein acknowledges in Wiener Kreis is particularly important for fixing the existential aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy. During the comparison of his philosophy with Kierkegaard's, Wittgenstein gives an example of the thrust against the limits of language yielding nonsense. Wittgenstein says,

> Imagine, for example, the astonishment that something
> exists. This astonishment cannot be expressed in the
> form of a question, and there is also no answer at all.
> Everything, which we would like to say, can only be
> nonsense a priori. (WWK 68)

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[1]Janik and Toulmin, pp. 139-140, 179-180, 183-184.

In making his comparison with Kierkegaard Wittgenstein must also be comparing his use of nonsense with Kierkegaard's use of paradox, since nonsense is a result of his thrust. Wittgenstein does not completely drop this use of nonsense in his later philosophy, and uses it repeatedly, particularly in On Certainty where he says that most of the propositions which Moore claims we know are nonsense even though useful nonsense. This approach is closely tied to Wittgenstein's position on justification. If one tries to justify something, according to Wittgenstein, eventually he will reach a point where justification must come to an end. What remains is nonsense since it cannot itself be justified. This claim with regard to nonsense is very similar to many existential claims about absurdity. There is good reason for this similarity since Wittgenstein and the existentialists are drawing their positions from the same parent, Kierkegaard.

Finally, Wittgenstein's philosophical aims even in the Investigations hold much more in common with contemporary German-speaking philosophy than might be imagined possible by those completely unfamiliar with German philosophy. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein speaks of ways of seeing things and asks himself, "Is this a 'Weltanschauung'? (PI I 122)." In Wittgenstein's notes on Frazer the same paragraph appears but with a stronger ending. There he says that a way of seeing things is "a kind of 'Weltanschauung' which it appears is typical for our time (F 241)." These remarks appear cryptic only if one does not know how important "Weltanschauung" is to twentieth century German philosophy. Von Rintelen in his recent book characterizes the quest for "Weltanschauung" as the basic desire of all German

philosophy of this century with the positivists of the Vienna Circle being the only exceptions.[1] Thus, Wittgenstein, at least from his own point of view, was in the mainstream of German-style philosophy even in the _Investigations_.

Exactly how much Wittgenstein is like the existentialists, the phenomenologists and German "Weltanschauung" philosophers is not yet certain and perhaps it can never be determined. Nevertheless, it is clear that the relationships are there, and the similarities point to a historical appraisal of Wittgenstein which makes him much more traditional and continental in his approach than positivists and linguistics previously would have had us believe. Investigations into these relationships should be healthy for English-speaking philosophy, and though it may lead to little of contemporary importance in ethics in the narrow sense, a better understanding of Wittgenstein's work through such investigations may yield valuable insights into contemporary philosophy on a more general level and may provide a means by which English-speaking and continental philosophy may some day close some of the gap which has grown up between them in recent years.

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[1]Rintelen, p. 2.

PART II

A WITTGENSTEINEAN ETHIC

CHAPTER IV

DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Introduction

Although Wittgenstein may have continued to hold that transcendental ethics are inexpressible in his later period, two paragraphs in the Investigations (PI I 77, 304) suggest that he may have eventually come to believe that non-transcendental, linguistically formulatable ethics were possible and permissible. Such a new position would not necessarily be incompatible with his earlier remarks if it arose out of his position on values as disguised facts, for instance, or if like Schlick he asserted that moral principles could be treated as social facts insofar as they are norms which regulate social behavior. At most, such a new position would only mean that Wittgenstein had enlarged the scope of the term "ethics" to apply to non-transcendental moral codes and the like. Since nothing in the Investigations speaks against such ethical positions, there has long been interest in why Wittgenstein himself did not elect to develop a linguistically formulatable ethical position of his own.

In addition, many philosophers, influenced by Wittgenstein, have used various aspects of the later philosophy in formulating linguistically formulatable ethical positions of their own. None of these attempts, however, have been very successful. Although employing notions like family resemblance and meaning as use, and the arguments against private language, they have produced ethical positions which

involve the application of rules in accordance with formal logical
systems. Such systems are not ultimately Wittgensteinean because they
do not apply Wittgenstein's primary insights on mathematical and logical
necessity and on justification. As a result, they form a natural part
of the centuries old effort to create a rational reasoning procedure for
ethics complete with logical inference and ultimate ethical principles.
Such ethical positions are not compatible with Wittgenstein's later
philosophy because they hold the premise that ethics is a completely
rule-governed activity. Since Wittgenstein in his later philosophy
did not hold that logical and mathematical reasoning was completely
rule-governed, it is unlikely that he would have considered ethical
reasoning to be completely rule-governed.

In this chapter, I shall develop what I consider to be a Wittgen-
steinean ethic. Unlike the views of others who have been influenced
by Wittgenstein's work, I will begin with the premise that ethics is
not completely rule-governed.

The point of departure for this view is Wittgenstein's discussion
of mathematical and logical necessity and what it means to follow a
rule found in the early paragraphs of the Investigations (PI I 141-155,
179-191), the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (RFM I 112-118),
On Certainty (OC 26-30, 44-47), the Blue Book (BL 12-15), and the Brown
Book (BR 141-143). Wittgenstein gives a famous example of a person
continuing a series of numbers. He shows that the series may in fact
be continued in any number of ways and that there is a rule to justify
each way. The point of this example is that, although we normally feel
some compulsion to continue the series in only one way, the procedure
cannot be completely accounted for as a rule-governed procedure since

everyone can appeal to his own rules rather than admitting error.
Furthermore, in continuing the series, Wittgenstein points out, "a new
decision was needed at every stage" (PI I 186), instead of a new rule
or intuition.

The ethical view to be developed below will treat ethical reasoning
in much the same way that Wittgenstein treats mathematical and logical
reasoning. Ethical reasoning will be viewed as an activity which is
not completely rule-governed and which requires, in practice, decisions
at every stage which are distinct from the ethical and moral rules
normally evoked to account for them.

My relationship to Wittgenstein, however, must not be pushed too
far since we may differ over the nature of decision. In using the word
"decision," I shall mean by decision, a mental process, and not merely
a result of a mental process. Whether my analysis of decision conforms
with Wittgenstein's conception of decision is difficult to determine
because he said very little about decision itself and I therefore take
full responsibility and blame for what follows while still giving
Wittgenstein credit for the inspiration.

Furthermore, although I consider what follows to be an ethical
position, it is not an ethical position in any ordinary sense. It is
not a metaethical inquiry, for instance. I will certainly not be con-
cerned with a study of ethics at a metalevel separate from practical
ethics. The position is, I suppose, metaethical in the sense that it
talks about ethics and the nature of ethics without doing ethics, but
more is normally meant by "metaethical" than this. The position is
also not a normative ethic. I am not going to investigate the ultimate
ethical principle or suggest how all ethical principles can be placed

in some sort of logical order nor am I going to examine how we come to have the particular ethical principles that we have. While these issues certainly have merit and are important, they are outside the scope of this inquiry. I will deal with the question of practical ethics, which is: how does one decide what to do in a practical situation?

It will be assumed that there are ethical principles involved, in some sense, with these decisions but it will not be necessary to discuss any of them except as examples. An important aspect of the account will be an examination of how these ethical or moral rules and principles enter into ethical decision; however, the questions of where the rules come from, how they are related to each other, and how they are justified will not be of major importance to my inquiry. My conclusions concerning ethical decision may have relevance to these issues and the relationships will be sketched when appropriate, but no general theory concerning these issues will be attempted. Also, since I am grounding this part in practical ethics, it should be noted at this point that I shall make no technical distinction between the words "ethical" and "moral" and will use them as loosely equivalent terms.

The method of this part is primarily descriptive. My aim is not to create a tight theory which fits together nicely on logical grounds, but which may not represent the actual ethical thought process. It is my opinion that the more perfectly the parts of a position fit together the more suspect the position often is. Where my account is deficient it should be the result of my inability to completely describe the decision thought process and not my inability to reshape it meta-physically.

There may be many ramifications of my account if it is true. I shall be concerned here with only one: how can my account of decision improve our understanding of ethical training? I believe that training is essential to decision just as it is essential to most other kinds of mental and physical activities and that adequate training procedures for decision must be based on an accurate account of decision. Since I consider such an account of ethical decision essential to practical ethics, I consider my account in this part of this dissertation to be an ethical position.

A question may arise concerning the sense in which the ethical view of this part is a Wittgensteinean ethic. It is not Wittgensteinean in the sense that it is Wittgenstein's view, since it certainly is not. It is not Wittgensteinean in the sense that he would have approved of it, for I have no idea whether he would have approved of it or not. It is Wittgensteinean, however, in the sense that it follows, I believe, rather naturally from certain remarks which Wittgenstein made in the later philosophy about logic and mathematics and is, therefore, a position which he conceivably could have developed, but which for reasons unknown he did not. In this respect, although the position given in this part goes beyond Wittgenstein, it, nevertheless, is relevant to a study of Wittgenstein's philosophy in that it helps to demonstrate the possibilities for ethical theory inherent in Wittgenstein's positions.

In addition to the relationship which my account has to Wittgenstein's philosophy, a number of other philosophical positions can be mentioned which may be of help and interest to some readers, although they are not necessary for the understanding of the position as it will be presented here. From the author's personal viewpoint, and in terms

of his own philosophical development, the ethical position to be
presented arises naturally out of the Toulmin-Hare controversy and
the related issue concerning Hume's remarks on the is-ought question.
The position is in many respects compatible with Urmson's paper "On
Grading" and Mandelbaum's Phenomenology of Moral Experience. The forth-
coming distinction between decision and judgment parallels a similar
distinction between discovery and justification made by such philosophers
of science as Toulmin, Hanson, and Kuhn. Just as they maintain that
there is a "logic" for discovery different from that of justification,
I want to claim that there is a "logic" for decision which can be dis-
tinguished from that of judgment. In this respect, my position is in
complete opposition to Sartre's view, which begins with choosing rather
than deciding apparently on the grounds that decision is impossible.
There will be a close connection between what I am doing in ethics and
what Polanyi has done generally in his book Personal Knowledge.
Polanyi's doctrine that "we know more than we can tell" is very similar
to Wittgenstein's doctrine that some things cannot be said. Such an
unspeakable, tacit aspect is central to ethical decision according to
my account. Finally, I am deeply indebted to Adriann de Groote's book
Thought and Choice in Chess, upon which my position relies most heavily.

There may be some confusion about whether my account is logic,
"logic," psychology, phenomenology or linguistic philosophy. My account
is certainly not formal logic though it is "logic" in its broadest sense.
I am concerned with the method of how one decides but I maintain that
this method cannot be completely accounted for in terms of a formal system.
I am not, however, suggesting that logic in ethics be done away with. I
believe that the application of logic to ethics is extremely valuable,

for example, in the area of ethical justification. My position is close

to psychology in that I use the work of a psychologist extensively. Never-

theless, my aim is not to develop a psychological position as such but

rather an ethical one; and ethics is a part of philosophy rather than

psychology. It is the custom in the philosophy of science following

Popper and Hempel to call an examination of the actual thoughts of a

scientist making a discovery "psychological." Those accepting this

distinction will consider what I am doing with decision to be psycho-

logical. I, on the contrary, consider this distinction to be arbitrarily

drawn and, in addition, a very unfortunate limitation on what philoso-

phers of science and ethicists should consider their respective domains.

My disagreement with the positivists on this point, however, is not

actually a factual one. Rather, I accept their point that examinations

of actual thoughts and rational reconstructions of thoughts are different,

but I feel that the actual thoughts are as worthy of examination as the

reconstruction and I reject the label of psychology insofar as it is

used to limit the field of philosophical inquiry. Moreover, my position

is not based on the mechanics of how the brain works or on the psycho-

logical behavior of human beings. Phenomenology may be a good label since

I will attempt to look at the nature of a particular type of thought

(decision) in a way which it has not been looked at by most previous

philosophical and psychological theories; nevertheless, since the scope

and methods of my account are not completely in accord with those of

the European phenomenologists, the term may be somewhat misleading.

Finally, linguistic philosophy may be too narrow a term since elements

of my account are not derived entirely from ordinary language. Much

of what I am investigating is not expressed in ordinary language, and

much of what is not expressed properly according to my account. I do not believe that any of these labels are completely adequate though my account is closely related to many of the approaches which the labels signify. It is my intention to come up with as simple an account of decision as possible which will still provide useful information about ethical training and ethics generally. For these purposes, I am willing to move freely across these recently erected boundaries.

In the rest of this chapter, I will discuss the general nature of decision. This discussion will center around a distinction between decision and judgment. The distinction will enable us to distinguish the practical decision process from other mental activities such as justification and judgment. In Chapter Five an analogy will be drawn between decision-making and chess playing. The chess decision process will be treated as a model for ethical decision. How a chess player makes a move in chess will be discussed at length. The point of these discussions will be to develop an account of ethical decision-making which will clarify the role of ethical rules (and principles) and ethical training, reveal the role of perception in decision, and permit some insight into the validity of various ethical positions, particularly intuitive, emotivist and rational ethics. These points will be the subject of Chapter Six.

Relation to Philosophy of Science

The move which I am making from judgment to decision in ethics parallels a similar move being made in more recent philosophy of science from justification to discovery. Early twentieth century philosophers of science and most logical positivists did not deal with discovery but

rather centered their attention on justification. Popper in 1935 wrote a book titled The Logic of Scientific Discovery which maintained that there was no logic to scientific discovery at all. He says in it that:

> The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me neither to call for logical analysis nor to be susceptible of it. The question how it happens that a new idea occurs to a man--whether it is a musical theme, a dramatic conflict, or a scientific theory--may be of great interest to empirical psychology; but it is irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientific knowledge. This latter is concerned not with questions of fact (Kant's quid facti?), but only with questions of justification or validity (Kant's quid juris?). . . .
> Accordingly I shall distinguish sharply between the process of conceiving a new idea, and the methods of examining it logically. As to the task of the logic of knowledge--in contradistinction to the psychology of knowledge--I shall proceed on the assumption that it consists solely in investigating the methods employed in those systematic tests to which every new idea must be subjected if it is to be seriously entertained.
> Some might object that it would be more to the purpose to regard it as the business of epistemology to produce what has been called a 'rational reconstruction' of the steps that have led the scientist to a discovery--to the finding of some new truth. But the question is: what, precisely, do we want to reconstruct? If it is the processes involved in the stimulation and release of an inspiration which are to be reconstructed, then I should refuse to take it as the task of the logic of knowledge. Such processes are the concern of empirical psychology but hardly of logic. . . .
> . . . my view of the matter, for what it is worth, is that there is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas, or a logical reconstruction of this process. My view may be expressed by saying that every discovery contains 'an irrational element,' or 'a creative intuition,' in Bergson's sense.[1]

According to Popper, the process of making a discovery is not susceptible to logical analysis and has nothing to do with logic since (he believes) the process of discovery has an irrational element in it. Thus, any discussion of this process will be psychological rather than philosophical since, from Popper's point of view, philosophy of science is

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[1]Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1959), pp. 31-32.

only concerned with rational reconstruction. Because the process of discovery is not logical according to Popper's standards, it cannot lend itself to a rational reconstruction and therefore must be discarded.

Hempel, following Popper, whom he cites on this point, also maintains that the philosophy of science is not concerned with giving an account of discovery. Rather, he says, it is concerned with a general theory of confirmation and justification. Hempel acknowledges that discovery is a problem but maintains that it can be resolved by seeing that "a precise analysis of the concept of confirmation" is really what is needed--i.e., in effect, shifting from discovery to justification.[1] Hempel writes:

> Another issue customarily connected with the study of scientific method is the quest for "rules of induction." Generally speaking, such rules would enable us to infer, from a given set of data, that hypothesis or generalization which accounts best for all the particular data in the given set. But this construal of the problem involves a misconception: While the process of invention by which scientific discoveries are made is a rule <u>psychologically guided</u> and <u>stimulated</u> by antecendent knowledge of specific facts, its results are <u>not logically determined</u> by them; the way in which scientific hypotheses or theories are discovered cannot be mirrored in a set of general rules of inductive inference. One of the crucial considerations which lead to this conclusion is the following: Take a scientific theory such as the atomic theory of matter. The evidence on which it rests may be described in terms referring to directly observable phenomena, namely to certain macroscopic aspects of the various experimental and observational data which are relevant to the theory. On the other hand, the theory itself contains a large number of highly abstract, nonobservational terms such as 'atom', 'electron', 'nucleus', 'dissociation', 'valence' and others, none of which figures in the description of the observational data. An adequate rule of induction would therefore have to provide, for this and for every other conceivable case, mechanically applicable criteria determining unambiguously, and without any reliance on the inventiveness or additional scientific knowledge of its user, all those new abstract concepts which need to be created for the formation of the theory that will account for the

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[1]Carl G. Hempel, <u>Aspects of Scientific Explorations</u> (New York: Free Press, 1970), pp. 4-5.

given evidence. Clearly, this requirement cannot be satisfied by any set of rules, however ingeniously devised; there can be no general rules of induction in the above sense; the demand for them rests on a confusion of logical and psychological issues. What determines the soundness of a hypothesis is not the way it is arrived at (it may even have been suggested by a dream or a hallucination), but the way it stands up when tested, i.e. when confronted with relevant observational data. Accordingly, the quest for rules of induction in the original sense of canons of scientific discovery has to be replaced, in the logic of science, by the quest for general objective criteria determining (A) whether, and--if possible--even (B) to what degree, a hypothesis H may be said to be corroborated by a given body of evidence.[1]

Like Popper, Hempel considers the examination of the process of dis-

covery a matter for the psychologist, not the philosopher of science.

To want to talk about discovery in philosophy of science involves a

misconception--that is, a "false" belief that logic has something to

do with discovery and "a confusion of logical and psychological issues."

Thus, like Popper, he maintains that it is not the domain of the

philosopher of science to investigate how a scientific truth is arrived

at but only to examine how one confirms and justifies the truth once it

is discovered.

It must, first of all, be conceded that this position is not neces-

sarily wrong. Philosophers have the right to define the limits of what

they are about; however, the decision by early twentieth century

philosophers of science to limit philosophy of science in this way

does represent a refusal on their part to examine a major part of the

scientific enterprise. This move was made because they felt that

philosophers of science ought to be dealing with logic and that logic

was not appropriate to discovery. As such, it parallels another move

made by the logical positivists which discounted any field to which

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[1]Hempel, Scientific Explanation, pp. 5-6.

the verifiability principle or criterion could not be applied. At their worst, such moves represent a general contempt for the scientist as a being who often exhibits illogical, inexplicable behavior not up to the logical standards of the positivists as when Reichenbach said, "Scientists often have strange beliefs, and make fallacious inferences with good results. The logician is not interested in copying the scientist's mistakes."[1]

While it is not within the scope of this chapter to debate the soundness of the positivists' decision to ignore discovery and treat it either as psychology or logical error, it should be noted that the position is no longer generally accepted. Recently, attempts have been made to deal with the inference or mental activity of the discoverer on its own terms and this new approach has met with some success. Examination of what the scientist is actually doing has lead such philosophers of science as Hanson and Toulmin to conclude that, while it is true that traditional logic cannot fully account for discovery, other means of inference besides deduction and induction can and ought to be developed to explain what is really going on in the process of discovery. Hanson opts for a Peircian abduction or retroduction together with a notion of conceptual Gestalt referred to as "seeing that."[2] Toulmin similarly maintains that there is no deductive relationship between different levels of theory, individual laws and particular inferences drawn by the scientist. Inferences are not deduced from laws but are drawn in

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[1]Hans Reichenbach, "The Verifiability Theory of Meaning," _American Academy of Arts and Science_, LXXX (1951-1954), p. 52.

[2]Norwood Russell Hanson, _Patterns of Discovery_ (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1965), pp. 85-92.

accordance with them."[1] Like Hanson, Toulmin also considers the inferential techniques of discovery to be intricately interwoven with perceptual aspects, which he calls new ways of regarding phenomena.[2] These new approaches in the "logic" of discovery parallel the approach of this chapter since I will similarly distinguish between the "logic" of decision and the "logic" judgment.

In this connection, one final point needs to be made about the use of the word "logic." The shift from justification to discovery in the philosophy of science has been spoken of as a shift from the "logic" of justification to the "logic" of discovery. It should not be overlooked that those who use the expression "the logic of discovery" do agree with such philosophers as Popper, Hempel and Reichenbach that discovery is not ameniable to treatment in terms of traditional logic. The term "logic" is thus being used in a more general sense to mean the method or ordering process, or principles of discovery, and is intended to portray discovery as an area which, while separate from the domain defined by the positivists, is not completely within the realm of psychology and is still properly a part of philosophy and the philosophy of science. It certainly does not represent any misunderstanding about what the word "logic" means. Likewise, in talking about the logic of decision, I am in agreement with those who maintain that decision cannot be treated completely in terms of traditional logic. I am also using the term "logic" in a broad, and I believe, a fundamental and original sense in order to separate my approach to some extent from

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[1] Stephen Toulmin, The Philosophy of Science, An Introduction (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 85.

[2] Ibid., p. 29.

psychology. This terminology does not represent in my opinion the advocacy of any strange notion of logic. Its source is definitional and its use is justified by the growing acceptance of the parallel term "logic of discovery."

Decision and Judgment

The distinction between discovery and justification is well known in the philosophy of science today and similar distinctions are beginning to be applied outside the philosophy of science for much the same purposes--i.e., to distinguish the mental processes by which some determination is made and the logical procedures used to justify the determination. In legal theory the distinction has been made by Richard Wasserstrom in his book The Judicial Decision. Wasserstrom begins his book by distinguishing between how the judge decides his cases (which Wasserstrom calls "the process of discovery") and how the judge justifies his decisions (which Wasserstrom calls the "process of justification").[1] Wasserstrom draws this distinction because he is convinced that the judge may often (though not necessarily) make his legal decisions in a way which is different from the deductive procedures of the process of justification.[2] In ethics the distinction has been made by Maurice Mandelbaum in his book The Phenomenology of Moral Experience. Mandelbaum begins his book by distinguishing between "direct judgment" and "removed judgment" which parallels discovery and

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[1] Richard Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961; London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 27.

[2] Ibid., p. 28-29.

justification in philosophy of science and Wasserstrom's legal theory.[1] In this section I shall make almost exactly the same distinction calling the former "decision" and the latter "judgment."

By "decision" I shall mean that mental process of an ethical agent which usually culminates in choosing a course of action. It is what one does when one answers the question, "What ought I to do?" By "judgment" I shall mean the mental process of an observer or the ethical agent himself after the decision and action has taken place which attempts to answer the question, "What ought to have been done?"

Like Wasserstrom and the philosophers of science investigating discovery, I am similarly convinced that there are in some cases great differences between what one does in ethics, law and science and how one justifies what one has done. This point is also recognized by Wittgenstein who says in Lectures and Conversations:

> Giving a reason sometimes means 'I actually went this way', sometimes 'I could have gone this way', i.e. sometimes what we say acts as a justification, not as a report of what was done, e.g. I remember the answer to a question; when asked why I give this answer. I gave this answer, I gave a process leading to it, though I didn't go through this process. (LC 22)

Although this distinction may seem obvious once it is recognized, it has often been overlooked. Toulmin, for instance, who has developed an ethical philosophy with which I have a great deal of sympathy and who makes the distinction himself in his philosophy of science, apparently fails to make the distinction in ethics. At the beginning of his book An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics Toulmin writes:

> Whenever we come to a moral decision, we weigh the considerations involved--the relevant facts, that is, so far as we are acquainted

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[1] Maurice Mandelbaum, Phenomenology of Moral Experience (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1969), p. 45.

> with them--and then have to make up our minds. In doing so, we
> pass from the factual reasons (R) to an ethical conclusion (E).
> At this moment, we can always ask ourselves, 'Now, is this the
> right decision? In view of what I know (R), ought I to choose
> in this way (E)? Is R a good reason for E?' When considering
> ethics in general, therefore, we shall naturally be interested in
> the question, 'What is it that makes a particular set of facts,
> R, a good reason for a particular conclusion, E? What is "a good
> reason" in ethics?'; and this will interest us to a greater degree
> than questions like, 'What is the analysis of "right"?', and 'Is
> pleasure better than knowledge, or knowledge than pleasure?'[1]

Although Toulmin's enterprise is perhaps much more relevant than an

analysis of ethical terms, his approach here fails to give an account

of decision. According to Toulmin, we weigh the relevant facts and

make up our minds and "in doing so, we pass from the factual reasons

(R) to an ethical conclusion (E)." At first glance, this appears to

be getting at the decision process; however, Toulmin's "factual reasons"

are not necessarily the same thing as Toulmin's "relevant facts." The

reason that we do something is not necessarily the same thing as the

facts of the situation. Also, the reason we give for doing something

is not necessarily the actual cause of what we do. We look at the facts

to decide what to do. We look at reasons to judge whether we are jus-

tified in making the decision after it is already made. Toulmin passes

quickly over the decision process merely telling us that somehow we

pass from "is" to "ought." Only after the decision is made, does he

begin a detailed examination of something which may in many cases be

judgment rather than decision.

In Chapters Five and Six I will attempt to give an account of

ethical decision which will, I hope, clarify what goes on in the decision

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[1]Stephen Toulmin, An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics
(Cambridge: At the University Press, 1964), p. 4.

process when the ethical agent does not follow a rational, deductive
or quasi-deductive procedure similar to the procedures of ethical
justification. While this account will not cover all ethical decision
(since, for instance, some ethical agents may in fact regularly reason
in ways identical to the procedures of ethical justification), never-
theless, the account will extend into areas which, though they have
never received much attention from philosophers, may be fundamental
to the development of a workable practical ethic.

Before beginning this account, however, it will be necessary in
order to avoid confusion and unnecessary questions to (1) say a little
more about the distinguishing characteristics of decisions and judg-
ments, (2) give my reasons for dealing with decision as a mental
phenomena, (3) distinguish decisions from acts, and (4) give a pre-
liminary account of the relationship of decision and perception. These
matters will be the subject of the rest of this chapter. The next
chapter (Chapter Five) will begin with a discussion of the relation of
chess and ethics and will contain my account of chess decision. The
following and final chapter of this part (Chapter Six) will apply the
account of chess decision to ethical decision and discuss the impli-
cations of this new account of ethical decision in ethical theory.

General Characteristics of Decision and Judgment

Although my use of the terms "decision" and "judgment" may not
follow common philosophical use, it will still be very close to everyday
usage. I am using the terms in a fairly ordinary sense. By "decision"
I mean a mental process or activity sometimes called deliberation which

is often the cause of human action. By "judgment" I mean a mental process by which the worth of things and actions are evaluated.

There are some difficulties. My sense of decision must be distinguished from choice. There is a sense in which decision is the same as a choice. In that sense decision is considered to be the result of the mental process that I am here calling decision. For my purposes choice is such a result of decision and therefore is not a part of the phenomena which I am trying to isolate and examine. In addition, when I say that decision is a cause of human action, I do not mean that it is the only cause. I recognize that there are other causes for human action, such as emotion, random motion, reflex, whim, and so on. With regard to judgment, there are similar difficulties. By judgments, I mean primarily judgments involving the worth of actions, particularly actions caused by decisions. Judgments of worth in general, including judgments of actions, may often be a part of the decision process, but they are not what I call decision even then. Judgments in such cases serve a role not unlike that of facts. They are part of the basis for decision but not the decision process itself.

Both decision and judgment, as I am using them, have in common the fact that they are mental processes. They differ in that decision involves causing human action and judgment involves appraising it. The only exceptions to this characterization are judgments of worth of actions when they are part of particular decisions and decisions which cause an individual not to perform an action. Despite appearances, these exceptions do not offer any difficulty. There is nothing particularly remarkable about a decision that does not lead to an action. Nearly every decision involves not doing a number of actions. The only

interesting aspect of a decision not to do anything at all is the
absence of any positive action. Since such decisions as mental processes
are in every way the same as other decisions, there is no reason to
give them special status or regard them as mysterious problems. With
regard to separating judgments of worth which are parts of decision
from the decision itself, the following example might be helpful. In
making an aesthetic judgment, the judger as an ordinary person is not
involved in any decision or course of action. If, however, he is an
art critic who must judge an exhibition, give an award, etc., then the
situation is much different and a decision may be required. The awarding
of the prize may provide the winner with the encouragement and money
to continue his art and may affect many other artists as well as the
immediate course of contemporary art. In such cases, judgments of
worth will still be fundamentally involved but they may be subordinated
to a decision process which may, rightly or wrongly, involve many con-
siderations other than the particular works being considered at that
time. In these cases, the decision process can be clearly distinguished
from the judgmental one. If, however, no outside factors are taken
into consideration and the prize is awarded solely on the basis of
judgments of worth, there may be no decision process at all which can
be examined separately as a mental phenomenon. In such a case, the
judgments and the decision could be separated logically but not phe-
nomenologically since both the judgment and the decision occurred
simultaneously as a result of the same mental activity. While such a
case may represent a counterexample to the distinction I am making,
it is not overly important since my distinction will hold in the majority
of cases as we shall see in Chapter Five.

It is difficult to come up with universal characteristics of decisions since decisions seem to be related in terms of family resemblances rather than essences; however, there are a number of factors which generally figure in a characterization of decision. These factors are helpful in further distinguishing decision from judgment. First of all, decisions normally involve a problem. The problem is some situation in the world which is in need of resolution and can be resolved through some sort of human action. Unlike decision, judgment need not involve a problem at all. Secondly, the solution of the problem is unclear and often indeterminate. Various authorities agree on this point including Aristotle, Hare, Sartre, and Hempel.[1] The indeterminateness is in large part the result of inadequate knowledge of the present and the future. Hempel makes this point very clearly. He writes

> . . . we never have more than a very incomplete knowledge of the laws of nature and of the state of the world at the time when we must act. Our decisions must therefore always be made on the basis of incomplete information, a state which enables us to anticipate the consequences of alternative choices at best with probability.[2]

Except in very simple cases, this indeterminacy is always present and creates uncertainty in the mind of the agent even when he has adequately assessed the present situation and accurately calculated what will eventually happen. Similar indeterminacy and uncertainty do not occur in judgment which is not normally concerned with the results of future events. Finally, there is the problem of time. We have already noted that decisions usually are temporally prior to judgments and that future

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[1] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1112^{b}10; Hare, The Language of Morals, p. 59; Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions (New York: Citadel Press, Inc., 1957), pp. 24-25; Hempel, Scientific Explanation, p. 89.

[2] Hempel, Scientific Explanation, p. 89.

events play a role in decision to a degree not found in judgment. In addition, there are often time pressures associated with decision-making. The problem which must be resolved is a problem forced upon the agent by the events of the world. Generally, some action must be taken on these problems within a short period of time. Judgments seldom have any similar sense of urgency. Judgments concerning works of art, for instance, normally do not have any urgency about them at all. The judger is free to make his assessment immediately or mull it over at great length since nothing depends on the judgment. Although some decisions may on occasion be similarly free of time pressures, time pressure remains a key factor in most decisions, particularly in view of the tendency of the bulk of humanity to put off unwelcome decisions to the last moment.

In my discussion of the difference between decision and judgment, I have not so far identified one characteristic which clearly distinguishes decision and judgment. I am not sure that such a characteristic can be found; nevertheless, in order to make the distinction clearer, it might be helpful to look at the etymology and definition of the word "decision." "To decide" originally meant "to cut off." It is defined as: (1) "to arrive at a solution that ends uncertainty or dispute about," (2) "to bring to a definitive end," and (3) "to induce to come to a choice."[1] Synonyms include "determine," "settle," "rule," and "resolve" and have the following relationship to the word "decide":

> DECIDE implies the cutting off of debate, doubt or wavering; DETERMINE adds the implication of fixing something definitely or unalterably (decide to give a dinner; determine the guest list);

[1]Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, Mass.: G. and C. Merriam Co., 1965), p. 213.

> SETTLE implies a decision reached by someone with power to end all dispute and uncertainty; RULE implies a determination by judicial or administrative authority; RESOLVE implies a firm decision to act or refrain esp. after clearing up doubts or uncertainties or difficulties.[1]

From all this, it would seem that the main element of a decision is its ability to create certainty out of chaos, ending debate, uncertainty or doubt by cutting off all alternatives except the favored one. If this extrapolation is correct, it would appear that a difference between judgment and decision can be found. In these terms, judgment would be a second order activity appraising order already created and decision would be a first order activity creating this order.

This difference, if correct, helps us see that decision is a more difficult and complex activity than judgment. The determinateness resolved by the decision is largely absent in judging, for the indeterminateness has already been made determinate by the decision. As a result, it is easier to judge than decide. We often say with great certainty that someone should have done this or that instead of what he actually did. After listening with some annoyance, the reply will almost as often be, "That's easy to say now, but you probably wouldn't have done any better if you had been in my place." This answer is of great significance and has not received enough attention. The decision-maker had to create order. The moral judge does not. Since the action caused by the decision may have already run its course when judgment is passed, and all or most of the consequences may be clear, the judge may only need to compare the order which the decision attempted to create with the order in the world which actually resulted from the agent's action

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[1] Ibid.

in order to pass judgment. As a result, it may be possible for a person to pass judgment with great accuracy even though in a similar situation he may be just as helpless and prone to error as the decision-maker he is judging.

The situation is similar to that found in art. Many people are capable of learning enough about art to make judgments about individual pieces of art although they may never be able to create a work of art themselves or even duplicate one. Even though they can distinguish between good and bad art, they are unable to produce anything themselves. This difference between the creating and judging of art objects is generally recognized. We do not expect an art critic to be able to produce art himself no matter how much we respect his powers of judgment. The processes of creation and judgment are distinguished. It is acknowledged that the process of creation involves factors which are distinct from the process of judging the creation.

From these remarks it should be possible for the reader to get some idea about the differences between decision and judgment. Although the characteristics discussed in this section should not be taken as a rigorous analysis of what decision and judgment actually are, they should help in the identification of decision when it is encountered and investigated later in this and the next chapter. These characteristics will be especially helpful in evaluating the role of perception in decision and in testing the strength of the analogy between chess and ethical reasoning.

Decision as a Mental Phenomenon

There are several ways that decision may be approached. It may be treated in terms of formal logic, as a physiological process of the

brain, as observable behavior or as a private mental phenomenon. Such treatments are possible because all of these have something to do with decision. Each of them is compatible with the others for each represents a separate level of investigation. Decision does involve logic. It arises out of a physiological brain process. It is publicly observable insofar as it manifests itself in terms of action and choice. Finally, the human mind is aware of the decision process through its awareness of its own mental activity and life. In this part, not all of these approaches will be examined even though an examination of all of them together, if it could be accomplished, might give us the best picture of decision. The object of this part is to develop an account of decision which will suggest new ideas in the field of practical ethics. For this purpose, it will only be necessary to examine decision as a mental phenomenon.

Formal logic will not be considered as a central element in decision. Philosophers of science are generally agreed, whether they agree to a logic of discovery or not, that discovery cannot be accounted for purely in terms of formal logic. Those who do not believe that there is a logic of discovery consider the process of discovery to be a psychological rather than a logical one. Popper, one of the early formulators of this position, also held that the discovery process contained irrational elements which defied logical treatment.[1] Those who advocate a logic of discovery seek looser inferential forms which are not part of formal logic at least at this time. In saying that logic is not a part of decision, I am just accepting a distinction concerning

[1] Popper, Scientific Discovery, p. 32.

discovery already accepted on all sides in the philosophy of science and applying it to decision in ethics.

Decision as a physiological process is not considered in this dissertation because (1) such a physiological account, if possible, would involve investigations beyond the scope of this dissertation and very likely beyond the scope of philosophy and (2) it is pretty clear that such an account would not yield useful information in the field of ethics. One does not need a complete account of how an automobile works in order to drive one. Likewise, one does not need to know how the brain works in order to think and decide. The information derived from a physiological account may aid in efforts to correct defective brains medically, but it seems absurd to imagine that anyone would ever attempt to use such information to make a personal decision with his own mind or brain. No one will probably ever say that he decided to join the Free French Forces or stay with his sick mother by carefully altering the chemical balance in his frontal lobe.

An investigation of decision exclusively in terms of observable behavior is perhaps one of the most fashionable and at the same time weakest approaches. Behaviorism has been of particular importance to psychology as a means of avoiding talk about mental life. As a doctrine which denies mental life, however, it is clearly mistaken for, in that form, it denies phenomena of which the formulators of the doctrines themselves are immediately aware. The desire to simplify is considered commendable in both science and philosophy and simplification plays a role in the account given in this part; nevertheless, it is doubtful that an adequate account of decision can be given which is formulated completely in terms of publicly observable behavior. The performance

of an act is not a decision but the result of a decision and in some cases decisions may be made which do not result in public action as, for instance, (1) a decision not to do something, (2) a decision which one forgets to carry out and (3) a decision which turns out to be physically impossible to transform into action. Careful observation of an individual during the decision process itself (considered here to be the period of time prior to the performance of an act) would probably reveal that the subject concentrates his stare, wrinkles his forehead frequently, mumbles to himself or others, paces, shakes his head and so on. Such observations may provide criteria by which one could tell with a high degree of certainty when someone is in the process of deciding something but the particular behavioral manifestations during the decision process may be quite different from one person to the next and they can in no way be construed as a complete and useful account of decision. Nor can this behavior be taken as the equivalent of decision for one may frown, wrinkle his forehead, shake his head and so on when he is not making a decision. Although these behavioral manifestations can be said to occur when one is making a decision, they cannot be said to be what decision is.

This leaves only decision as a mental phenomenon. Since decision from this point of view is a private experience, it is difficult to make comparisons. The difficulty is not, however, overwhelming. The problem of describing the decision process will closely parallel the problem of describing private sensations generally. Wittgenstein deals with these problems extensively in the Investigations particularly in his examination of the word and sensation "pain." Wittgenstein did not intend to deny the existence of private sensations, nor that we are aware of such

sensations. At most, he only wanted to show that such sensations could not properly be taken as a key model of what we know epistemologically; and ontologically could not be treated in terms of an object-substance language. Private sensations are a special case in both epistemology and ontology. There is no criteria for first person cases. Having the sensation and knowing (being aware of the sensation) are the same thing whereas they are not in the second and third persons. Knowing that another person is in pain does involve publicly observable criteria. This position steers between the Cartesian and the behaviorist. By not taking private sensation as the model for what we know, the problems of solipsism and other minds do not develop. By not denying the existence in some sense of private sensations behaviorist dogmatism is avoided. The sensation is thus "not a something, but not a nothing either!" (PI I 304). Private sensations are maintained in an ambiguous status avoiding the absurdities and paradoxes of both the Cartesian and behaviorist positions. Decisions may be handled in much the same way.

Wittgenstein's beetle-box analogy (PI I 293) seems to offer a gentle compromise between the behaviorist and the Cartesian which permits public discussion and reference to private sensations without the necessity of creating an elaborate philosophical theory to account for them. Wittgenstein gives as his example a hypothetical situation in which everyone has a box which only they individually can see into. As a result, it is possible for everyone to have something different in his box, nothing at all, or something which is always changing. This is because, since no one can see into another's box for comparison, no common criteria can be formulated. Only a name can be given which stands for whatever is

in each box whether they are really the same thing or not. This name will be of importance only if whatever is in the box has some sort of role to play in our lives. For instance, in the case of pain, it is true that no one else can feel our individual pain and we can never know if what we call pain in ourselves is the same thing which all other persons experience. Yet this sensation is tied together with various sorts of situations in our publicly observable lives such as accidents. In these cases, the use of the word "pain" is associated with publicly observable criteria such as blood, groans and the like. It is technically speaking not necessary that the individual in such situations feel the same thing that I do or you do or that he feel anything at all; only that he exhibit the proper pain behavior. What this means is that we have objective standards (behavior) for asserting claims about pains in other persons regardless of whether their mental life is the same as ours or not. Such behavioral standards are more than adequate as long as (1) they are not used to portray decision as a mental phenomena which does not occur and (2) we keep in mind that our linguistic uses of these standards may in some cases erroneously prejudice us against conclusions reached phenomenologically.

Decisions, though not directly observable, play a role in our lives and their existence is manifested by the choices and actions which they cause. Although we talk of decisions and actually learned the concept of decision through language, we nonetheless, do experience mental phenomena as decision which we associate with our public decision talk. The room for error in associating mental life words with elements of mental life increases as the public criteria for public use of the word decreases. The word "pain" can be associated with the sensation "pain"

with a high degree of certainty. In the case of mystical words there is almost no certainty at all. Decision is somewhere in between. Thus, though it is difficult to talk of decision as a mental phenomenon, it is not impossible and good results can very likely be achieved if (1) not too much es expected, (2) there are not too many theory-laden assumptions, and (3) one is careful.

Decision and Acts

When I first introduced the term "decision" I described it as a mental process which is often the cause of human action. At this point, I would like to expand on this matter a little. For the purposes of this dissertation, I shall not regard decision as an act. By act, I shall here mean a movement of physical matter through time and space which has a definite beginning and end which is initiated by an agent and which is, at least in principle, publicly observable. Decision as a mental phenomenon cannot meet these criteria. I am aware that decisions are often spoken of as acts, but I wish to define act more narrowly here and in that way clearly separate the acts, which decisions generate, from the decisions themselves. I believe that our talk of decisions as acts is a remnant of the time when it was customary to treat the mind as a special kind of substance. Since this view of mind is no longer widely held, the assertion that decisions are acts can at most be considered metaphorical and potentially misleading. I, therefore, want to avoid this terminology.

I will, however, still regard decision as a mental process and even as a mental activity. I do not consider these quite as misleading as "act."

Separating decisions and acts is useful. For one thing, it permits me to clearly dissociate myself from behaviorist doctrine. Although I consider decisions to often be the cause of human acts, an act in my sense is not required in order for us to say that a particular mental process is a decision. In other words, a decision is a decision whether or not it is acted upon. The same goes for behavioral manifestations such as pacing and frowning and the like which often accompany decision. Although these manifestations may in some cases be taken as acts, they are in no way essential to a study of decision. Decision may occur independent of them and thus they are of no consequence in this investigation.

Iris Murdoch gives an example in her book The Sovereignty of Good which illustrates the point I am trying to make. Murdoch discusses a proper English lady's attitudes towards her daughter-in-law. At first the lady dislikes her daughter-in-law whom she decides is "inclined to be pert and familiar, insufficiently ceremonious, brusque, sometimes positively rude, always tiresome and juvenile."[1] Later she decides that her daughter-in-law is "not vulgar but refreshingly simple, not undignified but spontaneous, not noisy but gay, not tiresomely juvenile but delightfully youthful, and so on."[2] However, because she is a proper English lady with good upbringing, her "outward behavior, beautiful from the start, in no way alters."[3] If decisions are said to be acts or if an act is required in order for a mental process to be considered

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[1] Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), p. 17.

[2] Ibid., pp. 17-18.

[3] Ibid., p. 18.

a decision (theoretically), there might be some question about whether a person like the English lady is making decisions at all. By separating decision from act terminology no such difficulties can arise. A decision remains a decision whether or not it causes an act or is accompanied by behavioral manifestations.

Another reason for separating decisions from acts is that there are, I believe, elements of decision (and, on occasions, entire decisions) which are not acts in any sense. If decisions are considered to be acts, then the importance of these elements may not receive proper attention since they will appear as anomalous cases. These elements are perceptual and will be introduced separately in the next section.

Decision and Perception

In the forthcoming analysis of decision perception will play a major role. By perception I mean more than sensory impute. I also mean an organization or structure which is given to sensory impute by the human mind. Consider the duck-rabbit which Wittgenstein speaks of late in the Investigations (PI II 194). The duck-rabbit is perceived at two levels. It may be seen simply as a wiggly line and a dot. This is bare perception. On the other hand, it may be seen as either a duck or a rabbit or both. This is a higher level of perception. The wiggly line and the dot are structured and organized. This structure is partially dependent on the line and the dot and partially dependent on the mind which perceives it. The line and dot must be formed much as they are in order for the mind to see the duck or the rabbit. In addition, the mind must make a contribution beyond the bare perception of the line and dot in order for the duck or rabbit structure to appear.

Although the structure is in large part imposed on the line and dot by the mind, the imposition is not distinct from the perception itself. We do not see the duck or rabbit separate from seeing the line and dot. In many cases, people may have trouble seeing either the duck or the rabbit and may not be able to control the shift from one to the other. Most people, of course, do not have much trouble seeing both the duck and the rabbit; however, more complex Gestalt figures are often troublesome. Some people see them one way and cannot make the shift to the other structure occur. The shift from one perception of the figure to another is a mental phenomenon, but it is not always a straightforward agent directed mental act since we are often reduced to the role of a passive observer waiting for the shift to take place.

The same sort of perception occurs in complex human situations. Much of what we see in everyday life is a mix of sensory impute and imposed perceptual structure. Normally we do not see situations separate from the structure which the mind supplied. They come at the same time. On occasions, however, they may occur separately. Friends of mine, Doug and Vicki Huff, had an experience in Ankara, Turkey, in which layers of perceptual structure were gradually imposed.[1] Vicki dropped one of her contacts on the street in Ankara. Soon Vicki and Doug were down on their hands and knees looking for the contact. Immediately a crowd of Turks began to gather around the couple wondering about this curious behavior. Doug explained to one member of the crowd that they were looking for a contact. Since there was no word for contact in Turkish, it was translated "glass eye." Instantly the crowd's perception

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[1]Personal conversation.

of the situation was transformed from a perception of inexplicable move-
ment to the search for a glass eye. The crowd stepped back slightly
since people with glass eyes are popularly regarded in Turkey as sus-
picious and potentially dangerous and evil people. Then, when someone
noted that Vicki had both eyes and shouted in Turkish, "The eye exists!",
the perception of the situation shifted again and the perception was
finally matched up with the actual activity Doug and Vicki were engaged
in. These shifts were not strictly speaking agent controlled acts of
perception but were rather triggered by various remarks made to the
crowd which keyed the crowd into a series of perceptual reorganizations
of what they were seeing.

The Turkish incident itself has nothing to do with decision; how-
ever, similar perceptual shifts do take place which can be called
decision even though they are not strictly speaking agent controlled
mental acts. Consider the following excerpt from Tolkien's Farmer Giles
of Ham:

> The dragon was smoking and bellowing and losing all sense of
> direction. At last they came suddenly to the bridge of Ham,
> thundered over it, and came roaring down the village street. . . .
> . . . .
> Just outside the church the dragon gave up. He lay down
> in the middle of the road and gasped. Garm came and sniffed
> at his tail, but Chrysophylax was past all shame.
> "Good people, and gallant warrior," he panted, as Farmer
> Giles rode up, while the villagers gathered round (at a
> reasonable distance) with hayforks, poles, and pokers in
> their hands. "Good people, don't kill me! I am very rich.
> I will pay for all the damage I have done. I will pay for
> the funerals of all the people I have killed, especially the
> parson of Oakley; he shall have a noble cenotaph--though he
> was rather lean. I will give you each a really good present,
> if you will only let me go home and fetch it."
> "How much?" said the farmer.
> "Well," said the dragon, calculating quickly. He noticed
> that the crowd was rather large. "Thirteen and eightpence each?"
> "Nonsense!" said Giles. "Rubbish!" said the people. "Rot!"
> said the dog.

"Two golden guineas each, and children half price?" said the dragon.

"What about dogs?" said Garm. "Go on!" said the farmer. "We're listening."

"Ten pounds and a purse of silver for every soul and gold collars for the dogs?" said Chrysophylax anxiously.

"Kill him!" shouted the people, getting impatient.

"A bag of gold for everybody, and diamonds for the ladies?" said Chrysophylax hurriedly.

"Now you are talking, but not good enough," said Farmer Giles. "You've left dogs out again," said Garm. "What size of bags?" said the men. "How many diamonds?" said their wives.

"Dear me! dear me!" said the dragon. "I shall be ruined."

"You deserve it," said Giles. "You can choose between being ruined and being killed where you lie." He brandished Tailbiter and the dragon cowered. "Make up your mind!" the people cried, getting bolder and drawing nearer.

Chrysophylax blinked; but deep down inside him he laughed: a silent quiver which they did not observe. Their bargaining had begun to amuse him. Evidently they expected to get something out of it. They knew very little of the ways of the wide and wicked world--indeed, there was no one now living in all the realm who had had any actual experience in dealing with dragons and their tricks. Chrysophylax was getting his breath back, and his wits as well. He licked his lips.

"Name your own price!" he said. [1]
Then they all began to talk at once. . . .

In this story a decision takes place in some sense. After the dragon falls down in front of the church, the need for a decision arises. The townspeople need to decide whether or not to kill the dragon. They immediately set about making the determination. By the end of the excerpt the matter has been decided. The dragon will be spared in return for payment of large sums of money. Yet, if we look for an act which either actually is or signifies the decision, we find nothing satisfactory. The townspeople did not, after all, formally debate the matter, call for the question and take a vote. Trying to isolate the time when the decision was made is not helpful either. The question of whether or not the dragon should be killed is still at issue as late

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[1] J. R. R. Tolkien, "Farmer Giles of Ham," in The Tolkien Reader (New York: Ballantine Books, Inc., 1966), pp. 44-47.

as the point at which the dragon exclaims that he will be ruined. Suddenly after that, a shift occurs and a decision is required of the dragon rather than the people. This is evident from Farmer Giles' remark that the dragon must "choose between being ruined and being killed." The people's cry for the dragon to make up his mind emphasizes that the shift has occurred. It would not be correct to say that the people gave up their right to a decision since they still could decide to kill the dragon; yet, the decision is now in the hands of the dragon even though there is no point at which the people decided not to kill the dragon. There is, in other words, no moment or series of moments in which a decision is made and no act or series of acts which either are or signify the decision. Still, the people did decide in some sense for there is a definite turning point and they are, so to speak, acting of one mind even though there is no clear evidence of a specific agent directed action or series of actions which are publicly observable and which are or signify the decision beyond any doubt.

My solution is that there was a decision even though there was no _act_ of decision. Farmer Giles' statement to the dragon that he must "choose between being ruined and being killed," although not a decision or the report of a decision of the townspeople in the sense of an act, initiated a perceptual shift which radically restructured the situation. This shift was just as effective and objectively recognizable as a decision-act or the report of a decision-act even though strictly speaking there was no act of decision. The shift was immediately picked up by every participant including the dragon as the beginning of a new phase in the dispute. From that point on the major issue was

no longer whether the dragon would be killed (for that had already been "decided") but only how much the dragon must pay for his life. Yet although there was no act of decision in any ordinary sense, there still was in some sense a decision and this decision can (I believe) be best explained (understood) as a perceptual shift.

This shift fits the description of decision which I developed earlier in this chapter. I characterized decision as a mental phenomenon which sometimes caused human action and which made something indeterminate determinate. First of all, the shift is a mental phenomenon. Secondly, it is the cause of human action, letting the dragon go. Finally, it involves an indeterminate situation being made determinate. There is a definite movement from the problem of what to do with the dragon to the final solution of the problem. Thus, although this shift is not a straightforward case of an agent directed mental act, there are good grounds for considering it to be a decision.

The decision in the story is a group decision. Many people were involved in the decision to release the dragon. It should not be thought, however, that this type of decision is restricted to large groups. Imagine a case in which two people drinking a beer together are arguing about a course of action. After a lot of discussion, suddenly things ease and the conversation drifts to some topic not essential to the debate. A few minutes later one of the participants asks, "Well, are we or aren't we?" and the other replies, "Well, I guess we are." Sometimes the reply may be taken as a decision, if it is said with emphasis, for instance. Other times it may be said with resignation as if the participant is stating a fact. In such cases, it could be said that the decision was made "perceptually" just before the

conversation moved to the unrelated remarks and the question "Well, are we or aren't we?" is no longer a request for a decision but merely a request for verbal confirmation that the decision has been made. In some cases, one of the participants may simply state "Let's go!" indicating that he considers the decision made even though it has not been formally acted out any more than the townspeople in the story acted out theirs. It is possible, in fact, that conversational shifts to trivial subjects may even be a necessary part of such a decision process. The first participant may be giving the second participant time to let the new "perception" of the situation take hold or soak in.[1]

Some caution must be exercised at this point since what I have said so far does not establish a perceptual aspect in all decisions. I have only discussed a kind of perception which either arises spontaneously or is triggered by key remarks. The duck-rabbit figure is an example of the former and some variations of the two person example just given may be as well. The glass eye incident and the Tolkien story are examples of the latter. Of these, the glass eye incident is an example of perception but not of decision and the Tolkien story is an example of both perception and decision. The Tolkien story, however, does not give us conclusive grounds for thinking that there is a general relationship between decision and perception. The decision is a simple one of the yes-no or plus-minus variety. Farmer Giles' remarks were enough to trigger a shift which created an order which in turn functioned

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[1]For a parallel in terms of discovery see Wolfgang Koehler, The Task of Gestalt Psychology (Princeton: University Press, 1969), pp. 156-160. Koehler claims that a similar shift often occurs in scientific discovery as evidenced by the fact that major breakthroughs often come in taxi cabs and showers and the like.

as a decision. Most decisions, however, are more complicated. They involve problem-solving. As a result, they require more than just making any decision. They require making the right decision and by "right" I mean here one which leads to results of a desired kind. Thus, it is necessary to see if perception plays a role in problem-solving before we can say much about the relation of decision and perception generally.

As it happens, the examples of perception in problem-solving are not difficult to find. Perceptual shifts often occur in problem-solving situations. Suddenly the correct solution becomes clear and we "see" it. Quite often perceptual shifts occur without extensive examination of the problem taking place and in many cases the transformation from confusion and ignorance to knowledge is an instantaneous jump. This phenomenon is sometimes called seeing the answer "in a flash of light" and is sometimes represented by a light bulb lighting up in the mind. It is called insight behavior in some cases and in others intuition. It has been treated by some people as if it were the gift of the gods since it is not always straightforward agent controlled mental activity. It comes when it comes and if it doesn't come there is nothing that can be done about it. According to others it is the result of an intuitive faculty of the mind which, for some reason, not all people seem to possess or, if they possess it, are not able to use equally well.

Whether it is a special faculty or not, there can be no doubt that this kind of perception is a regular part of problem-solving. It is so wide spread in fact that it has even been documented in non-human species. The following account by Wolfgang Koehler of two chimpanzees,

one of which could obtain bananas from the ceiling by moving and standing

on boxes and one which could not, is one example of perception in problem-

solving among subhuman creatures. Koehler writes:

> It turned out that Rana simply could not imitate what Sultan had
> just done with the box. To be sure, she had realized that the
> box was an important object, for she now jumped up repeatedly from
> its surface--but without first moving it into the right position.
> Once she stood on the box in the posture of one who makes ready
> for a most strenuous action, then quickly jumped to the ground,
> ran to the place under the banana, and here jumped as high as she
> could--of course, in vain. The observer's impression was most
> convincingly that she tried to connect the box and banana by sheer
> speed. There was no improvement in several trials so that, even-
> tually, Sultan had to show once more how he did it. Afterwards,
> it was again Rana's turn. And now she clearly proved that she
> had entirely failed to understand the most crucial part of Sultan's
> action. She again approached the box, she also moved it, with
> great energy in one direction after another, but not in the right
> one, until at last she gave up and, sitting on the box, looked
> sadly at the distant banana. Obviously she could not recognize
> the most essential relation in Sultan's performance--a relation
> which, in the present case, extends from earlier parts of this
> performance to later parts. When Sultan begins to move the box,
> he already moves it toward the banana. But, for simple Rana, it
> is by no means necessary to relate this beginning of the movement
> to the place where it would later be useful in reducing the gap
> between the ground and the fruit. To Rana, the beginning of the
> movement may for instance, appear as a simple form of playing.
> Chimpanzees do simply push boxes around when they play. Or she
> may see the beginning of the movement as a movement away from the
> original place of the box, which would be a second, but again not
> the required, relation. Again, the movement might be seen as a
> movement parallel to one of the walls, and so forth. Why, then,
> should poor Rana move the box in the right direction? Once the
> box is in the right place, she will, of course, realize its value
> in this place. But this is later in Sultan's performance, and at
> this time she is not likely to think back to what happened before
> and now, retrospectively, grasp the right relation--the relation
> between the beginning of the movement and the final position of
> the box under the banana. The right relating of facts across time
> intervals is an extremely difficult achievement for the Ranas of
> this world. Mere seeing does not guarantee that successive events
> within a performance are correctly related.[1]

I am not suggesting that our investigations can be conducted through

the observation of chimpanzees. More complicated problem-solving

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[1] Koehler, The Task of Gestalt Psychology, pp. 158-160.

procedures beyond the present abilities of chimpanzees must be examined
if an account of the role of perception in human problem-solving and
human decision is to be developed. The kind of perception essential
for Rana to understand how Sultan gets bananas, however, is one kind
of perception which will be essential to my account. As Koehler notes,
this "seeing" is more than mere sense perception. It involves grasping
the significance of many interrelationships between objects as they
relate further to goals and projects of the perceiver.

Even though perception is not generally accepted today in my sense,
the role I am suggesting perception plays in decision is consistent
with some ancient and modern philosophers. Although Aristotle did not
develop a detailed theory of perception, his work as I interpret it is
full of references to perception in my sense, particularly in his ethics.
Early in his ethics Aristotle notes that exact determinations concerning
anything perceived by the sense cannot be achieved by reasoning alone
and must ultimately be decided by perception.[1] Later he states that
perception rather than scientific knowledge is fundamental to practical
wisdom.[2] In this instance particularly he is making a point very similar
to my own since his conception of practical wisdom includes deliberation
which is the Aristotlian equivalent of what I mean by decision process.
His discussion of perception and intuition at the end of the Posterior
Analytics may also be relevant.[3] Aristotle talks about foreknowledge
there carefully dismissing the approach Plato suggests in the Meno.

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[1] Nicomachean Ethics 1109^{b}20-24.

[2] Nicomachean Ethics 1142^{a}25-30.

[3] Posterior Analytics 99b20-100^{b}15.

The insightful and intuitive phenomena which sometimes appear to be foreknowledge are part of the perceptual phenomena which I am trying to identify in this section.

With regard to contemporary discussion of perception, my position is in substantial agreement with that of Michael Polanyi and, I will argue in Part III, Wittgenstein as well. Polanyi particularly has done extensive work with regard to perception in problem-solving, rule-governed behavior and reasoning. His work in many respects is a much better case for perception, especially in the philosophy of science, than has been presented by Toulmin and Hanson, discussed earlier in this chapter. Polanyi has demonstrated very convincingly that perception must be accepted as a critical element in almost any task, mental or physical. According to Polanyi, it even plays a more fundamental role in human activities than do rules. Consider the following example from Polanyi's work.

> . . . from my interrogations of physicists, engineers and bicycle manufacturers, I have come to the conclusion that the principle by which the cyclist keeps his balance is not generally known. The rule observed by the cyclist is this. When he starts falling to the right he turns the handlebars to the right. This results in a centrifugal force pushing the cyclist to the left and offsets the gravitational force dragging him down to the right. This maneuver presently throws the cyclist out of balance to the left, which he counteracts by turning the handlebars to the left; and so continues to keep himself in balance by winding along a series of appropriate curvatures. A simple analysis shows that for a given angle of unbalance the curvature of each winding is inversely proportional to the square of the speed at which the cyclist is proceeding.
> But does this tell us exactly how to ride a bicycle? No. You obviously cannot adjust the curvature of your bicycle's path in proportion to the ratio of your unbalance over the square of your speed; and if you could you would fall off the machine, for there are a number of other factors to be taken into account in practice which are left out in the formulation of this rule. Rules of art can be useful, but they do not determine the practice of an art; they are maxims, which can serve as a guide to an art

only if they can be integrated into the practical knowledge of the art. They cannot replace this knowledge.[1]

Many of Polanyi's basic positions on perception and rules are implicit in this example: (1) rules do not need to be known to perform a task skillfully, (2) often tasks are performed skillfully without knowing the rules, (3) often the rules are not known to anyone, and (4) in some cases even knowing the rules is of no help at all.

Polanyi is also able to make the same case with regard to scientific reasoning. Speaking of reasoning he says:

> No rules can account for the way a good idea is found for starting an inquiry; and there are no firm rules either for the verification or the refutation of the proposed solution of a problem. Rules widely current may be plausible enough, but scientific enquiry often proceeds and triumphs by contradicting them. Moreover, the explicit content of a theory fails to account for the guidance it affords to future discoveries.[2]

Polanyi goes on to maintain that perception can account for the way we reason. He claims that "trained perception is basic to all descriptive sciences" and "the logic of perceptual integration may serve . . . as a model for the logic of discovery."[3] I shall maintain in this part on similar grounds that trained perception is basic to decision-making and that perception can be the basis for an adequate account of the logic of decision-making.

To see how these sorts of positions relate to ethics it is only necessary to compare my position in this part with that of R. M. Hare.

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[1] Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 49-50.

[2] Michael Polanyi, "The Logic of Tacit Inference," in Human and Artificial Intelligence, ed. by Frederick J. Crosson (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), p. 220.

[3] Ibid., p. 221.

Although Hare approaches my position in many respects, we differ on three major points: (1) the role of perception, (2) the role of principles or rules, and (3) the nature of decision. The most basic of these is our disagreement over perception. Hare denies that decisions can be based on perception. He says, "And it should not need pointing out that decisions of this kind are decisions, and not, as Aristotle seems sometimes to think, exercises of a peculiar kind of perception."[1] Hare replaces perception with principles. There are arbitrary decisions, he says, which do not involve principles, but all proper decisions do involve following and modifying principles.[2] Despite their heavy involvement with principles, however, decisions are treated by Hare as ultimately prior to principles and more fundamental than them. Even though principles in some respects often determine decisions, decisions are still more fundamental since we must decide to follow the principles.[3]

On the subject of the ultimate status of decision, I cannot deny that such decisions are sometimes made, especially by existentialists; however, I suspect that they are not much more common than decisions to speak the language of the country we live in, decisions to obey the laws and customs of our country, and decisions to treat people as beings like ourselves rather than as robots or phantoms. I also suspect that Hare's conception of decision unnaturally restricts what can be called decisions. I doubt very much, for instance, that Hare would consider that the people in the Tolkien story made a decision. With regard to

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[1] Hare, The Language of Morals, p. 54.

[2] Ibid., pp. 51-52.

[3] Ibid., p. 69.

perception we need only look briefly at Hare's own arguments to see

how strained they are. Consider the following argument from The

Language of Morals.

> Drivers often know just what to do in a certain situation
> without being able to enunciate in words the principle on which
> they act. This is a very common state of affairs with all kinds
> of principles. Trappers know just where to set their traps,
> but often cannot explain just why they have put a trap in a par-
> ticular place. We all know how to use words to convey our
> meaning; but if a logician presses us for the exact definition
> of a word we have used, or the exact rules for its use, we are
> often at a loss. This does not mean that the setting of traps
> or the use of words or the driving of a car does not proceed
> according to principles. One may know how, without being able
> to say how--though if a skill is to be taught, it is easier if
> we can say how.
> We must not think that, if we can decide between one course
> and another without further thought (it seems self-evident to
> us, which we should do), this necessarily implies that we have
> some mysterious intuitive faculty which tells us what to do.
> A driver does not know when to change gear by intuition; he
> knows it because he has learnt and not forgotten; what he knows
> is a principle, though he cannot formulate the principle in
> words. The same is true of moral decisions which are sometimes
> called 'intuitions' because we have learnt how to behave, and [1]
> have different ones according to how we have learnt to behave.

The examples which Hare gives would be considered by most people and

most philosophers to be examples illustrating the role of perception,

not the role of rules and principles. Instead, Hare uses them as an

indication that we have somehow in our minds principles which were

never learned and which cannot be expressed, but which are still known

and applied in a non-perceptual sense. Such principles are to me more

mysterious than the "mysterious intuitive faculty" which Hare is trying

to avoid. I myself am not interested in developing a theory about an

intuitive faculty; however, perceptual abilities which can be readily

observed in humans and animals and directly experienced by ourselves

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[1] Ibid., p. 64.

cannot be easily dismissed by talk about mysterious principles which we often have no knowledge of in any ordinary sense. Like Polanyi, I am convinced that rules and principles are not adequate as an account of mental operations and consider perception to be a more plausible account than the one we find in Hare.

CHAPTER V

CHESS DECISION

Introduction

Wittgenstein often uses chess analogies in his philosophical work
particularly in investigations of the nature of rules. Although his
treatment of chess has little to do with ethics, it does display some
of the usefulness of chess as a model. With regard to ethics speci-
fically, chess has been introduced as a model for ethical reasoning on
at least two occasions. Stanley Cavell uses chess to differentiate
two kinds of rules found in ethics and R. M. Hare uses chess briefly
as a model for ethical reasoning.[1] The idea of using chess as a model,
thus, is not entirely new to philosophy or ethics.

In this chapter and in the chapters following I will use chess
as a model for ethical reasoning to an unprecedented degree. I will
begin this chapter with a section on the relationship of chess and
ethics and the advantages and disadvantages of the model. Then I will
discuss Wittgenstein's conception of following a rule. Finally, I
will conclude with a discussion of Adriaan de Groote's psychological
studies on chess reasoning. This chapter will call special attention
to the way rules are used in chess reasoning. The conclusions drawn
with regard to chess decision will be applied to ethical decision in
the next chapter.

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[1]Stanley Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say? (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1969), pp. 25-29; R.M. Hare, Freedom and Reason,
Galaxy Books (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 55.

Chess and Ethics

Chess and ethics are analogous in at least seven ways. I shall discuss each of these in some detail as they constitute my primary reasons for employing chess as a model for ethical reasoning. They are similarly concerned with consequences and involve similar difficulties in determining consequences. They have similar time problems. They have similar difficulties assessing the value of the elements of problem at hand. They both use rules as guides to decision. They both involve cognitive and emotional elements and, finally, both deal with intentions. In addition, I shall mention other advantages and a few disadvantages of the model. I shall argue that none of the disadvantages are significantly detrimental.

Both chess and ethics have similar problems with determining consequences. In the last chapter I pointed out the difficulties involved in accurately calculating consequences in ordinary life. It was noted that our incomplete knowledge concerning the state of the world and the laws of nature often forced us to make decisions based on incomplete knowledge.[1] Chess decisions suffer identical limitations. This fact, however, has been obscured by some writers who have claimed that, since chess has a finite solution, chess decisions are in principle based on complete information. Von Neumann and Morgenstern,

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[1] Hempel, _Aspects_, p. 89; Hare, _Language of Morals_, p. 59.

for instance, have claimed that chess is a game of perfect information.[1]
Such assertions are entirely misleading. Most chess games take 25 to
40 moves to play. Edward Lasker has calculated that, if a machine
was built and programmed to process and evaluate the first 25 moves
of the game of chess and if it had the capacity to evaluate 1,000
moves a second, it would still take four and a half billion years for
the computer to get to the ninth move.[2] Human beings, of course, have
less trouble playing chess because of their superior ability at evalua-
ting moves; nevertheless, assuming that a chess player can determine
which three moves are the best possibilities (and assuming that on the
average there are only three good moves), there are still 729 positions
to be considered, still far too many to look at in the time limits
imposed by the chess clock in actual games.[3] Thus, although chess is
a finite game, obtaining a complete solution to the game would be
similar to finding a complete deterministic solution to future events
in the universe, and even at the practical level where only a few
moves are being considered the number of possibilities are so great
as to make exact calculations impossible except in cases were the

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[1] John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and
Economic Activity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), pp.
124-125.

[2] Edward Lasker, "The Electric Chess Player" in The Adventure of
Chess (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1959), p. 214.

[3] Richard Reti, Modern Ideas in Chess (New York: Dover Publica-
tions, Inc., 1960), pp. 5-6.

moves are forced.[1] This difficulty, which the chess player shares with his ethical counterpart, is one of the key factors which makes chess decision a good model for ethical decision.

Part of the reason for not being able to determine consequences accurately is that the chess player does not have enough time to consider all possibilities. He has time problems in the sense that there is seldom enough time in any practical sense to make a systematic, detailed examination of all practical move possibilities. As just noted, the possibilities quickly become too great. In addition, the chess player has time pressures in another sense. Tournament and match play utilize clocks which give the chess player about two and a half to three minutes per move. If the player does not make all of his moves within the specified time, he loses the game. These time pressures are very similar to time pressures experienced by ethical agents. In many ethical situations, no reasonable amount of time will permit a complete analysis of future possibilities resulting from proposed courses of actions and in most cases the ethical agent has some specific deadline for making his decision which serves as an additional handicap. As a result, time pressures are often common to both ethical and chess decision, particularly considering the natural tendency of most people to put decisions off to the last moment.

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[1]A forced move is a move in which the detrimental consequences are so great that to fail to make the "forced" move loses the game (for instance, moving the queen to avoid capture). Only such moves can be predicted with complete accuracy.

Since precise calculation is not possible, the chess player must rely on the help of tactical and strategic rules and on the value determinations which he can make with regard to the actual position and the possible future positions which he has time to examine. Value determinations appear at first to be more exact in chess than in ethics. This appearance, however, is for the most part illusory. It is possible to assign numerical values to each of the pieces on the board much the way one assigns values to cards in bridge bidding. The total value expressed in terms of pawns provides information about the material strength of each player. Material advantage, however, is inadequate as a measure of the value of positions in most cases for three reasons. First of all, in addition to material advantage positional advantage must be considered and it defies numerical presentation. Secondly, series of moves often occur in chess which force a win despite the material strengths of the players. These series of moves are called combinations. Botvinnik defines a combination as "a forced variation with sacrifice."[1] The key element is the sacrifice which involves a voluntary disregard of relative material value. In such cases, the numerical value structures break down. The sacrifice, thus, signifies that there has been a valuational transformation in which the standard means of assessing value no longer apply.[2] Thirdly, no firm relationship between positional and

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[1]M.M. Botvinnik, "What is a 'Combination'?" in One Hundred Selected Games (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1960), p. 267.

[2]Emanuel Lasker, Lasker's Manual of Chess (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1947), pp. 109, 166.

material value and combinational opportunities has ever been established. Wilhelm Steinitz has claimed that good positional play must lead to combinational possibilities, but, as Lasker notes, sounding very much like Hume on "is" and "ought", this "must" is more like an "ethical power."[1] The limited usefulness of material value, the presence of positional value features and the regular emergence of combinational play which renders both positional and material advantage meaningless, force the chess player to constantly rely on valuational techniques which are non-numerical and which are, therefore, similar to those which must be applied by the ethical agent who in practice is also unable to rely on numerical valuation in most cases.

The application of rules in chess and ethics is also very similar; however, since there are two kinds of rules in chess and only one kind has its counterpart in ethics, we must distinguish them before the close relationship can be clearly seen. In chess, as Cavell notes, we find rules which constitute the playing of the game and rules which guide us in playing the game well when we happen to be playing it.[2] Those rules which constitute the rules of the game I shall call "constitutive rules." These rules include descriptions of how the queen, knight and the other pieces move. To violate these rules means that chess is no longer being played. If, for instance, a player insists on moving the queen as a knight, then the game is no

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[1] Ibid., p. 215.

[2] Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, pp. 29-30.

longer chess, but something new which the wayward player is inventing on the spot. Constitutive rules are very similar to laws of nature which describe physical limitations in the real world. The chess player can no more make a queen move like a knight than he himself can make his body walk through a wall. Constitutive rules are, in effect, a description of the powers and limitations of the pieces over which the player, as a player of chess, has no choice. As a result, constitutive rules have no real counterpart in ethics since the ethical agent does have a choice about the employment of ethical rules.

Ethical rules are actually analogous to strategic and tactical rules of play. Following these rules on the proper occasions may help the chess player play better and achieve his goals more often. The chess player is not obligated to follow them and following them at the wrong time may lead to terrible results. They serve only as guides to action and not as categorical imperatives. Under certain circumstances it may be best to follow the rules "Control the center of the board," "Exchange a knight for bishop," "Control the seventh rank with your rook," etc., but numerous situations can easily be imagined in which the rules either have no application at all or only make the player's situation worse if he follows them. Similar difficulties are encountered in practical ethics where principles such as "Tell the truth" and "Keep promises" may on occasion lead to morally improper results. These rules are intended for the most part as guides to achieving morally acceptable ends. When it can be seen that bad results will follow from an application of such a rule and when the intentions of the agent are proper, deviation from such rules

are morally acceptable. I shall call these sorts of rules "noncon-
stitutive" in both chess and ethics. Although they guide our deci-
sions and choices of courses of action, we are not, under normal
circumstances, required to follow them and not following them does
not necessarily involve violating the conditions which constitute
what chess is or what ethical life is. Continual disregard for these
nonconstitutive rules will, of course, amount to a violation of these
conditions as in the chess game played by two inmates of an insane
asylum in Beckett's Murphy.[1] In this game the constitutive rules of
the game are not violated but, because the players considered the
capture of each others pieces in bad taste, the game resembles some-
thing more like a geometrical ballet than a game of chess. In like
manner, a person who persistently disregarded ethical rules would
not be considered to be engaged in an ethical life even if the dis-
regard for the rules never led to consequences which would result in
moral disapproval. Aside from such cases, my distinction between con-
stitutive and nonconstitutive rules holds and the nonconstitutive
rules in chess function in much the same way as most moral rules in
practical ethics.

Strategic and tactical rules in chess are especially interesting
to deal with because they are the product of several centuries of
theoretical investigation which is similar to parallel attempts to

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[1] Samuel Beckett, Murphy (New York: Grove Press, 1957), pp. 243-245.

find the laws of the universe in science and the ultimate ethical principles in ethics. The theoretical history of chess began during the Renaissance. The constitutive rules of the game were established by 1600. They received little more attention except for a brief period in the early twentieth-century when some important players erroneously held that the game of chess was on the verge of being solved causing some speculation about what changes could be made in the constitutive rules to give the game new life. Aside from this brief and pointless period of speculation about constitutive rules, the theoretical history of chess has been devoted entirely to a search for tactical and strategic (nonconstitutive) rules which help one play better.

The development of nonconstitutive rules was not easy. It was the product of a number of centuries. In the late sixteenth century a system for recording moves was developed and games began to be recorded and studied. The first stages of theoretical study involved the cataloguing and evaluation of openings. Play beyond the opening continued to be combinational without any regard for principles of development or position. Philidor was the first player to publish a theoretical work on chess. His book on the role of pawns published in 1749, although said to have "taken chess out of the narrow confines of Euclidean observation into the boundless realm of Cartesian thought,"[1] was not generally accepted and play continued to be primarily

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[1] M. Euwe, The Development of Chess Style, translated by W.H. Cozens (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1968), p. 7.

combinational. By 1851 combinational chess play had reached its peak
with the games of Adolf Anderssen. Anderssen's genius and insight
which created brilliantly long and complicated combinations, however,
could not be reduced to rules and principles. The games of Anderssen
and others of this romantic period of chess reveal instead the incre-
dible feats which can be accomplished by human minds without the use
of any strategic or tactical rules and without any of the theoretical
knowledge available to the novice of today. Such feats, however, were
soon swept aside by players armed with theoretical knowledge. Modern
chess began with Morphy who introduced rules of play into the game
through his own accomplishments over the board. In 1858 Morphy went
to Europe and promptly beat every chess player he could find including
Anderssen. After seven games Anderssen resigned from the match con-
ceding that he had little hope of beating Morphy.

Study of Morphy's games revealed rules of play which permitted
players of lesser ability to easily beat stronger intuitive players.
The discovery of these rules ushered in a quest for objective rules
of play. In the hands of Wilhelm Steinitz this search reached the
level of a scientific inquiry. The rules found in Morphy's games came
to be considered the rules for open play in which complications were
avoided and advantages were made permanent by trading pieces. These
rules, however, were found to be of little use in closed games in
which the center of the board was blocked and manuverability was
limited since closed games, it turned out, required other sets of
rules. Steinitz first developed rules for the closed game and followed
them with principles for half open games which share some of the

characteristics of both open and closed games. Steinitz' theoretical research and speculation popularized by Tarrasch and others led the players of the turn of the century to believe that they were on the verge of finding all the objective principles of good play and that soon the game would be completely solved to the point that players employing these principles could neither win nor lose unless someone made a mistake. This objectivity, however, was not realized and the belief was given up in the 1920's when the hypermoderns demonstrated that the counterpositives of most rules of play could also produce winning results at grandmaster level when these new rules were applied by the right player.

Despite extensive synthesis of the hypermodern and scientific technique, the mythos of scientific discovery was broken. Today chess players do not speak of principles which will solve the game of chess. Such principles are now sought after only by computer programmers who generally have great faith in their machines and little knowledge of chess. Style, personality and talent are now seen as significant elements, perhaps superceding the tactical and theoretical rules of chess theory. It is believed by some, in fact, that these elements are the basis of the theoretical rules which have been developed.[1] The fall of scientific principles in chess and the recognition that these principles are only heuristically valid closely parallels similar developments in ethical theory. Today many ethical philosophers

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[1] Euwe, Chess Style, p. ix; Richard Reti, Modern Ideas in Chess, translated by John Hart (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1960), pp. 119-127.

no longer have any desire to seek the ultimate principles of ethical reasoning, and though they may consider ethical principles as appropriate guides for most situations, they recognize the limitations that such principles have.[1] This similarity also enhances the analogy between ethics and chess.

This point is particularly clear if one compares the principles Fine presents in his beginner's book Chess, the Easy Way with the moral principles which most of us learn as children. Although chess principles are the result of the theoretical investigations just described, none of the principles are true in all cases. The chess student must learn the principles, learn the kinds of situations for which the principles are appropriate, and learn how to apply them to the situations when they occur. We have the same difficulty with moral principles.

So far I have maintained that chess and ethics have common problems with determining consequences, with overcoming time pressures, with evaluating present and future states of affairs and with the use of nonconstitutive rules. These similarities represent a number of good reasons for using chess as a model for ethical reasoning. In addition, there are three other similarities, which while not of the

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[1]Hare, Language of Morals, pp. 58-60; Stephen Toulmin, "Is There a Fundamental Problem in Ethics?", Australian Journal of Philosophy, XXXIII(May, 1955), 1-19; Stephen Toulmin, "Principles of Morality," Philosophy, XXXI (April, 1956), 146-150; Sartre, Existentialism,pp. 24-28; A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1952), pp. 102-114; Anthony Flew, "Conscious Use of Models in Ethical Analysis," ETC: A Review of General Semantics, XI (Summer, 1954), 284-289.

same significance as the first four, do show how suitable the analogy actually is. First, it is interesting to note that, although chess does involve cognitive processes, it is not actually an intellectual activity. No relationship has ever been established between intellectual ability and chess ability (dG 361-370). Since it is desirable that an ethical reasoning procedure be suitable for all people without regard to their intellectual capabilities, the lack of relationship between chess and intellectual ability makes it more likely that the analogy between chess and ethics will be a good one. Secondly, chess and ethics have similar involvement with human emotions. Chess and ethical decisions often induce similar emotional stress. Furthermore, both chess moves and ethical actions, real or imaginary, can be recorded in dramatic form. The reinactment of these actions stir us emotionally in much the same ways. Thirdly, since the chess player in playing chess is interacting with another human being, in addition to the problems posed by the geometrical configuration, the chess player must also judge the intentions of his opponents.[1] While these elements common to both chess and ethics are not themselves adequate justification for using chess as a model for ethical reasoning, they do help to display what a complex and rich analogy it is.

In addition to these similarities, chess also has big methodological advantage over ethics. A chess position has a more definite character than an ethical situation. Since there is a simple notation for recording positions and moves, the chess position can be described

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[1]Lasker, Manual of Chess, p. 128.

precisely in terms of its geometrical relationships. This description, of course, does not in any way constitute an understanding of the position. Knowing where the pieces are is not the same as knowing the dynamic interrelationships between the pieces in the position. Those relationships remain to be discovered by the player. Being able to precisely capture all of the elements of the chess position in terms of diagrams and notation, however, is of great benefit to someone wishing to use chess play as a model for human thought. The simplification introduced by the notation makes it easy to identify exactly what the chess player is considering. In real life situations no similar notation is available and the elements involved are potentially greater and more nebulous. In addition, in ethical situations the description is more likely to require an understanding of the problem than in chess. In other words, assumptions about the nature of the problem may be needed in order to initially select and describe those elements which make up the situation. In chess, however, the problem can be precisely described in terms of a sixty-four square space without involving any assumptions or understanding of the actual problem. Thus, what the chess player is thinking about can be identified precisely and simply without any reference to the problems being considered. This capability makes possible more accurate data collection in the study of the chess thought process than is possible in the study of the ethical thought process.

Despite all these similarities and the methodological advantages, however, it must be admitted that the analogy is not perfect. There are some dissimilarities. For one thing, chess reasoning is probably

much more nonverbal and visual than ethical reasoning. Secondly, ethical action is often considered to involve noncognitive elements called habits. Habits have no similar role in chess decision. Thirdly, ethical reasoning often involves following rules regardless of consequences and this sort of rule-governed activity is alien to chess. Finally, chess is a game and ethical activity is not. I shall consider each of these one at a time.

With regard to the first dissimilarity, it is true that the chess player is concerned primarily with the movement of objects through space to a degree which the ethical agent usually is not and his investigations may be visual without any verbal, mental or oral, accompaniment; nevertheless, (1) most of this visual, nonverbal reasoning could be expressed in words if the chess player chose to do so and (2) the chess player is considering powers and properties of the various pieces which are not visual in the sense of bare perception. Ethical agents also contemplate actions which are movements through space and consider the powers and objects in the world including themselves and other people in ways similar to the chess player. The dissimilarity is not, therefore, a major difficulty since it is only a difference of degree.

Habits do play a role in ethics that they do not play in chess. Some characteristics of chess style, of course, may be habitual. We might say, for instance, that a chess player is in the habit of opening with his queen pawn rather than his king pawn. He may be in the habit of trading queens every time he gets a chance. Such habits, however, are not essential to chess decision which is a cognitive

process because in so far as habits are noncognitive tendencies to act in particular routine ways and are automatically performed without conscious awareness, they bypass the decision process and in some cases permit moves to be made without any decision process taking place at all. Such habitual moves may prove fatal to the chess player particularly if his opponent is versed on his routine play. In ethical life habits may play a more positive role, permitting the automatic, routine performance of many acts which do not require deliberation or decision; however, as replacements for decisions, they are no more desirable in ethics than in chess. Thus, even though habits do not play a positive role in chess similar to the one they sometimes play in ethics, they do not affect the suitability of chess as a model for ethical reasoning since habits are not part of the decision process.

With regard to rule following, it is true that rules are often followed in ethics in a way that they are not followed in chess. On some occasions ethical activity functions deontically. Rules are followed because they are the rules to be followed and the consequences of following these rules are not taken into consideration. There is no deontic rule following in this sense in chess. Chess play is always oriented towards consequences and as such is teleological. If ethics were considered to be an entirely deontic enterprise, this difference would be fatal; however, in so far as ethics is considered to be a teleological system the model holds very well. Furthermore, even though radical rule-following without regard to consequences is completely alien to chess, rule-following does occur in many cases in

a modified form within the context of consequence oriented decision-making. Principles can be used in chess to guide decision in a way very similar to the way principles are used in practical ethics to guide conduct. This often occurs particularly in those cases in which all consequences are considered equal. The chess player in such cases may base his decision solely on some principle or concept for want of something better. Since radical rule-following in ethics may be a theoretical consideration which seldom appears in practice, there may not be any actual difference between chess and ethics in practice.

Finally, using chess as a model for ethics does not in any way suggest that practical ethics is a game. The fact that chess is a game is not particularly important in terms of the analogy I am drawing between chess and ethics. The similarities which I wish to emphasize are the rule-governed and rule-following aspects of chess and especially the decision process which is employed in making individual chess moves. In this respect, we shall not be particularly interested in the thought process as a part of a series of decisions constituting a particular game except in so far as they, along with other pertinent data, contribute to particular (one move) decisions. Even the chess player, however well he may be able to calculate his move possibilities, must like his ethical counterpart make his decisions one at a time. That the chess player has in mind the ultimate checkmate of the enemy king will not be any more or any less significant than the ethical agent's long range goals (to be happy, etc.). Furthermore, although the chess player, as a participant in the game

of chess, has no control over these long range goals which are established by the basic constitutive rules of the game, he does have control over his short term goals and in this respect the limited goals which the chess player decides on and the decisions which serve as means to these ends simulate ethical activity very closely. Thus, within this narrower context, chess decision parallels much ethical decision-making of the problem-solving variety. These relationships are only obscured if the game aspect of chess is needlessly emphasized.

It would be foolish to claim that chess and ethics are similar in every respect. There are respects in which chess and ethics are very dissimilar. This, however, is to be expected in every model and every analogy. Moreover, none of the difficulties discussed above seriously call into question the applicability of chess as a model for ethical reasoning and the similarities give every indication that the model is a good one.

Rule-Following

As noted in the last section, the theoretical history of chess has largely been a search for a set of rules which when followed will lead to won games. The history of the chess development of most chess players parallels this historical trend. Chess novices begin by studying rules of how to play the game. Fine's beginner's book Chess, the Easy Way, for instance, contains lists of rules for the opening, middle game and end game. The rules for the opening, for instance, include such rules as "Do not bring your queen out early," "Play to

get control of the center," "Develop knights before bishops," "Make one or two pawn moves in the opening, not more," etc.[1] The beginner is supposed to learn the rules, learn how to recognize situations in which the rules apply, and learn how to apply them in those situations. The procedure even in advanced books is often the same. Fine, for instance, in his widely acclaimed book on chess endings provides very complicated rules for his readers. Here is one example.

> Rule 4. If the Black King is on the same rank as the Pawn, and the White Rook is on the first rank, White to play always wins when the Pawn is on the second, third, or fourth rank, wins if and only if his King is three ranks behind the Pawn on the fifth rank, two ranks behind the Pawn on the sixth rank, and on the same rank as the Pawn on the seventh. In addition, if the Kings are on the same rank as the Pawn on the seventh rank. In addition, if the Kings are on the same side of the Pawn, White must never have to move into a position in which the Black King has the opposition.[2]

Such examples show that chess play is regarded as a rule-governed activity by most players whatever the skill level. They believe that chess is a matter of learning rules and applying them.

A justification of this conception of chess play is given by Emanuel Lasker in his Manual of Chess. In his chapter on chess openings he says that the study of compilations of games alone does not provide an adequate basis for chess playing skills. One must in addition find rules which the games exemplify. He writes:

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[1] Reuben Fine, Chess, the Easy Way (New York: Cornerstone Library, 1942), pp. 29-44.

[2] Reuben Fine, Basic Chess Endings, Tartan Books (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1941), p. 274.

> There is justification for the compiler. But can
> a player hope to become a master merely by studying a
> compilation? No. That were (sic) possible if the num-
> ber of the different lines of play were small. In Chess,
> however, that number no matter how critically one may
> select and how many feeble lines of play one may reject,
> goes into many millions. The brain cannot encompass
> them by a process of mere compilation. One must there-
> fore search for rules, laws, principles capable of com-
> prising within their compass the result of a thousand,
> nay of ten thousand different variations.[1]

In his chapter on chess education he returns to the same theme.

> Education in Chess has to be an education in in-
> dependent thinking and judgment. Chess must not be
> memorized, simply because it is not important enough.
> If you load your memory, you should know why. Memory
> is too valuable to be stocked with trifles. Of my fifty-
> seven years I have applied at least thirty to forgetting
> most of what I had learned or read, and since I succeeded
> in this I have acquired a certain ease and cheer which
> I should never again like to be without. If need be,
> I can increase my skill in Chess, if need be I can do
> that of which I have no idea at present. I have stored
> little in my memory, but I can apply that little, and
> it is of good use in many varied emergencies. I keep
> it in order, but resist every attempt to increase its
> dead weight.
> You should keep in mind no names, nor numbers nor
> isolated incidents, not even results, but only methods.
> The method is plastic. It is applicable in every situa-
> tion. The result, the isolated incident is rigid, be-
> cause bound to wholly individual conditions. The method
> produces numerous results; a few of these will remain
> in our memory, and as long as they remain few, they are
> useful to keep alive the rules which order a thousand
> results.[2]

According to Lasker, the possibilities of the game of chess are too

great for human minds. These possibilities, therefore, can only be

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[1] Lasker, Manual of Chess, p. 40.

[2] Ibid., pp. 337-338.

handled in terms of rules which cover thousands of cases and thereby keep our minds from becoming clugged up with endless amounts of data. Rules, according to Lasker, have easy application while the data which the rules represent may have very little application at all. Thus, Lasker says it is better to learn rules of play rather than to study enormous numbers of particular cases with only limited application.

The tendency towards rules is a common tendency in many areas in addition to chess and similar reasons for rules are produced to justify their use. Since ethical reasoning is often regarded as a rule-governed activity, much effort has been expended through the centuries to find rules which apply to many cases and which when applied lead to morally favorable results. It will, therefore, be especially interesting to see how well the model of rule and application works out in chess.

Before going on to chess reasoning, however, it might be useful to take a look at the role of rules in mathematics and logic since mathematics and logic have long been considered model rule-governed activities. In this regard Wittgenstein's remarks on the problems involved in logical and mathematical rule-governed reasoning in the Investigations, The Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, and parts of On Certainty should help provide a basis for evaluating rule-governed reasoning procedures in chess and ethics.

Philosophy has traditionally given logic and mathematics a special status. They have been the model by which philosophers hoped to approach greater degrees of certainty in other fields. Physics was

quantified to make possible the employment of mathematical reasoning and formal logic was applied to the reasoning in those fields which could not be quantified. The certainty achieved in these fields has been the result of rule-governed mathematical and logical procedures. Ethics and chess have likewise been influenced by this logico-mathematical model. In both areas ethicists and chess theoreticians have sought the principles and rules which govern ethics and chess respectively and have sought to understand how to apply them properly. Wittgenstein's analysis of mathematics and logic, however, suggests that rule-governed procedures play a less decisive role in mathematical and logical reasoning than has previously been supposed. His analysis casts doubt on the role of rule-governed procedures in other fields as well.

In the _Investigations_ Wittgenstein devotes much effort to explaining what it means to follow a rule and what it means to say that someone knows how to follow a rule. The explanations turn out to be complicated and not all of them support the model of rule and application. Wittgenstein gives the following example:

> A writes a series of numbers down; B watches him and tries to find a law for the sequence of numbers. If he succeeds he exclaims: "Now I can go on!"--So this capacity, this understanding, is something that makes its appearance here.--A has written down the numbers 1, 5, 11, 19, 29; at this point B says he knows how to go on. What happened here? Various things may have happened; for example, while A was slowly putting one number after another, B was occupied with various algebraic formulae on the numbers which had been written down. After A had written the number 19 B tried the formula $a_n = n^2 + n-1$; and the next number confirmed his hypothesis.
> Or again, B does not think of formulae. He watches A writing his numbers down with a certain

> feeling of tension, and all sorts of vague thoughts go
> through his head. Finally he asks himself: "What is
> the series of differences?" He finds the series 4,
> 6, 8, 10 and says: Now I can go on.
>   Or he watches and says "Yes, I know that series"--
> and continues it, just as he would have done if A had
> written down the series 1, 3, 5, 7, 9.--Or he says
> nothing at all and simply continues the series. Per-
> haps he had what may be called the sensation "that's
> easy!". (Such a sensation is, for example, that of a
> light quick intake of breath, as when one is slightly
> started.) (PI I 151)

In this example Wittgenstein gives us a number of alternative accounts

of what goes on in someone's mind when he comes to understand how to

continue a series of numbers. Only the first possibility clearly

follows the pattern of rule and application. In this case B looks for

a rule and then applies it. The second case may be a case of rule

and application but it need not be. B does not look for a rule. After

some confused thoughts he notes the series of differences and is able

to go on with the series. After noting the differences he may find

a rule which he then applies and he may proceed in a way similar to

the third or fourth cases. He may, as in the third case, remember the

series and continue it from memory or, as in the fourth case, it is

possible that nothing at all occurs in his head except perhaps a

feeling that the solution is easy and he continues the series without

any thought process at all. The continuation, for instance, may

simply appear on the paper or on the blackboard through the medium

of the hand and, if B hesitates, the ability to go on may disappear

as quickly as it came. Any of these accounts could be an accurate

description of what goes on in B's head. The first case, rule and

application, thus, has no special priority as the account of how B

understands.

Furthermore, finding the rule or formula is certainly not what understanding is. As Wittgenstein points out, "it is perfectly imaginable that the formula should occur to him and that he should nevertheless not understand (PI I 152)." Descartes and Beeckman, for instance, found the correct formula for accelerating falling bodies without recognizing it.[1] What we call understanding in B's case need not be something in B's mind at all "for even supposing I had found something that happened in all those cases of understanding,-- why should it be the understanding? (PI I 153)." What is pertinent, Wittgenstein says, are the circumstances: "If there has to be any-thing 'behind the utterance of the formula' it is particular circum-stances, which justify me in saying that I can go on (PI 154)." In most cases we say that a person understands if he is able to go on and continue the series; nevertheless, although the ability to go on is a criterion for saying that someone understands, it is not what understanding is either.

Wittgenstein indicates that understanding is a state. He says, "The understanding itself is a state which is the source of the cor-rect use (PI I 146)." However, speaking of understanding as a state is confusing, Wittgenstein says, and because of this confusion he considers it inadequate as an explanation as well (PI I 149). He also rejects talk of understanding as a mental process on the same grounds (PI I 154). There are two perspectives from which the problem of

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[1]Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, pp. 37-49.

understanding can be approached. The special mental experience of the individual involved may be important from his point of view, "but for us it is the circumstances under which he had such an experience that justify him in saying in such a case that he understands, that he knows how to go on (PI 153)."

The difficulties involved in letting the individual's feeling that he understands signify understanding are disclosed by cases in which the individual appears at first to understand and then deviates in such a way that we can no longer believe he understands at all. This is particularly clear in cases in which the individual defends the deviation. Wittgenstein gives the following example:

> Now--judged by the usual criteria--the pupil has mastered the series of natural numbers. Next we teach him to write down other series of cardinal numbers and get him to the point of writing down series of the form
>
> 0, n, 2n, 3n, etc.
>
> at an order of the form "+n"; so at the order "+1" he writes down the series of natural numbers.--Let us suppose we have done exercises and given him tests up to 1000.
> Now we get the pupil to continue a series say "+2" beyond 1000--and he writes 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012.
> We say to him: "Look what you've done!"--He doesn't understand.--He answers: "Yes, isn't it right? I thought that was how I was meant to do it."--Or suppose he pointed to the series and said: "But I went on the same way."-- It would now be no use to say: "But can't you see...?"-- and repeat the old examples and explanations.--In such a case we might say, perhaps: It comes natural to this person to understand our order with our explanations as we should understand the order: "Add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000 and so on.
> Such a case would present similarities with one in which a person naturally reacted to the gesture of pointing with the hand by looking in the direction of the line from finger-tip to wrist, not from wrist to finger-tip. (PI I 185)

In this case the pupil thinks he is doing what was meant, what the examples he was given indicated, and he thinks he understands; yet, from our standpoint he doesn't understand. This example shows that understanding must in some cases be something other than a feeling that one understands or even a displayed ability to follow a formula. One may feel he understands when from our point of view he does not. Also, he may think he understands (because he has got the right answers several times) and his failure to obtain right answers in future cases may still convince us and him that he doesn't understand at all.

The pupil's position nevertheless, is stronger than one might suppose at first. The assertion that the pupil misunderstands is difficult to justify. In Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics Wittgenstein says defiantly, "However many rules you give me--I give a rule which justifies _my_ employment of your rules (RFM I 113)." He says in addition, "We might also say: when we _follow_ the laws of inference (inference-rules) then following always involves interpretation too (RFM I 114)." Wittgenstein's point is that rules do not really compel us to draw specific conclusions. In addition to ridiculous cases in which a person behaves in a manner similar to that of Humpty Dumpty in Through the Looking-Glass there are other cases in which people with the sincere intention of behaving in accordance with the rules still interpret the rules in unusual ways and reach strange conclusions.[1] Such people can not be considered guilty of

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[1] Lewis Carroll, The Annotated Alice, with introduction and notes by Martin Gardner (New York: Bramhall House, 1960), pp. 261-276.

failing to follow the rules since they follow the rules in the normal way. The difficulty is that they do not understand the rules in the sense in wich they were meant. Rule-following, thus, involves factors which are not logically contained within the rules.

Wittgenstein does concede that there is something which makes certain results and certain interpretations of the rules preferable to others. He says:

> Nevertheless the laws of inference can be said to compel us; in the same sense, that is to say, as other laws in human society. The clerk who infers...must do it like that; he would be punished if he inferred differently. If you draw different conclusions you do indeed get into conflict, e.g. with society; and also with other practical consequences. (RFM I 116)

These factors are, however, not part of the rules since they are empirical restraints, which are only contingent, rather than logical elements of the rules. As a result, successful rule-following often requires taking into consideration the contingent empirical context or circumstances within which the rule is introduced and applied. In such cases, the rule-following loses its necessary logical character.

In addition to social convention and the facts of the world there is something else, according to Wittgenstein, also distinct from logical compulsion or necessity which is involved in the actual use of rules. (Here we are again speaking of application rather than justification.) In On Certainty Wittgenstein speaks of something extra which cannot be described. He writes:

> But can it be seen from a rule what circumstances logically exclude a mistake in the employment of rules of calculation?
> What use is a rule to us here? Mightn't we (in turn) go wrong in applying it?

> If, however, one wanted to give something like a
> rule here, then it would contain the expression "in nor-
> mal circumstances." And we recognize normal circum-
> stances but cannot precisely describe them. At most we
> can describe a range of abnormal ones.
> What is 'learning a rule'?--<u>This</u>.
> What is 'making a mistake in applying it'?--<u>This</u>.
> And what is pointed to here is something indeterminate.
> (OC 26-28)

Wittgenstein is saying in these paragraphs that there are other fac-

tors other than logical ones which exclude mistakes. These, he says,

are "normal circumstances" which are "indeterminate" and can only

be indicated by the word "<u>this</u>." A few paragraphs later Wittgenstein

makes an even stronger assertion. He claims that rules in many cases,

rules for calculating, for instance, are not really needed at all.

He writes:

> If you demand a rule from which it follows that there
> can't have been a miscalculation here, the answer is that
> we did not learn this through a rule, but by learning to
> calculate.
> We got to know the <u>nature</u> of calculating by learn-
> ing to calculate.
> But then can't it be described how we satisfy our-
> selves of the reliability of a calculation? O yes!
> Yet no rule emerges when we do so.--But the most impor-
> tant thing is: The rule is not needed. Nothing is
> lacking. We do calculate according to a rule, and that
> is enough.
> <u>This</u> is how one calculates. Calculating is <u>this</u>.
> What we learn at school, for example. Forget this trans-
> cendental certainty, which is connected with your con-
> cept of spirit. (OC 44-48)

Although Wittgenstein does acknowledge that we do calculate according

to rules, he suggests that rules are often not involved in calculation

or in checking calculations. Calculating is described in the same

manner that learning rules and applying them is described. He

characterizes it with his indeterminate and indescribable "<u>this</u>."

This "this" is supposed to be some factor which is necessary in addition to the rule and which may in some cases provide adequate guidance without the rule actually being involved.

The Blue Book provides some clarification of this point. In the Blue Book's version Wittgenstein begins by making a distinction between "a process being in accordance with a rule" and "a process involving a rule" (BL 13). Being in accordance with a rule simply means that a rule can be produced which, if followed, produces the desired result. It does not mean that this rule was actually used. Involvement of a rule means that the rule was actually used in the thought process to get the desired result. Wittgenstein gives the continuation of the series, 1, 4, 9, 16 as an example. He says, "What I wrote is in accordance with the general rule of squaring; but it obviously is also in accordance with any number of other rules; and amongst these it is not more in accordance with one more than with another (BL 13)." For instance, the rule instructing the agent to increase the differences by two with the first difference being an odd number or a rule stating that the differences will be the series of odd numbers will achieve the same results as a rule about squaring the cardinal numbers. None of these rules need to be involved in the calculation of the next number. One of these rules would be involved only if the person continuing the series used it. Yet, the correct continuation is still in accordance with all of these rules whether any of them are used or not. Thus, when Wittgenstein said that "we do calculate according to a rule, and that is enough (OC 46)," he was

not in any way making the claim that rules were always used (involved) in calculations.

Also, we must ask whether Wittgenstein's introduction of "this" implies intuition. Wittgenstein denies intuition in the Investigations. He says there that "it would almost be more correct to say, not that an intuition was needed at every stage, but that a new decision was needed at every stage (PI I 186)." This paragraph certainly excludes intuition but it does not necessarily deny a perceptual account. In addition, Wittgenstein does not wholeheartedly endorse fundamental decisions (in Hare and Sartre's sense) since he only says that "it would almost be more correct to say" that they were decisions. The "almost" shows the tentativeness of his conclusions. Furthermore, the "this" itself could be emphasizing a perceptual element. Although it may not be intuitive, it still may be something similar to what I brought up in my section on perception in the last chapter. Elsewhere, Wittgenstein seems to be making this sort of point. Speaking of what we do when we attempt to explain to someone how we meant them to follow our rules, Wittgenstein says:

> I wanted to put that picture before him, and his accep-
> tance of the picture consists in his now being inclined
> to regard a given case differently; that is, to compare
> it with this rather than that set of pictures. I have
> changed his way of looking at things. (PI I 144)

Although this position is much different than that of an intuitionist, it is still very similar to perceptual positions like that of Polanyi, Hanson, and Toulmin.

It is not unlikely that the difficulties which Wittgenstein points out about rules generally will also apply in chess play. Wittgenstein

himself seems to have thought so for he says in the Blue Book, "If

we are taught to play chess, we may be taught rules. If then we play

chess, these rules need not be involved in the act of playing chess.

But they may be (BL 13)." In the next section we will examine chess

play itself to see what insight it can give us into the nature of

the decision process. In particular we shall examine the role of

rules in chess play and the role of the indeterminate perceptual-like

element ("this").

Chess Decision

A fascinating and brilliant book has been written on the psycho-

logy of chess decision. The book is Thought and Choice in Chess by

Adriaan de Groote. De Groote is an anti-associationist psychologist

interested in applying Otto Selz' anti-associationist psychology to

chess playing. De Groote himself is an expert chess player in Holland

who, therefore, had access to chess players of all levels of ability

from the beginner to grandmasters including past, present and future

world champions. To test Selz' conclusions de Groote adopted a modi-

fied method of introspection. In the primary experiment he showed

chess players of all skill levels three chess positions and asked

them to try as far as possible to think aloud as they determined what

move should be made in each case. De Groote in a sensitive introduc-

tion and epilogue discusses many of the drawbacks of the method

acknowledging particularly that the nonverbal aspects of chess think-

ing and the potentially inhibitive requirement to think aloud may

cause some distortion (dG 80-84). Nevertheless, it is difficult to

imagine how else one could go about examining the decision process

and, as stated earlier, the geometric aspect of chess makes it possible to more exactly identify what the chess player is thinking about than is possible in other decision activities.

De Groote identifies three to four major phases which appeared in the thinking aloud statements which he called protocols. De Groote writes:

> The four Phases are:
>   1. The First Phase of Orientation, especially orientation to possibilities. What we find here is largely 'looking at' the consequences of moves and general possibilities in a certain direction.
>   2. The Phase of Exploration. The subject tries out rather than 'investigates' possibilities for action. He calculates a few moves deep a few sample variations, or what he considers to be the main variation; if these are unsatisfactory he puts the move(s) in question temporarily aside.
>   3. The Phase of Investigation. There is a deeper, more serious search for possibilities, strengthenings, etc., that are quantitatively and qualitatively quite sharply defined. The investigation is more directed and much more exhaustive: more variants are calculated and they are calculated more deeply.
>   4. The Final Phase of Proof. The subject checks and recapitualates, he strives for proof; the obtained results are made into a subjectively convincing argument. A certain completeness is sought in the calculation of results, be it for the positive or negative part. (dG 267)

I shall follow de Groote closely except that I shall treat the orientation and the exploration as one phase. This is justified in terms of de Groote's work by his admission that "a chess protocol can be divided into any number of phases and subphases (dG 102)" and by his use of the collapsed three phase description elsewhere in the book (dG 179).

Of the three phases, the orientation phase is the most unnatural. Such orientation phases seldom occur in actual games; however, since each position was taken from the middle of a game, the player in the

experiment had to go through a period of orientation which he would not necessarily have been undertaken in actual games. Several of the players including some grandmasters complained that it was difficult to get into the position because the history of the position, the motives and intentions of the player, and his general plan were not known (dG 84-87). Some players felt it necessary to attempt a kind of reconstruction of the position--i.e., how it came about--before going on to the problem of future action. Although this artificial orientation phase may create some distortion in de Groote's study of actual chess decision, it, if anything, improves our analogy of chess and ethical thought by making the decisions studied more like those ethical decisions which often are not part of an ongoing series of actions and decisions.

De Groote divides the orientation phase into three parts: the static moment, the dynamic moment, and the evaluative moment (dG 149). The player begins by simply looking at the chess board (static moment), then he begins examining the dynamic relationships between the pieces (dynamic moment), and finally he appraises the position (evaluative moment). In many cases these moments follow in a temporal order. In others, evaluation may occur before the dynamic phase. De Groote writes:

> Without considering a particular position and, to a degree, the personality of the subject, it does not appear possible to determine whether this very first evaluation occurs before or after the (very first) dynamic operation. Even in a very early stage some degree of mutual interaction between the results of dynamic orientation and evaluation appears. (dG 156-157)

Similar problems are encountered in trying to temporally separate the static and dynamic moments. De Groote writes:

> With the master perception and abstraction proceed in an automatic way. Only the very first few seconds of the thought process can be considered 'pure perception.' (dG 151)

Thus, the three moments are actually in general only logically distinct. They may not occur in actual cases in the expected temporal order or as completely distinct parts of the thought process.

The separation of the moments is directly related to the skill level of the player. Players of lesser skill are more likely to display the moments as distinct parts. Highly skilled players do not. For them, the separation collapses and the moments take place simultaneously if they take place at all. De Groote writes:

> From a comparison of protocols of different subjects it appears that the process of specializing and concretizing is carried out much more quickly, to a higher degree, and more adequately--i.e., compared with the objective solution--by the master than by the less skilled player. This was particularly evident from the experiments in which the subject was interrupted after ten or fifteen seconds of looking and thinking. When asked to give as good a recount as possible, the masters often appeared to be completely 'in the know' after this short exposure time. Not only did they remember the position, perhaps with the exception of some unimportant detail, but they also knew quite often what was at stake and in which direction to search, which methods of play and/or moves were considerable, what was within reach, etc. (dG 200)

The situation is completely different with less skilled players. De Groote writes

> ...with regard to the evaluation of the position, it is clear that there is a large difference between the masters (plus expert players) and the less strong players (of the W- and C-classes). For the latter group the 'integration' requires much more effort; correspondingly,

> they remain much more uncertain of their evaluation.
> They do not express their evaluative judgments as easi-
> ly as the masters do, in whose protocols the first lines
> often contain a judgment of the position already...
> Often no evaluative statements at all are found in the
> protocols of the weaker players. If, at the end of the
> experiment, the experimenter asked their opinion, it
> sometimes appeared that even then they had not arrived
> at a definite judgment. (dG 156)

Thus, with regard to highly skilled players, perception of the board

and recognition and evaluation of the problem may take place almost

automatically. Statements by the better players as they describe

the situation on the board often already contain evaluational com-

ments. The integration of these moments is directly related to

ability and skill at the game.

After the player has determined a few move possibilities, planned

the direction he will take, and evaluated his position, the investi-

gative phase begins. A special characteristic of the transition is

the focusing of attention on certain possibilities without prior cal-

culation or investigation. In the investigative phase, the player

examines the possibilities which he has predetermined in the orienta-

tion phase. One of the main methods is "trying out." This approach

is primarily empirical in nature. De Groote writes:

> Trying out, by actually doing and trying out as a
> mental operation, forms a very important (help) method in
> thinking and decision making in general. But in chess
> thinking this method is of prime importance. The entire
> thought process may be conceived as an empirical thought
> investigation: by trying out moves and plans in one's
> head, the player determines their worth. No other
> argument can stand up against the empirical argument.
> (dG 293)

Although the investigation is empirical, however, the player still

does not examine every possible move. We have seen the impossibility

of trying to do so earlier. In order to surmount this difficulty,
the chess player avoids complicated solutions and looks at simpler
possibilities first. De Groote writes:

> Since risky moves require keener and deeper cal-
> culations than safe moves, another element is present in
> such a rejection; namely, the avoidance of voluminous
> calculations. Indeed, this may be an autonomous motive.
> Continuations that can be reasonably evaluated via ela-
> borate calculations are deferred sooner. (dG 273)

De Groote calls this tendency a natural indication of the economy of
thought inherent in chess decision making (dG 273).

The way in which the chess player avoids voluminous calculations
is through what de Groote calls "progressive deepening." De Groote
writes:

> The term denotes a remarkable phenomenon peculiar to
> rather lengthy thought processes that are needed for
> solving difficult choice problems. The analysis of a
> certain idea (plan), move, or variant proceeds pro-
> gressively in successive phases of (re-) investigation,
> either immediately or non-immediately. The investiga-
> tion not only broadens itself progressively by growing
> new branches, countermoves, or considerable own-moves,
> but also literally deepens itself: the same variant
> is taken up anew and is calculated further than before.
> (dG 265)

The analysis of progressive deepening is the key to understanding the
investigative phase. As de Groote notes, one of the primary character-
istics of progressive deepening is immediate and non-immediate rein-
vestigation. We shall discuss favorite formation and feelings of
maximum and minimum expectancy.

Reinvestigation involves the reconsideration of series of moves
a number of times in the thought process. When de Groote first ob-
served reinvestigation, he was tempted to consider it a sign of

weakness of memory. He rejected this conclusion, however, on the grounds that reinvestigation was almost identical in all players at all skill levels from the beginner to the grandmaster. De Groote writes

> ...it seems in order to stress once again the importance
> of the phenomenon of re-investigation. In particular,
> the phenomenon cannot be interpreted to reflect some
> sort of weakness of the human mind: 'indecisiveness'
> or 'weakness of memory.' If that were true the weaker
> players especially would produce many 'repetitions,'
> but this is by no means the case. In Section 36 the
> phenomenon was shown to be practically a general one; non-
> immediate re-investigation alone, for instance, was found
> in more than half of the protocols of the main series. ...
>   Absence of non-immediate re-investigation rarely
> appears when the following three conditions are fulfilled:
> (1) the subject is a strong player; (2) he makes a serious
> effort; (3) he has to solve a difficult problem. (dG 170)

Assuming that all elements found in the thought process must have importance (since in most respects unnecessary calculation was avoided as much as possible), de Groote concluded that the reinvestigation must have some significant role considering its prominence in the investigative phase. Specifically, he concluded that it "provides an instance of the method of 'progressive deepening' (dG 171)."

If we consider every series of possible moves to be represented by a small letter, an investigative phase may be represented in the following manner:

d-a-e-c-c-e-c-e-d-d-e-e-e-d-d-e-d (dG 170).

Here we see examples of both immediate and non-immediate reinvestigation. It should not be supposed, according to de Groote, that the reinvestigation is simply a continuous duplication of the first investigation. If this were so, then only weakness of memory would be an

adequate account. This view must be discarded since there is no variation with skill level. The only other alternative is that the player is doing something different in each reinvestigation even though he is seemingly only going over moves previously studied in a mechanical manner. Here is a possible account. The player examines line of play d mumbling something like "If this, then this, and he will do this and his knight can't move." Then he may say, "But wait a minute, what about the bishop" and he examines line d again. In these cases the player is not doing the same thing because in each case he is going through the moves with a different problem in mind; he is "seeing" the problem as something different in each case, the problem of the knight and the bishop respectively. This involves a perceptual shift from the problem as the knight to the problem as the bishop. In this manner, according to de Groote, the solution and the problem are being examined simultaneously by the same procedures (dG 183). What this means is that when the perception of the problem shifts, this shifting requires that the previously studied lines must be re-investigated in terms of the new updated perception of the problem. In the first example given above, the board is seen in terms of a problem involving a knight and the player is attempting to solve this problem. In the second example, he has seen a second danger, the bishop, and he goes through the same moves again in terms of the new problem, the bishop. Each example involves a different perception of the problem and this perception directly affects goal formation and solution attempts. What this indicates is that much of the decision-making process is taking place largely on a perceptual level. This

means that the nature of the problem will remain in continual flux throughout the investigative phase. Only at the end of the investigative phase is the choice of move made and the perception of the problem fixed and concretized.

Another aspect of progressive deepening is favorite forming. The player often immediately focuses on particular lines of play. The preference for these lines of play is not determined by investigation. Favored lines of play simply emerge early in the investigative phase and even in the orientation phase. This phenomenon which de Groote calls favorite forming is the counterpart of elimination of bad lines of play. De Groote writes:

> The process of favorite forming is obviously the counterpart of elimination. While elimination proceeds from an originally rather neutral, explorative way of investigating to a negatively directed one, here the development proceeds from neutral to positive. (dG 177)

The favorite actually complements the elimination process. The favorite serves as a standard by which other move possibilities can be evaluated. At the same time, the elimination process strengthens confidence in the favorite by highlighting its superiority over the discarded possibilities. The emergence of the favorite is due in most cases, according to de Groote, to linkings with the past experience of the player, particularly at master level. De Groote writes:

> In a great many cases, at any rate with masters, we may ascribe early favorite formation to an automatic activity of experiential linkings. First to come up for investigation in a given position is the special method of play which attends its 'type' and its (type of) core problem. If there is only one move that can achieve something positive in the direction defined by type, core problem, and estimated value, then this move automatically becomes the favorite. If there are more moves that correspond to the direction (board goal), often while scanning the possibilities the subject 'intuitively' chooses a tentative

> favorite. Rarely does completely pure, comparative examination of different considerable moves or plans occur without a trace of emotional preference for one of them.
> (dG 195)

These favorites, based on past experience and intuitive and emotional preference, do much to bring about the speedy concretizing of the problem.

One final feature of the investigative phase is the presence of feelings of minimal and maximal expectancy. Nearly all of the methods of the investigative process are to some degree dependent on these feelings (dG 195). Through these feelings the value of the position is compared with the value of the results of various possible moves. According to de Groote, these feelings of expectancy fulfill a quantitative role. De Groote attempts somewhat unsuccessfully to discuss them in terms of numbers (dG 196) since in actual practice, these feelings provide comparative valuations than numbers can provide.

If the player finds a move which gives him a feeling of value close to his maximal expectancy, he will often abbreviate the investigative process. If a move is below the minimal expectancy, it will be rejected immediately. It should be noted that maximal expectancy is not the same thing as estimated value which is lower. De Groote writes:

> The chief difference between the maximal expectancy and the estimated value is that the former contains an element of hope and is not independent of the will to win. The latter is more nearly objective: it is the rating that the subject would assign to the position at a particular stage if asked to evaluate, as objectively as possible, the position on the board. The maximal expectancy is the rating he would give if asked how much he could hope to attain in the position, given 'good' play by the opponent.
> (dG 196)

The player seeks to move towards his maximal expectancy while at the same time establishing a floating minimal expectancy which gravitates towards the maximal expectancy throughout the investigative phase. De Groote writes:

> Through the establishment of a minimal expectancy, the margin of uncertainty within the estimated value is bounded from below. But sometimes, in addition, the estimated value is heightened: provisionally if the minimum found is lower than the original estimated value but definitely if the minimum found is higher than the original estimated value.
> In the event that the minimum found should exceed the maximal expectancy as well (i.e., the subject finds an unexpectedly favorable possibility), the result will be both a rise in the estimated value and a (temporary) vanishing of the margin of uncertainty between the maximal expectancy and the estimated value as they both rise to the level of the newly found minimum. If after finding the minimum the subject tries anew to improve it, there is a difference again between estimate and expectancy.
> (dG 214)

These emotional features of the investigative phase are extremely interesting. They provide a quantitative-like basis for comparison of position possibilities with a very high degree of accuracy. Just how remarkable these features are cannot be grasped until it is realized that numerical quantification is almost useless in this phase of the thought process.

Furthermore, in addition to their valuational role these emotional factors on occasion also function very much like some sort of pre-knowledge. It is almost as if the player knows the solution before he has made any investigations. The investigations themselves are carried out in such cases only in order to work out the details and confirm the feeling of maximal expectancy which is forcefully directing the attention of the player to the particular line.

De Groote cites one example which is particularly convincing.
Without looking at any other possibilities, the chess player immedi-
ately tackled the problem of solving a lengthy but winning combina-
tion. The player went over the moves required for the combination
but had one of the moves out of order. Despite repeated attempts to
recalculate the combination, the player failed to move the obstinate
move into its proper place. The inability to work the combination
gradually caused the player to express a great deal of frustration
with himself. Reluctantly he eventually turned to the examination
of other move possibilities selecting one of them, but still con-
vinced that the combination was there even though he couldn't work
it out. De Groote notes that "with such a highly specialized
anticipation of the nature of the combination, it would certainly
not have been accidental had the subject indeed found it (dG 211)."
In other words, we have something very much like "knowing" in this
case since trial and error behavior can hardly explain such selected
investigative effort. According to de Groote, knowledge in chess
need not be explicit. De Groote writes:

> Such familiarity does not have to consist of an explicit
> knowing that a certain method (which can be put into
> words) has been applied in situations of a certain
> character (which can be described). In many cases the
> process is rather one of immediate routine actualization
> of the method of play itself without intercession of
> any formulatable knowing. (dG 211)

This sort of knowing is reminiscent of the remembering of the Memo
and the perceptual accounts in Polanyi's works. The example given
here is a dramatic one, but not far removed except in degree from the
selectivity and direction found in the trying out of the orientation

and exploration phase and the favorite forming of the investigative phase. It is the same emotional feelings of expectancy which are serving as directional pointers in all cases. As such, they represent a kind knowledge possessed by the player prior to the knowledge he acquires through the investigative phase.

At the end of the investigative phase a decision is made concerning which of those moves considered is the best move. At this point the thought process moves into the final phase, the proof phase. De Groote characterizes this phase as involving "the _striving_ _for a_ '_proof_' and for rounding off the thought process (dG 145)." De Groote writes:

> The final form of reasoning adopted by the subject is always a subtle and precise adaptation to the situation on the board (that is, to his perception of it) and to the way his total problem conception is developing. The problem of how to structure the 'subjectively convincing argument' transforms itself to conform to this development. To the extent that the completeness is considered difficult to attain or less essential the subject then completes it with non-probative arguments: emotional, intuitive, and/ or deductive arguments of a general nature. This _intuitive_ _completion of the argumentation_ is an important method of chess thinking (dG 285).

In those cases where all alternative move possibilities have bad results or do not solve all of the perceived problems on the board, the proof phase will involve nothing more than a review or recapitulation of the alternatives in comparison with the preferred move and all the alternatives will be systematically discarded. In cases in which the situation is much more complicated and unclear the elimination process will be less complete and the player will show more tentative approval. He will say something like "I guess I'll play _a_; I don't see anything better (dG 285)." Since in most cases, as has

been pointed out earlier, the situation will be too complicated for a complete mathematical solution, the proof phase does not constitute a decisive argument, but rather only a search for a decisive argument. As the player compares the alternative moves to the preferred move, his feeling of confidence and certainty in the preferred move will increase. This growing feeling of certainty is the "intuitive completion of the argumentation (dG 285)." The proof phase in this respect is similar to favorite forming in the investigative phase except that the problem has already been fixed and concretized, to use de Groote's expressions. As pointed out in the discussion of the investigative phase, the player's conception of the problem and the solution are in flux and continually changing, progressively deepening particularly as a result of immediate and nonimmediate reinvestigation. With the selection of the move at the end of the investigative phase the nature of the problem is also fixed since the move is being viewed in terms of a floating conception of the problem. This fixing of the problem in terms of the preferred move selection gives the preferred move a great advantage in the proof since all of the alternative moves are being reviewed in terms of a problem conception which is most intimately tied to the preferred move rather than any of the alternatives. Is is, therefore, unlikely that any of the alternatives have a chance of displacing the preferred move. This checking and recapitulation, nevertheless, is a natural part of the thought process and serves to help convince the player that he is making the correct decision at the end of the investi-gative phase.

<u>Conclusions</u>

In the last section we examined a number of phases of chess thought which de Groote uncovered in his psychological study of chess decision. In this section we will draw some conclusions about the role of trial and error behavior, perception, deductive reasoning, and rule-following in chess which will permit us to make comparisons with ethical reasoning, the subject of the next chapter.

De Groote states emphatically first of all that trial and error has nothing to do with chess reasoning. He acknowledges that "trying out" is similar to trial and error, but maintains that the strongly directive nature of chess reasoning sets it apart from trial and error. De Groote writes:

> The trying out by the chess player and by the human problem solver in general is always <u>trying out if</u>....The word 'if' indicates that the trying <u>out occurs within</u> the framework of a rather well defined goal-setting. The subject is looking for something definite, he nurtures fairly specific quantitative and qualitative expectations, and a schematic anticipation is undoubtedly present. This 'sense of direction' is clearly expressed in the goal-settings and problem formulations that often precede a trying out...and shows up indirectly in the small proportion of the existing possibilities that are actually tested.... As a result of the player's knowledge and experiential linkings the choice-of-move-problem presents itself in a bounded and highly specified form only. Furthermore, various hunches, expectations, and suppositions (favorite forming is a form of hypothesis forming!)--in short: anticipations--co-determine the where and what of search and trying, respectively. As we know, all sorts of antici-pations figure in the succession, content, and character of the elaborative phases generally....the strong <u>directive, selective, and evaluative role played by anticipations</u> might well be the most important difference from trial-and error. (dG 295)

In addition de Groote cites other differences including "the more complex and especially intensive problem development during trying

out (dG 295)" and the fact that "trying out in chess thought is always part of a rather complex process (dG 295)." We need only to think again of the chess player who homed in on the lengthy and complex combination without considering any other alternatives (dG 211) to see just how unlike trial and error behavior chess thought often is. A chess player, of course, could play by trial and error if he wished, but de Groote's study gives no evidence that it ever occurs.

Throughout the examination of the phases in chess reasoning, the presence of perception as a major element in the thought process was continually manifest. We saw in the orientation phase the rapid evaluative determinations made by the chess player. In the investigative phase we saw the strong directive nature of the investigation suggesting something like "insight" or "intuition". The shifting nature of the solution and the problem in particular indicates some such perceptual phenomenon at work in the thought process. De Groote himself noted this perceptual aspect and considered it fundamental to the whole thought process. To illustrate the emphasis he places on it I will quote him at some length. De Groote writes:

> The rapid insight of the chessmaster into the possi-
> bilities of a newly shown position, his immediate 'seeing'
> of structural and dynamic essentials, of possible combi-
> natorial gimmicks, and so forth, are only understandable,
> indeed, if we realize that as a result of his experience
> he quite literally 'sees' the position in a totally
> different (and much more adequate) way than a weaker
> player. The vast difference between the two in efficiency,
> particularly in the amount of time to find out what the
> core problem is ('what's cooking really') and to discover
> highly specific, adequate means of thought and board
> action, need not and must not be primarily ascribed to
> large differences in 'natural' power for (means)

abstraction. The difference is mainly due to differences in perception.

It is above all the treasury of ready 'experience' which puts the master that much ahead of the others. His extremely extensive, widely branched and highly organized system of knowledge and experience enables him, first, to recognize immediately a chess position as one belonging to an unwritten category (type) with corresponding board means to be applied, and second, to 'see' immediately and in a highly adequate way its specific, individual features against the background of the type (category).

It is no accident that the word 'seeing', as used here, stands both for perception and (means) abstraction. The two processes tend to fuse together; they are difficult to distinguish. But if a master and a weak player are compared, often the former literally 'sees' possibilities that are deeply hidden for the latter, possibilities that the latter must try to discover, calculate, think out, or deduce in order in his turn to be able to 'see' them (understand them). In other words; the difference in achievement between master and non-master rests primarily on the fact that the master, basing himself on an enormous experience, can start his operational thinking at a much more advanced stage and can consequently function much more specifically and efficiently in his problem solving field.

It is not easy to appreciate fully the enormous effect of the expert's reproductive completion of the perceived situation, as his perceptual advantage might be called. In fact, the more 'experience' a person has collected in any field, the more difficult it becomes for him to understand the behavior of the have-nots. Thus every teacher knows the following frequent brand of over-estimating his students: opining that from the given problem situation his students can 'immediately' derive (see) some property or means that he himself finds quite obvious--whereas in reality, in order to 'see' it, much perceptive and abstractive experience is required. The teacher has had this experience for so long that he is no longer aware of it. An experienced problem solver in any field is particularly apt to forget about his primary and fundamental problem transformations even before he starts his own consciously operational thinking. This is especially true when these problem transformations have shifted, over the long run, from the field of thought to the perceptual field--as they usually have in chess.

A simple example to illustrate the general idea can be borrowed from Kohler's experimental adventures with anthropids. (KOHLER 1917, transl. 1925; see also SELZ 1922). We humans are struck by the inability of these otherwise quite intelligent animals to take a ring off

a nail--a possibility that we 'immediately see.' Due to our experience with nails and rings and their usage, we <u>see</u> the situation in a totally different way than the ape does. Similar examples can be given touching upon the relation between adults and children.

The relation between chessmaster and weaker player is--within a somewhat more limited universe--wholly comparable. The master's inability to identify with the weaker player and his difficulties is often striking. Generally it shows up on a lack of respect; anyone who does not belong to the elite is a 'patzer.' The virtuoso cannot possibly respect as a chessplayer a person who cannot even think out in half an hour what is completely obvious to him, since he himself immediately <u>reads</u> it from the perceptual situation.

Pure means abstraction is, in itself, never more than one step with a limited scope. Generally, it derives its power from the problem conception or situation perception from which it starts. As a result of the fact that it often occurs as an 'illumination' to the subject and/or as a striking find or discovery to the observer, the importance of the operation has often been overdrawn--just as with the composer's inspiration (BAHLE 1936 and 1939). We should keep in mind, however, that <u>all</u> 'masterly' achievements--fascinating discoveries <u>included</u>--in general as in chess, are based on a body of 'mastery' that is acquired by experience (and hard work), namely mastery over an extensive, differentiated system of immediately actualizable dispositions for typical problem transformations; or in other words: masterly over a highly composite set (program) of general and specific perceptual and thought habits (routines). The gist of the preceding discussion might be summarized by saying that the master <u>is</u> primarily by virtue of what he has been able to build up by experience; and this is: (a) a schooled and highly specific way of <u>perceiving</u>; and (b) a system of reproductively available <u>methods, in memory</u>.

In using the latter term we must take care, however, to distinguish between <u>knowledge</u> and <u>intuitive experience</u>. They can both be regarded as mutually interwoven subsystems of experiential linkings (in the domain of chess) that result from learning processes and are 'located' in memory, but they differ, by definition, in that knowledge (knowing that...) can be verbalized while intuitive experience cannot. Knowledge can be explicitly formulated by the subject and thus communicated, in words, to others; it is retrievable from memory by verbal cues. Intuitive experience, on the other hand, is an intuitive know-how-- as distinct from knowing that...--that is only actualized by situations (on the chessboard or in the thought process) where it can actually be used. Here, too, adequate methods

are immediately available from memory but, if used, the subject could not describe them, let alone write his own heuristic program. In principle, intuitive experiential linkings may at any time become knowledge (knowing that, in addition to knowing how), namely, at that moment when the subject becomes fully aware of them.

It will be clear now that the differentiated system of thought habits (routines) which forms the essence of chess mastership, consists partly of knowledge but largely of intuitive experience. The latter is possible and may be highly efficient in chess because the game has in fact nothing to do with verbalization; types of positions and corresponding playing methods--moves, maneuvers--have a language of their own. In this respect the chess player's system of thought habits is rather comparable to a system of motor habits such as that of a billard or tennis player. In fact, most skills depend largely on 'intuitive experience', i.e., on a system of methods that one cannot explicitly describe.

Terms like 'intuitive experience' -- and 'intuitive completion'...--imply a rather specific conception of intuition. This conception needs some comment.

The term is used in widely divergent meanings. It may, for instance, stand for a deep and fundamental philosophical insight (BERGSON 1934), or it may denote a supposedly fundamental function of the human mind, along with thinking, feeling, and perceiving, namely, the function 'which tells us of future possibilities and gives us information of the atmosphere which surrounds all experience' (FORDHAM 1956, p. 35; JUNG 1933). Apart from those cases where the term stands for some philosophical idea or belief, it is used rather loosely in everyday language, e.g., in expressions like: 'I chose it by intuition,' 'I knew instinctively that it was wrong,' 'Her intuition told her not to trust the man.' 'Intuition' may also denote a quality, a talent, namely, the ability to judge or predict correctly 'on an intuitive basis.' With regard to the evaluation of social situations women are often supposed to have this quality--as opposed to manly 'reason.'

The meanings of the terms 'intuition' and intuitive,' as they were introduced in the proceding pages for chess thinking, are nearer to the usage of everyday language than to the more philosophical and theoretical concepts. In chess, judgments, evaluations, preferences for certain plans or moves may be 'intuitive.' The chess player's so-called feel for a position and other 'feelings that...,' his hunches and his anticipations may be 'based on intuition' or 'contain an intuitive element.' Characteristically, the implied judgments are by definition supposed to be generally correct or at least to be better than

chance, while at the same time the subject cannot (com-
pletely) explain his motives; he is not able to explain
how his conclusion could be justified by the available
evidence. Also, intuitive judgment is based on more than
the sum of an incomplete, explicitly rational argumenta-
tion plus a purely emotional preference: otherwise the
intuitive completion of the argumentation could not be
better than chance--which presumably it is.

    If intuition is defined in this way, we must conclude
that it is highly frequent in chess thinking....Most con-
spicuous are those riving cases where intuition points
in a direction different from the other argumentation:
the 'feeling that...' may at times be stronger than quite
some evidence to the contrary.

    Now it appears beyond doubt that intuition of this
type is primarily, if not wholly, based on what we have
already called 'intuitive' experience. That is, we are
dealing here with an effect of a learning process--be it
learning without awareness-and not with the working of
some magical, mysteriously inexplicable power of the mind
which some people enjoy and others do not. There are, of
course, differences: some chess players make more (effi-
cient) use of intuitive 'methods' than others; but be
that as it may, whatever intuitive powers a player has
are based on previous learning. (dG 306-310)

The "rapid insight," the "seeing" of possibilities on the board is

in many respects the same perceptual phenomenon which we discussed

in the last chapter. When the chess player looks at the board, de-

pending on his experience and skill, all sorts of dynamic relation-

ships will pop into his mind. This is the same phenomenon which is

encountered in the lines becoming a duck or a rabbit, or a situation

becoming structured along specific lines (dragon and lost contact

examples). The chess player's case differs from these cases, however,

in that there are various sorts of emotional anticipations which are

also serving as bits of pre-knowledge channeling and directing the

subsequent investigations. Although de Groote lumps these perceptual

and emotional factors together as intuition, he certainly does not

mean intuition in the old philosophical sense as a special and

mysterious faculty which only some people seem to possess. De Groote feels that his examination of chess players of all skill levels confirms that these intuitive powers are linked to experience. As the chess player's skill increases and as he gains more experience, he is more able to automatically "see" and anticipate all sorts of features of the board situation which would require lengthy investigations in the case of possessing less skill and ability. What makes the intuitive process appear mysterious is that it is characterized by an increased reliance on rapid, nonverbal thought; but as de Groote notes, "in principle, intuitive experiential linkings may at any time become knowledge...namely, at that moment when the subject becomes aware of them (dG 308)." Here de Groote is distinguishing between knowledge and intuitive experience on the grounds that knowledge is always verbally formulated while intuitive experience, while in principle verbally formulatable, is not normally verbally formulated when it makes itself manifest in the thought process. While it may still be mysterious how the mind manages to behave in this manner (a question for the psychologist to answer), with all the data collected it should no longer be considered mysterious that the mind does behave in this manner and that such behavior is essential to efficient and rapid problem-solving. The regular appearance of these perceptual and emotional elements and the high reliance placed on them at higher skill levels demonstrate that they are too important to overlook simply because we cannot give a psycho-physical explanation of how they operate. Just how very important they are we shall see when we look at the role of deductive reasoning and rule-following in chess thought.

De Groote asserts on occasion in his book that deductive arguments sometimes occur in the chess thought process particularly in the proof phase; however, he has little evidence in his researches to show that they do occur with any regularity or that they are (in most cases) fundamental to the reasoning process. There are an almost total absence of rules and consciously rule-governed operations in the protocol statements. There is, in fact, only one clear example in de Groote's book of a nonconstitutive rule influencing the chess decision and even this case does not follow the pattern of rule and application. In position A of the main experiment, the best objective solution involved the exchange of a bishop for a knight. Strong players had no difficulty seeing the possibility and grasping its significance while weak players in most cases failed to even consider the exchange as a possibility (dG 90). There has long been a theoretical controversy over the relative values of the knight and the bishop and hence whether the exchange of a knight for a bishop or vice versa is most advantageous. Grandmasters have been divided on this point and at different periods in the last hundred years contrary opinions have been popularly held by chess theoreticians. Tchigorin and the hypermodern school have advocated the superiority of the knight while Steinitz and Tarrasch favored the bishop.[1] Today we are generally in favor of the bishop as well and Fine in his beginning book includes preference for the bishop as a general rule of the end game.[2] The

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[1]Fine, Basic Chess Endings, p. 193.

[2]Fine, Chess, the Easy Way, p. 168.

same rule can be found in almost every beginning book. The weaker players were affected by this rule to the extent that most did not "see" the exchange and missed the combination. Strong players were not affected at all. Furthermore, even though this rule was clearly having an influence on weaker players, they were not consciously employing the rule according to the pattern of rule and application-- i.e., the rule was never mentioned in the protocols. The rule made itself manifest only within the perceptual aspects of the problem conception. The exchange was simply not "seen" as a possibility. Moreover, this is the only case of rule involvement which de Groote documents in his entire book. This strikingly illustrates how insignificant a role deductive-like rule-following plays in the vast majority of chess decisions.

The absence of rule-following procedures and the prominence of procedures involving perceptual and emotional factors (for instance, favorite forming, reinvestigation, evaluation in the orientation phase) raises a major question. Since chess learning is heavily embedded in rule learning and rule application, how do the perceptual and emotional techniques appear and what accounts for the decline of rule-governed reasoning as the player's abilities improve? De Groote gives the following account of chess development.

> Let us now try to get a somewhat more detailed picture of how the player's mastership comes about in these periods of passionate chess playing.
> As a matter of course he accumulates more and more 'knowledge and experience.' This means, in our terminology, that a system of highly adequate thought habits is built up in a process of progressive extension, differentiation, and refinement. The player's system of knowledge and

experience expands rapidly in terms of thinking and play-
ing methods he has available.

What actually happens is best illustrated by looking
at playing methods. First, by means of playing experiences
and/or textbooks the player gets to know certain important
general strategic and tactical rules; next, he learns
to recognize and to handle exceptions to these rules--
which in their turn grow into new, more refined rules; with
new exceptions, etc. Finally, the player develops a
'feeling' for cases in which these already highly spe-
cialized rules can be applied. Thus, for instance, the
player learns how important it is to occupy the center
of the board with Pawns; then he finds out that a too
broad or too far advanced Pawn center may be weak since
it may become an easy object of attack. Next the player
discovers that advanced Pawns (such as the White Pawn
at K5 in the French Defense) can be both weak and strong--
in different respects. Finally he develops an ever finer
and more reliable feeling for the types of situations
where the strengths and the types where such a Pawn
structure prevail. Another example: A materially equal
ending with a blocked Pawn structure usually peters out
to a draw as the material is exchanged down; but the
'strong' Bishop generally wins out against the 'weak'
Bishop; however, in positions with long Pawn chains
where the King cannot penetrate, the strong Bishop may
be powerless. A Player develops a feeling for those
cases where there are winning chances and for the ways
in which such chances must be exploited. In this manner
the player's ability to classify and to apply appropriate
treatment (in terms of thinking and playing methods)
is steadily refined. (dG 351-352)

What this means in a shorter form is that rules and exceptions to rules

are used by the learner as training devices particularly at an early

period in the chess player's development. The player learns rules,

learns the exceptions, and sets out to diligently apply the rules in

play. Once the player has achieved his goal, however, the rules are

no longer necessary since what the rules were designed to point out

have been transformed into perceptual and emotional factors which

replace rule and application activities. As de Groote puts it, the

player develops a _feel_ for a certain sort of thing and this feel per-

mits the rules themselves to drop out of the decision procedure. The

one actual example of this in de Groote's book is the bishop-knight exchange rule which had become transformed into the perception of the weak players and had been transcended in the stronger ones as a result of their additional experience. In the latter the abilities of the player have simply moved beyond what the rules can "perceptually" provide.

What I have just said is misleading in only one respect. In addition to their usefulness as a teaching device early in the player's development, the rules also reappear in justification. In most cases when asked why he made such and such move, the strong player hesitates and then brings forth one of the rules he learned early in his career saying that "this is an example of the need to apply rule x." These sorts of answers can easily lead one to mistakenly believe that the chess player is operating on the model of rule-application even though in most cases he is not. The chess player gives these deceptive explanations for three reasons: (1) the purpose of the question may be educational in which case the player is answering as a teacher providing rules as already discussed above; (2) the purpose of the question may be theoretical in which case he is formulating a hypothesis about positions of this type; (3) most importantly, the player may be giving the answer in terms of rules simply because the factors which actually caused him to make the move in question are perceptual and emotional and hence nonverbal. The third is probably the most important reason why chess justifications are presented in rule-governed, often syllogistic, form. To paraphrase Wittgenstein, "what cannot be said, cannot be said," and if the player is to give an

explanation and a justification at all he may often have to resort
to the crude and unpolished rules which he learned as a beginner and
which in the actual decision process he long ago discarded in favor
of nonverbal perceptual and emotional factors.

In the next chapter we will see what implications this account
of chess reasoning has for ethical reasoning and training.

CHAPTER VI

ETHICAL DECISION

Introduction

In the last chapter we examined chess decision in some detail. We say that chess decision seldom followed the model of rational, deductive reasoning and that in most cases chess decision actually was the product of complex mental operations in large measure dependent on nonverbal emotional and perceptual factors not commonly considered to be part of human thought. In this chapter we will examine the implications of this analysis of chess decision with regard to ethical decision-making. We shall be concerned with ethical decisions which, like chess decisions, involve problem-solving. Examples include Sartre's Frenchman who must decide whether to stay with his mother or join the Free French Forces and Wittgenstein's scientist who must decide whether to stay with his wife or continue his cancer research.[1]

I shall begin with an account of what ethical decision would be like if it is like chess decision. Then I shall discuss what implications this account has in ethical theory.

A Phenomenology of Ethical Decision

Judging from de Groote's work in chess, we may well expect ethical decision to be in three parts: orientation, investigation, and proof. The only possible problem is the orientation phase, which in

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[1]Sartre, Existentialism, p. 24; LE 22-23.

some cases may not be present; however, although the orientation phase was artificial in chess, it is more likely to be an actual part of an ethical decision. In some cases to be sure an ethical decision in real life is part of an ongoing series of actions and decisions in a way very similar to actual chess play. In such cases an orientation phase would not be necessary. Yet, people are often in real life suddenly confronted with situations which they have not had any part in developing and which they have not been aware of until a crisis stage has developed. This lack of continuity is part of what an existentialist means by saying that man is thrown into the world. In these cases, an orientation phase similar to that observed in de Groote's chess experiments is likely to occur. In those cases in which no distinct orientation phase occurred, however, there still might be an exploration phase of preliminary trying out to order favorable possibilities for the investigative phase. (The exploration phase, it will be recalled, was dealt with as part of the orientation phase in the last chapter in order to simplify the account given of chess decision.) I shall discuss some of the characteristics of each phase that might likely occur in ethical decision.

If the situation with which the ethical agent is confronted has not developed gradually as part of his experience, the ethical agent may need to orient himself. The ethical agent, like the chess player, may well want to know what caused the situation to develop as it did prior to it coming to his attention. He may want to uncover the actual history of the events leading up to the situation and, if that is not possible, he may wish to reconstruct the past events in some

hypothetical way. The purpose of this activity will not be to cast
judgment on what should have occurred but rather to enable the agent
to determine more fully and accurately the dynamic elements which
are operating within the problem situation and to increase the agent's
emotional "feel" for the problem. This orientation will most likely
be brief. It will not usually involve any detailed examination of
the situation; however, it will entail an evaluation of the situation
which limits the range of the forthcoming investigation. The evalua-
tion will be composed of evaluative and descriptive elements inter-
woven together. This unity will be more apparent among those people
who make ethical decisions best (i.e., with best practical results).
The evaluation will have both perceptual and emotional components.
The agent's view of the situation will not be pure perception but
rather a structured perception with key features automatically high-
lighted. Several alternatives will be set aside for examination in
the investigative phase. The determination of these alternatives
may involve some trying out characterizing an exploratory phase. This
trying out, however, will not be for the purpose of finding an imme-
diate solution but rather to aid the agent in getting the "feel" of
the situation. This "feel" for the situation will be characterized by
the emergence of minimal and maximal levels of expectancy with regard
to what can be expected to be accomplished and by a feeling of what
the actual value of the situation may be (somewhere between minimal
and maximal levels). In this way, the agent will already know or at
least feel what in general the prospects for success are and also
have some idea of how bad things could be if things went badly. Armed

with this evaluation in perceptual and emotional terms, the agent will
be ready for the investigative phase. Even if the agent does not
engage in a pure orientation phase and begins instead with an explora-
tory phase, he will still have "in hand" such an estimate or evaluation
of the situation before entering into the detailed analysis of the
investigative phase.

In the investigative phase, as in chess, people may proceed in
at least two ways. Some may jump around without detailed calculation
and others may proceed in more methodical manner. Despite personal
differences, however, investigations will never be exhaustive except
in simple situations. The agent will, nevertheless, seek a solution
as quickly as possible based on what de Groote calls the desire for
economy of thought. This approach will be relaxed only when the time
factors are not of serious consequence. In those cases which are com-
plex and for which a solution is required within a limited amount of
time the agent will employ what de Groote calls progressive deepening.
In some cases the agent may adopt a favorite solution (favorite forming)
and compare other lines of action with it. Those which do not yield,
as a minimum, the feeling of minimum expectancy evoked by the favorite
will be eliminated. Those which yield a high level of expectancy
relative to the favorite will be examined in greater detail. In other
cases (and probably all cases) the agent will employ immediate and non-
immediate investigation. Those courses of action selected during the
orientation or exploration phase will be repeatedly reexamined in terms
of various proposed problems and solutions. In this method the nature
of the problem and the solution of the problem will fluctuate together

with examined courses of action serving both as solution attempts
and further clarifications of the core problem. This reinvestigation
will be in large measure perceptual in the sense discussed in Chapter
Four and Chapter Five. As the agent examines and reexamines various
courses of action he will see these courses tentatively as solutions
to various proposed core problems. The agent's perception of the core
problem will shift as progressive deepening continues through rein-
vestigation, favorite forming and elimination of unsuitable possibili-
ties. The decision may result from (1) a gradual improvement in the
clarity of perception of the problem (in which case the final per-
ception may make a specific act of will in the sense of choosing un-
necessary by making the decision suddenly appear obvious) or (2) a
choice based on incomplete information (in those cases in which ade-
quate information is not available, there are time pressures or the
difficulty of calculating consequences is too great). The difference
between these two possibilities will only be one of degree since in
most cases the information examined will not be sufficient to produce
a mechanical, deductive conclusion. Throughout the investigative
phase possible solutions will be matched against minimal and maximal
expectancy levels. Should maximal expectancy be reached early and
careful rechecking of calculations suggest low probability of error,
the decision may be made without examining all the courses of action
selected in the orientation phase. On the other hand, should all
courses of action produce subminimal expectancy values, the agent may
start over and return to activities characteristic of the orientation
phase. In almost every case, the agent will not reach a final

conclusion without the addition of what de Groote calls intuitive and emotional completion (dG 274). When the argumentation still remains incomplete after all practical investigations have been made, the uncertainty will be removed "as a last resort" by "a 'feeling that...,' an impression, a hunch, sometimes even an unadulterated emotional preference...(dG 274)." In less drastic cases the agent will select that course of action which most closely approaches his maximum feeling of expectancy. This decision finally will have little to do with the actual application of ethical rules. If they appear at all, they will appear as limitations on the agent's possible courses of action rather than as premises in a rational argument. Most often they will exhibit themselves as perceptual or emotional factors. These will be derived in part from rules (learned earlier) and in part from the agent's past experience. They will be together into what de Groote calls "intuitive experience."

Once the decision has been made the proof phase will begin. The ethical agent will review each major course of action in terms of the final perception of the problem. In view of the fact that the selected course of action and the selected problem are intimately related having been derived simultaneously from the same mental operations, the cards will so to speak be heavily stacked in favor of the selected course of action; nevertheless, the proof phase will help provide additional confidence and certainty with regard to the selected action. The review will subjectively increase the agent's feeling of certainty (intuitive and emotional completion) and also avoid the possibility of an obvious mistake being made. As in the investigative phase, the

proof phase will seldom take on a deductive rule-governed form. The phrasing of the proof phase will primarily be disjunctive. The selected course of action will be compared to successive alternative possibilities and the alternatives will be eliminated one after the other. A deductive proof will occur only if the ethical agent is asked to justify his decision or if he expects to be asked to justify it. In such cases the agent will often select a rule which he considers the proper justification for his selected action. The agent may not and need not have consciously employed this rule either in the investigative or proof phases.

Ethical Examples

Examination of a few examples may help clarify what I am saying. I shall borrow them from Sartre and Wittgenstein.

Sartre makes claims in his essay "Existentialism as a Humanism" which, if true, indicate that the decision powers of human beings are very limited.[1] Sartre in fact does not even speak of decision using instead the word "choice" to replace it. The picture Sartre paints to illustrate his positions of a young Frenchman trying to decide whether to stay with his sick mother or leave France to join the Free French Forces is indeed extremely dismal. The young Frenchman finds that he is unable to reach any conclusion at all based on future events since these are unknown. He finds no solace in Christian or Kantian rules discovering that they are too general and provide no clue as to

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[1]Sartre, Existentialism, pp. 23-28.

how they should be applied. Finally, he discovers that seeking advice is also senseless since he unconsciously picks advisers who will tell him what he wants to hear. In the end the Frenchman finds that he can do nothing but trust his instincts, do what his feeling dictates, hope, without knowing, that he has made the choice that future consequences will disclose as the correct one, and face with despair and anguish the results for which he must consider himself absolutely and totally responsible.

If the analogy between chess and ethical reasoning is correct, the position of the young Frenchman is much better than Sartre believes. The Frenchman will not be hopelessly lost in a sea of anguish, forlornness and despair between two irreconcilable alternatives. Rather he will begin what will appear outwardly to be an empirical examination of the facts: his mother's health, the possibility of a neighbor or relative taking care of his mother, the state of oppression in France, the need of the French Forces for men, the amount of danger represented by the Nazis, etc. By considering these "facts," which he will go over and over (reinvestigation), the nature of the problem and its possible solutions will progressively deepen. Using his past experience, his moral training, and his natural judgmental abilities, the Frenchman will eventually come to some conclusion. He may look at the sad state of Jews and conclude that the problem is the Nazis and they must be stopped at all costs; he may decide that the problem is his mother's health since there are many other Frenchmen without sick mothers who will be able to join the French Forces; he may decide that the alternatives can be reconciled by having his

sister come up from Lyon to stay with mother while he goes to fight; or he may decide to stay because his sister cannot get a travel permit from the Nazis, etc. Whatever he decides, it will be based on the facts as he interprets and perceives them and it will be the solution which most closely matches his maximum feeling of expectancy concerning what can be achieved. Such a decision involves a great deal of uncertainty and undoubtedly will require a good deal of emotional and intuitive completion, but nevertheless it is much more likely to be the correct decision than one made according to Sartre's format. It will also probably be what the Frenchman would <u>actually</u> do.

Although Sartre fails to give us an accurate account of the decision process, Wittgenstein interestingly provides us with ethical examples which very closely approximate the kinds of conclusions which we reached in the analogy between chess and ethical reasoning. Wittgenstein's primary example of how a doctor might reason in deciding whether to stay with his wife or continue his cancer research is surprisingly similar to what one might expect in an ethical protocol statement after reading de Groote's chess protocols. Wittgenstein told Rush Rhees:

> "Such a man's attitude will vary at different times.
> Suppose I am his friend, and I say to him, 'Look, you've
> taken this girl out of her home, and now, by God, you've
> got to stick to her.' This would be taking an ethical
> attitude. He may reply, 'But what about suffering
> humanity? how can I abandon my research?' In saying
> this he may be making it easy for himself: he wants
> to carry on that work anyway. (I may have reminded him
> that there are others who can carry it on if he gives up.)
> And he may be inclined to view the effect on his wife
> relatively easily: 'It probably won't be fatal for her.

> She'll get over it, probably marry again,' and so on.
> On the other hand it may not be this way. It may be
> that he has a deep love for her. And yet he may think
> that if he were to give up his work he would be no hus-
> band for her. That is his life, and if he gives up
> that he will drag her down. Here we may say that we
> have all the materials of a tragedy; and we could only
> say: 'Well, God help you.'
>   "Whatever he finally does, the way things then
> turn out may affect his attitude. He may say, 'Well,
> thank God I left her: it was better all around.' Or
> maybe, 'Thank God I stuck to her.' Or he may not be
> able to say 'thank God' at all, but just the opposite.
>   "I want to say that this is the solution of an
> ethical problem." (LE 22-23)

In some cases which Wittgenstein cites in this example the doctor is
only rationalizing in order to be able to do what he really wants. In
some of the cases, however, the doctor is actually examining the
consequences of his actions and looking in earnest for a good solution.
The weighing of various factors, how his wife will take the divorce,
his love for his wife, the importance he attributes to his cancer
research, the effect on his wife and himself if he gives up his cancer
research, could bring about the sort of reasoning we found in chess
thought. The doctor may continually puzzle over the various alter-
natives and consequences (investigation and reinvestigation) until a
best solution and a best problem (either the wife or the research) are
found. The answer may be to leave the wife or give up the research
or some compromise may be reached which avoids either extreme. Al-
though the decision process involves to an extreme degree the doctor's
personal feelings and his perception of the situation, Wittgenstein,
nevertheless, still indicates that the problem has a sort of objective
solution for he notes that the doctor's decision may be tested by
the future results of his actions and he may later as a result of

these consequences come to conclude that he made a right or wrong de-

cision. Such is also the lot of the chess player who must eventually

face the consequences of his decisions.

With regard to the place of rules in ethical decision Wittgenstein

seems to be very much in the know. This fact is strikingly brought

home when it is realized that Wittgenstein gives as his primary example

a decision employing no ethical rules at all. Then he goes on to con-

trast the ruleless ethical decision with one which employs rules.

Wittgenstein's conclusions with regard to rule-governed ethical deci-

sions very strongly suggest de Groote's experimental results in chess.

In the case of a doctor applying the rules of a Christian ethic, Witt-

genstein seems completely convinced that the doctor will simply not

see divorce as a possible course of action. Wittgenstein says:

> If he has, say, the Christian ethics, then he may say it
> is absolutely clear: he has got to stick to her come what
> may. And then his problem is different. It is: how to
> make the best of this situation, what he should do in or-
> der to be a decent husband in these greatly altered cir-
> cumstances, and so forth. The question 'Should I leave
> her or not?' is not a problem here. (LE 23)

This example is very similar to the cases encountered in chess in which

chess players failed to see the exchange of the bishop for a knight

as a viable possibility because of their adherence to the rule that a

bishop is more valuable than a knight in the end game (dG 90). In

the Christian doctor's case his adherence to the Christian rule against

divorce similarly narrows his range of courses of action and dramati-

cally affects his very perception of the problem he is facing.

These examples should help to illustrate what I am suggesting is

the correct description of most ethical decision-making. They should

also serve to make the account more plausible to those who are scep-
tical. The reader's introspection into his own thoughts when making
a decision may give additional verification. Nevertheless, they do
not prove that it _is_ the method used by everyone or that everyone
should use this method of thought. With regard to the first I can only
acknowledge that it is possible that some or even many people may
think and decide in other ways. With regard to the second I can only
say that (1) this method proves its worth pragmatically in chess and
has every likelihood once it is studied by philosophers and psycho-
logists of doing so in ethics as well and (2) the method is not really
a procedure being normatively recommended but rather a natural part
of human mental development which needs to be recognized and under-
stood.

Implications

Although it is not possible to demonstrate irrefutably the truth
of this account of ethical reasoning, it is possible to list a great
number of things which, though of major interest to ethical theory
now and then, would be cleared up, tossed out, trivialized or trans-
formed if my account of ethical reasoning is accurate. I shall list
them one at a time and briefly discuss each.

(1) There would no longer be a need to look for a rational de-
cision procedure. It would be clear that such a procedure, even if
found, would be of little value, since the mind has faster, more
efficient, and natural methods of dealing with ethical decision. Rule-
governed operations would not need to be completely disregarded,

however, if, in line with the distinction between judgment and decision in Chapter Four, they were recognized as rational justification procedures.

(2) The notion of intuition in ethics would need to be reevaluated. Intuition could no longer be considered a pure ability of faculty possessed by only a few lucky persons but rather as something possessed by everyone to some degree, composed of perceptual and emotional elements and capable of being developed by training, experience, and so on.

(3) The talk of practical ethics purely in terms of habit and feeling alone would have to be abandoned. There is certainly an element of cognition in chess and ethical decisions and it is not clear that habit alone can account for this cognitive element. Developing moral habits purely in terms of conditioning is certainly out of the question. Such conditioning would circumvent and perhaps short circuit the cognitive element.

(4) With regard to emotion or feeling, the emotivist theory of the type in which "x is good" is taken to mean "I like x" would not be adequate. This does not mean, however, that feeling does not play a role in determining motives and favored courses of action. Indeed, it serves as a most critical element providing evaluative comparison much more subtle and precise than can be provided by numbers, gauging minimum and maximum levels of expectancy, and augmenting certainty requirements by providing intuitive and emotional completion.

(5) The universality requirement in most of the ways it is most commonly understood would be superfluous for ethical decision though perhaps not for ethical judgment. There are no chess rules (except

for constitutive ones) which are universalizable and yet the chess player seems to have no difficulty dealing with them. Similar ease can be expected with ethical rules.

(6) The notion of ethical knowledge and perhaps the notion of knowledge in general would have to be reexamined. The question would be whether intuitive experience ("knowing how" as de Groote defines it) should be included with more ordinary ethical knowledge ("knowing that"). We may wish to seriously introduce some new category such as "foreknowledge."

(7) The talk of rules as imperatives would need to be discarded. Imperatives are not needed in chess to solve chess problems. Furthermore, if there were such imperatives in chess and they had to be obeyed, they would rob the chess player of some of his decision power in much the same way that the rule about bishop-knight exchanges robbed the weaker chess player of some of their perception of the problem, causing them to miss the best solution. Similar disasters could be expected in ethical situations as for instance in the doctor's case in Wittgenstein's examples. There is often a trend in ethics which seeks to create systems which not only tell the ethical agent what to do but, if he adopts the system, makes him do this or that. The imperative is the most obvious tool of these philosophers so distrustful of human beings making their decisions freely. The approach to ethics suggested by the chess analogy makes ethical rules mere guides and presupposes a desire on the part of the ethical agent to want to do the right thing. Practical ethics should not be distorted by attempts to force contrary and cantankerous people to be ethical. Such distortion can

only hamper the efforts of the sincere ethical agent who is trying to
make correct decisions by unnaturally weighting this or that rule and
thereby distorting the ethical perception which will emerge in part
as a result of the agent having at one time learned the particular rule.

(8) The search for an ultimate principle which will provide the
ultimate justification and deductively unite all ethical rules could
be terminated. None of the rules in chess are deductively related.
Many of them conflict to the extent that following this or that rule
may point the chess player towards a course of action completely con-
trary to what a number of other rules might dictate. These difficul-
ties offer no problem to the chess player and there is no reason why
they should offer any to the ethical agent.

(9) The belief that rules are of fundamental importance to the
decision process would have to be abandoned as a myth. Rules would
have to be put into their proper perspective and viewed primarily as
premises for ethical justification and as training devices which early
in the ethical agent's ethical education would aid him in the develop-
ment of his ethical perception.

(10) Finally, interest in rational decision procedures and ulti-
mate principles would be replaced by interest in practical ethical
training. We do not need to discover the ultimate rules or discover
the ultimate solution to chess to be able to play chess well. Like-
wise, it is very unlikely that we need discover the ultimate rules
or the ultimate ethical solution in order to be able to make ethical
decisions well. The chess player can be trained (even self trained)
to develop a high skill level simply by studying the various

nonconstitutive rules which are available in beginning books and by
gaining experience in playing the game. Similar results can be ex-
pected in ethics. Many people in fact do develop ethical decision
abilities in this manner already. Recognition of the important role
of training and possible streamlining of training techniques may in
fact produce exactly those results which the ethical philosopher is
seeking even without the ultimate ethical system ever being discovered.

PART III

WITTGENSTEIN AND PERCEPTION

CHAPTER VII

WITTGENSTEIN AS A PERCEPTUAL ANALYST

Introduction

In Part II I presented what I consider to be a Wittgensteinean style ethical position. Wittgenstein of course did not actually hold this position; however, he came much closer to doing so than one might suppose at first. Wittgenstein makes a distinction in _Lectures and Conversations_ which is very much like my distinction between decision and judgment. Wittgenstein writes:

> Giving a reason sometimes means 'I actually went this way', sometimes 'I could have gone this way', i.e. sometimes what we say acts as a justification, not as a report of what was actually done, e.g. I remember the answer to a question; when asked why I give this answer, I gave a process leading to it, though I didn't go through the process. (LC 22)

In the _Blue Book_ Wittgenstein anticipates some of de Groote's findings. He writes: "If we are taught to play chess, we may be taught rules. If then we play chess, these rules need not be involved in the act of playing. But they may be." (BL 13) In Wittgenstein's conversations with Rush Rhees (LC 22-23) Wittgenstein anticipates some of the perceptual problems which de Groote found in chess. The doctor who is unable to see divorce as a possible alternative is in much the same situation as the weak chess player who fails to see the exchange of the bishop for a knight as a possibility.

Wittgenstein appears to have fallen short of the position given in Part II because he could not give an adequate account of the role of perception in so-called rule-governed mental activities. In both the

Brown Book and the Investigations Wittgenstein is insistent that insight
and intuition are not involved. Instead of developing a perceptual
account of the kind given in Part II, however, he moves reluctantly
towards a doctrine of fundamental decisions. In the Brown Book he
writes:

> It is no act of insight, intuition, which makes us use the
> rule as we do at the particular point of the series. It would
> be less confusing to call it an act of decision, though this
> too is misleading, for nothing like a decision must take place,
> but possibly just an act of writing or speaking. (BR 143)

In the Investigations he echoes the same sentiments saying that "it
would almost be more correct to say, not that an intuition was needed
at every stage, but that a new decision was needed at every stage"(PI
I 186). The tentativeness of his introduction of decision as a possible
account of what takes place in so-called rule-governed operations indi-
cates that Wittgenstein was undecided and very much in a muddle about
what the correct account might be.

This state of affairs is particularly unfortunate in view of the
fact that Wittgenstein in many places appears to be holding the per-
ceptual position developed in Part II. He did not, however, come to see
that the perceptual phenomena which he often examined could be an
adequate account of intuition and insight and in addition the basis
of decision.

In this chapter I shall review the role of perception in Wittgen-
stein's philosophy. This review will show just how close Wittgenstein
came to the views developed in Part II and may provide the basis for
a reinterpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy.

"Seeing"

In On Certainty Wittgenstein points out that "knowing" and "seeing" have very similar primitive linguistic meanings. For example, he says that "I know he was in the room" is like "I saw he was in the room" (OC 90). Such a position places "seeing" very close to a pure perception in that, according to Wittgenstein, what is being discussed in such propositions is the relation of "the speaker and a fact" rather than the relation of "the speaker and the sense of a proposition." Wittgenstein also says in On Certainty that "it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game" (OC 204). Such remarks cast doubt on whether Wittgenstein is favorable towards a conception of perception as described in Chapter Four of this dissertation. They also make Wittgenstein's position, if he did hold a perceptual view, appear to be complicated. However, the difficulties are not as great as they may seem. In the first example above (OC 90) Wittgenstein's arguments are aimed at discrediting Moore's notion of sense data as a necessary part of perception. The second example (OC 204) becomes intelligible if it is assumed that Wittgenstein is arguing against "seeing" in the sense of intuition. Wittgenstein generally disapproved of intuitionist theory. He says in the Investigations that "intuition [is] an unnecessary shuffle" (PI I 213). This does not prevent him, however, from discussing perceptual phenomena in part two (seeing as and seeing an aspect) at great length (PI II 193-215). If we begin by recognizing that Wittgenstein is not concerned with sense data and traditional intuitionism, most of Wittgenstein's remarks on "seeing" can be coherently interpreted as remarks about perception in the sense discussed in Part II of this dissertation.

In the second part of the Investigations Wittgenstein speaks about "seeing as" and "seeing an aspect," phenomena which refer to something other than pure perception and involve perceptual shifts of the type discussed in Chapter Four. Wittgenstein writes:

> The change of aspect. "But surely you would say that the picture is altogether different now!"
> But what is different: my impressions? my point of view?-- Can I say? I describe the alteration like a perception; quite as if the object had altered before my eyes.
> "Now I am seeing this", I might say (pointing to another picture, for example). This has the form of a report of a new perception.
> The expression of a change of aspect is the expression of a new perception and at the same time of the perception's being unchanged. (PI II 195-196)

Wittgenstein does not want to say that the change is a change in the impression. The impression does not change; yet something does change, and it is, Wittgenstein concludes, the "organization of the visual impression" (PI II 196). This organization is not part of "perception" (pure perception in my terminology) though "it is like seeing and again not like seeing" (PI II 197). In some cases this organization or "seeing as" is close to interpretation. Wittgenstein writes:

> Take as an example the aspects of a triangle. This triangle can be seen as a triangular hole, as a solid, as a geometrical drawing; as standing on its base, as hanging from its apex; as a mountain, as a wedge, as an arrow or pointer, as an overturned object which is meant to stand on the shorter side of the right-angle, as a half parallelogram, and as various other things. (PI II 197)

Nevertheless, according to Wittgenstein, the phenomena is not inter-pretation in most cases. Wittgenstein writes:

> Do I really see something different each time, or do I only interpret what I see in a different way? I am inclined to say the former. But why?--To interpret is to think, to do something; seeing is a state. (PI II 212)

What is seen is "aspects of organization" (PI II 208) or "perceived structure" (PI II 209). This structure or organization is not part of conscious thought nor is it part of the objects or the impressions of the objects being seen. Wittgenstein says that "what I perceive in the dawning of an aspect is not a property of the object, but an internal relation between it and other objects" (PI II 212).

This sort of account adapts itself well to an account of what the chess player sees on the board. We found in de Groote's research that the chess player automatically saw certain sorts of structure on the board. This structure was not part of the objects on the board nor part of the human mind, but rather was perceived relationships (in the context of the game of chess) between the pieces on the board. Wittgenstein's account in the Investigations is very much in tune with this account of perceptual phenomena of chess.

The relationship between "seeing" in this dissertation and in Wittgenstein's philosophy, furthermore, is not restricted to the remarks in the Investigations. Similar remarks are given in the Tractatus. The most interesting example is a paragraph which discusses the two ways of seeing a cube. Wittgenstein writes:

> To perceive a complex means to perceive that its constituents are related to one another in such and such a way.
> This no doubt also explains why there are two possible ways of seeing the figure as a cube; and all similar phenomena. For we really see two different facts. (TLP 5.5423)

As in the discussions in the Investigations, the perception involves perceived relation and each perceived way of seeing the complex is a "different fact" (meaning, apparently, that in each case the perceiver sees something different as in the Investigations). In the example

just quoted the phrase "internal relation" is not used; however, this

deficiency is more than made up earlier in the Tractatus where the term

is introduced and discussed at length. Wittgenstein writes:

> In a certain sense we can talk about formal properties of
> objects and states of affairs, or, in the case of facts, about
> structural properties: and in the same sense about formal
> relations and structural relations.
> (Instead of 'structural property' I also say 'internal
> property'; instead of 'structural relation', 'internal relation'.
> (TLP 4.122)

The term is used in exactly the same sense that it is used in the

Investigations: to designate structural or organizational relation-

ships between perceived objects.

There can also be little doubt that the "similar phenomena" (TLP

5.5423) which Wittgenstein has in mind in the cube example includes our

picture of life and the world. Near the end of the Tractatus Wittgen-

stein speaks of people who after a period of long doubt came to see the

world ("the sense of life") clearly (TLP 6.521). In the final para-

graphs Wittgenstein makes it plain that he is attempting to produce

the same effect on his readers. Those who understand him, he says,

will throw away the ladder after they have climbed up and then "will

see the world aright" (TLP 6.54). Although, like those of the earlier

example (TLP 6.521), they will be "unable to say what constituted that

sense," they, nonetheless, will perceive a structure or organization

which will give the world meaning.

There is a fundamental relationship between much of the "seeing as"

discussions in the Investigations and the "seeing" of the Tractatus.

The perspicuity of this close relationship is marred only by a slight

difference in perspective in the Tractatus. For the most part, the

Tractatus is more concerned with what is perceived than with the

perceiver and perception from his point of view. As a result, Wittgenstein presents his position in terms of "showing." When it is realized, however, that what is shown must also be seen, much of the differences between the perceptual account of the early and later periods disappears.

In addition, if the mystical account at the end of the _Tractatus_ is taken to be an account of the type of perceptual growth which we encountered in chess, then even the mystical loses much of its mysteriousness. It will be remembered that de Groote notes that as the player improves his ability to play chess his ability to speak about what he is doing decreases and he finds it more and more difficult to understand why the weak player does not see immediately what he sees (dG 307). In the _Tractatus_ Wittgenstein may be attempting to account for the same sort of phenomena. Just as the chess player discards his rules after transforming them into perceptual factors Wittgenstein may be indicating in his remarks about throwing away the propositions a similar perceptual transformation. (While this may be somewhat simplified, it is likely that Wittgenstein may have been trying to account for this sort of phenomena even there.)

With regard to ethics particularly, Wittgenstein makes some remarks very early in his philosophical life which suggest Gestalt type perceptual shifts. Wittgenstein writes in the _Notebooks_, "And it is also clear that the world of the happy is a _different_ world from the world of the unhappy" (NB 77). The talk about different worlds is very similar to the talk about seeing different cubes and different duck-rabbits. The connection is even stronger when we consider his question "Is seeing an activity?" which immediately follows the talk about happy and unhappy worlds. Wittgenstein is already puzzling over the problem of whether

or not "seeing" is an activity which he was later to resolve in the
Investigations in the section on "seeing as" (PI II 212).

Some reference to "seeing" can also be found during the so-called
middle period in Wittgenstein's life. Wittgenstein told Moore in the
early 1930's that in ethics and aesthetics "you make another person
'see what you see'" (ML III 19). Although such "seeing" seems to have
some diversity (since there are often more than one way to see some-
thing), Wittgenstein occasionally talks very much like an intuitionist
claiming special insight. At the end of the lecture on ethics he says:

> You will say . . . that all it comes to is that we have not yet
> succeeded in finding the correct logical analysis of what we mean
> by our ethical and religious expressions. Now when this is urged
> against me I at once see clearly, as it were in a flash of light,
> not only that no description that I can think of would do to
> describe what I mean by absolute value, but that I would reject
> every significant description that anybody could possibly suggest,
> ab initio, on the grounds of its significance. That is to say:
> I see now that these nonsensical expressions were not nonsensical
> because I had not found the correct expressions, but that their
> nonsensicality was their very essence. (LE 11)

In these remarks Wittgenstein twice asserts that he "sees" that his
position is correct and this "seeing" is the position's justification.
This same sense of "seeing" as a justification also surfaces earlier
in the Notebooks where Wittgenstein apparently first comes to see that
ethics is inexpressible (NB 78).

These examples all serve to show that Wittgenstein considered
"seeing" to be both an interesting part of the philosophical matters
he was investigating and also considered it part of his method of
investigation.

Pictures

In the Notebooks and the Tractatus Wittgenstein presents a picture
theory of language. In the Tractatus he introduces it with the statement

that "we make pictures to ourselves of facts" (TLP 2.1). The remark

in German ("Wir machen uns Bilder der Tatsachen") has two sources.

The idiom first of all is the same one used by Hertz in introducing

his picture theory in his book <u>Principles of Mechanics</u>. Hertz writes,

"Wir machen uns innere Scheinbilder oder Symbole der aeusseren

Gegenstaende."[1] As Janik and Toulmin note, Wittgenstein's picture

theory is very similar to that of Hertz.[2] The picture theory of both

follows the twentieth century shift away from visual models which,

Carnap notes, is characteristic of modern science and philosophy of

science.[3] In this respect, Wittgenstein's early picture theory shows

great disregard for visual representation in a primary sense (pure

perception) emphasizing instead structural relationships of the type

partly discussed in the last section on "seeing." This point is par-

ticularly clear in those paragraphs in which Wittgenstein extends the

conception of picture to include phonetic notation, musical scores,

gramophone records and so on (TLP 4.011-4.016). What pictures represent

are essentially internal relations of the type already discussed in

the last section.

The second source for Wittgenstein's picture theory is ordinary

language. Speaking of the second use of the idiom "Wir machen ein Bild"

(TLP 3.001) Wittgenstein says to Ogden in a letter on Ogden's translation

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[1]Heinrich Hertz, <u>Die Prinzipien der Mechanik</u>, <u>Gesammelte Werke</u>, Vol. III (Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1894), p. 1.

[2]Janik and Toulmin, pp. 139-146, 179-185.

[3]Rudolf Carnap, <u>An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science</u>, edited by Martin Gardner (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1966), p. 173.

of the _Tractatus_:

> I don't know how to translate this. The German "Wir können uns ein Bild von ihm machen" is a phrase commonly used. I have rendered it by "we can imagine it" because "imagine" comes from "image" and this is something like a picture. In German it is sort of a pun you see. (O 24)

The idiom which Wittgenstein speaks of as a pun is roughly equivalent to the English idiom of "getting the picture." Once it is realized that Wittgenstein intends for his statements (TLP 2.1, 3.001) to refer not only to Hertz' models but also to common language and ordinary experience, the close relationship of Wittgenstein's perceptual concerns ("seeing") to his picture theory can be seen. "Getting the picture" and "machen ein Bild" both refer in ordinary life to experiences in which someone suddenly understands something in a way often represented by a light bulb lighting up in someone's head. This sort of experience involves the same sort of keying in found in the examples of the lost contact in Turkey and the dragon story in Chapter Four. Wittgenstein's admission in his letter to Ogden that he is attempting to deal with this ordinary experience in addition to philosophical and scientific model theory helps more than any other point discussed so far to bring Wittgenstein's early picture theory into line with the perceptual discussions of this dissertation.

Despite these similarities it can, nevertheless, be objected that the early picture theory (1) considers linguistic statements to be pictures and (2) assumes a logical structure both in the world and the picture and (3) that both of these (1 and 2) are inconsistent with the perceptual account in this dissertation. In Chapter Four linguistic statements were not themselves pictures. They served only to trigger and key in the perceptual structure. Also, in the _Tractatus_ Wittgenstein

speaks as if by dissecting language he can uncover the primary logical

structure which is fundamental to the world (TLP 4.002). This sort of

fundamental structure is contrary to my perceptual theory since, in my

view, the perceptual is presented as a higher level of mental activity

than rational thought (as when the chess player leaves his rules and

logical reasonings behind and simply "sees" the board situation) and

in the Tractatus level it seemingly is not. In the balance of this

section I will argue that, although these are good objections, none-

theless, they are not fatal to the thesis that Wittgenstein had a

perceptual doctrine similar to the one developed in Part II. My

position will be that Wittgenstein quickly abandoned both of these

views and moved throughout his later philosophy towards the sort of

perceptual view found in this dissertation.

As early as the Notebooks Wittgenstein was concerned about shadows

behind sentences (NB 27-31). His disapproval of admitting such shadows

into his philosophical account of a sentence continued throughout his

philosophical career. This is particularly clear in Moore's lecture

notes (ML I 12-14) and the Blue Book (BL 36-37). Wittgenstein solved

the shadow problem in part by conceiving of the sentence as a picture

in the Tractatus. In the Philosophische Grammatik, however, Wittgenstein

has already given up this simplified viewpoint. Pictures are separate

from language but still intricately interwoven with it to form a compli-

cated structure. Wittgenstein writes:

> If one holds it self-evident that man enjoys his fantasy,
> then one thinks that this fantasy is not like a painted picture
> of a plastic model, but a complicated structure out of hetero-
> geneous constituents: words and pictures. One will then no
> longer place the operations of written and verbal signs in
> opposition to "picture-representations" of events. (PG 132)

This modified relationship between words and pictures continues throughout all of the later philosophy unchanged. "Picture," in a sense distinct but still intertwined with language, remains a fundamental term in all of the later writings including the Investigations.

With regard to the removal of the "logical" from Wittgenstein's perceptual account, the discussions of the non-necessary nature of rule-governed activities in the Investigations and the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, already discussed in Part II, show in part how the change in Wittgenstein's position took place. The dramatic difference this change makes, however, was not fully evidenced until Wittgenstein began writing On Certainty. The change is highlighted in this book because On Certainty is the only book in the later period which deals with the world in detail and on the scale of the Tractatus. In the Tractatus one of the main objects was to uncover the logical structure of the world. The implication was that the bits and pieces of this logical structure were logically related. In On Certainty such logical structure has disappeared. The structure of the world as we see it is revealed instead by statements which have the form of empirical statements (though they really aren't). These statements serve to key us in on the picture of the world which the people who speak our language have developed over the centuries. As such, they serve as a foundation in much the same way that hypotheses do in science except that they are held much more strongly than scientific hypotheses and therefore can seldom be discarded (OC 402). Furthermore, they turn out to be the same propositions which Moore claimed to know on a common sense basis (OC 136-137). The learning of these propositions results in a system of

judgments which arises in a perceptual rather than a logical sense.
Wittgenstein writes:

> When we first begin to <u>believe</u> anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole.)
> It is not single axioms that strike me as obvious, it is a system in which consequences and premises give one another <u>mutual</u> support.   (OC 141-142)

The child is taught various things which have consequences which he must swallow down with what he learns (OC 143)--i.e., much of what he learns is not consciously taken in but taken in by implication. These "bits and pieces" form a system by which the world is automatically viewed (OC 144).

In this regard, Wittgenstein speaks of light dawning over the whole of this system in a manner which strongly suggests the perceptual views of this dissertation. Nevertheless, someone might want to say that Wittgenstein's talk of "mutual support" (OC 142) still leaves room for a logical structure of the type found in the <u>Tractatus</u>; however, this is not the case. Rather Wittgenstein's examples throughout <u>On Certainty</u> completely close the door to this viewpoint. The best example is that of a king who has been taught all his life that the world came into existence when he was born and will cease to exist when he dies (OC 92). Wittgenstein asks how Moore, who holds the opposite view on this one point, can convince the king that he is wrong. The answer is that he cannot. If Moore succeeded, it would not be, according to Wittgenstein, by pointing out the illogic of king's position. The proposition from the king's point of view is not inconsistent with his world picture nor with the other propositions which both the king and Moore hold in common. Rather it is inconsistent <u>only</u> with Moore's proposition that the world

has existed long before his and the king's birth and will continue to exist long after their deaths. Wittgenstein concedes that Moore could "convert the king to his view, but it would be a conversion of a special kind; the king would be brought to look at the world in a different way" (OC 92). The way in which this one proposition held by the king and its denial held by Moore permeate the king and Moore's separate perceptions of the world demonstrates that the structure of the world which each perceives is perceptual rather than logical and, furthermore, indicates that Wittgenstein has given up completely the doctrine of logical structure of the Tractatus in favor of a perceptual viewpoint similar to the perceptual account of Part II.

Synoptical Representations, Philosophical Method
and Weltanschauung

The "seeing" and the pictures which I have been speaking of in the last two sections are interrelated throughout Wittgenstein's philosophy by virtue of the fact that they are found together at every stage. In the early philosophy the pictures are what we are "seeing." In the later philosophy discussion of pictures and "seeing" still remains intertwined. Wittgenstein himself was very much aware of this relationship and carefully avoided creating any conflicts between the two accounts. At one point in the Investigations he even rejects a possible account of how the visual impression is structured on the grounds that if he accepts the account then "the similarity to a picture is now impaired" (PI II 196). In this section I will show that "seeing" and pictures also play a significant role in Wittgenstein's philosophical method throughout his philosophical career and in his conception of

"Weltanschauung." The key term in this section is "synoptical repre-
sentation."[1]

The connecting link among all of Wittgenstein's later perceptual
remarks is Wittgenstein's remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough. Wittgen-
stein begins with the same remark from the Philosophische Grammatik
in which he rejects the Tractatus' view that statements are pictures
while still maintaining a close relationship between them. He writes:

> If one holds it self-evident that man enjoys his fantasy,
> then one thinks that this fantasy is not like a painted picture
> or a plastic model, but a complicated structure out of hetero-
> geneous constituents: words and pictures. One will then no
> longer place the operations of written and verbal signs in
> opposition to "picture-representations" of events. (F 240)

This remark is followed by a great number of remarks about pictures
and their role as an alternative to explanation. The reader is asked
in order to simplify this discussion to disregard Wittgenstein's par-
ticular objections to Frazer, which are not really relevant to this
discussion, and concentrate on the perceptual discussions only. These
discussions begin with the remark that:

> The historical explanation, the explanation as a hypothesis
> of evolution is only a kind of summary of the data--its synopsis.
> It is just as possible to see the data in its relation to itself
> and summarized in one general picture, without making it in the
> form of a hypothesis about development in time. (F 242)

Speaking unfavorably of Frazer's approach again a few lines later,

Wittgenstein continues:

> "And so the choir indicates a secret law," one would say to
> the Frazerian collection of facts. This law, this idea, I can

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[1]This term "uebersichtlichen Darstellung" appears only in two
places (F 241; PI I 122). In the Investigations it is translated as
"perspicuous representation." I am using synoptical because the con-
text of the earlier reference to it (F 241) which follows an example
about a synopsis of data.

> only represent through an evolutionary hypothesis or analogous
> to the model of a plant, through the model of a religious
> ceremony, or once again through the arrangement of the fact-
> materials alone in a 'synoptical' representation. The concept
> of the synoptical representation is of fundamental significance
> to us. It signifies our representation-form, the kind, by
> which we see things. (A kind of 'Weltanschauung' which it
> appears is typical of our time. Spengler.) This synoptical
> representation facilitates understanding which consists in
> "seeing the connections." For that reason the importance of
> discovering connecting links.
>   A hypothetical connecting link in this case is supposed to
> do nothing when the attention to the similarity, the connection,
> leads to the facts. As one illustrates through an internal
> relation of the form of a circle to an ellipse that an ellipse
> converts gradually into a circle; however, that is not to main-
> tain that a certain ellipse factually, historically arose out
> of a circle (evolutionary hypothesis), but only in our eye to
> sharpen a formal connection. However I can also see the evolu-
> tionary hypothesis as nothing more extensive than a wording of
> a formal connection. (F 241-242)

Regardless of the validity of Wittgenstein's criticism of Frazer (which

I suspect may be at least partly unfair), the passages from these three

pages draw together, in a consistent manner, terminology which points

to widely separated remarks by Wittgenstein throughout his philosophical

career.

In the quoted passages we find first of all the assertion of the

relationship between language and pictures. Secondly, we find Wittgen-

stein assuring us that we can form "a kind of summary of the data--its

synopsis" which will make it "possible to see the data in its relation

to itself and summaries in one general picture." This general picture

is a "synoptical representation." This is a picture which one "sees"

by forming internal relations or connections between the data or fact-

materials. Thirdly, this synoptical representation is also treated as

a Weltanschauung or way of looking at things which is said to be charac-

teristic of our times. These remarks suggest other remarks from all

parts of Wittgenstein's philosophy. The relation of language and

pictures has already been discussed at length; however, it is signifi-
cant that Wittgenstein includes the remark about words and pictures
from the Philosophische Grammatik in the remarks on Frazer and equally
significant and exciting that near the end of these remarks he makes
a series of statements which later came to be an important paragraph
in the part of the Investigations in which Wittgenstein explains his
method (PI I 122). One connecting link is Wittgenstein's claim that
looking at the data and seeing internal relations permits one to form
a general picture or synoptical representation. "Internal relations"
it will be remembered is a term equally at home in the discussions of
the Tractatus and the Investigations. The remarks about "seeing" also
tie the notes on Frazer together with Wittgenstein's general discussions
and use of that term.

In addition, the term "synopsis" and its relation with these general
pictures and representations permit relationships to be drawn between
widely separate accounts of Wittgenstein's method. Wittgenstein speaks
of a synopsis on two occasions in Moore's notes. The first occurs in
his discussions of aesthetics and ethics where Wittgenstein is criti-
cizing Darwin along with Frazer in a manner similar to the criticism
in the notes on Frazer (ML III 20). In the second and more important
case Wittgenstein is speaking of his philosophical method. He says
that he is attempting to remove our intellectual discomfort by means
of "a synopsis of many trivialities" (ML III 27). This synopsis allows
us to put everything in order and become emotionally free of the desire
to do philosophy. In this respect he says what he is doing is similar
to ethics and aesthetics. It is also similar to the alternative method
of the Tractatus which was intended to be used if the reader could not

accept the final conclusions of the _Tractatus_ (TLP 6.53) and the method of examples of the _Investigations_ (PI 133). This relationship shows how consistent Wittgenstein's methods and aims were throughout his philosophy and how closely they were always tied to perceptual approaches.

Finally, the relation of Wittgenstein's conception of Weltanschauung also permits us to see another thread of unity. Wittgenstein was in large part concerned with arriving at a Weltanschauung and discussing the nature of Weltanschauungs from the beginning to the end of his philosophy. The Weltanschauung was a way of seeing or perceiving the world which was arrived at by putting together relationships in the way described in the notes on Frazer. It is not only the ultimate application of the perceptual approach but also, as discussed in Chapter Three, the connecting link between Wittgenstein's philosophy and contemporary German philosophy.[1]

Conclusion

When confronted with all of these remarks and interrelationships between various types of perceptual discussions throughout all the periods of Wittgenstein's philosophical career, it is difficult to imagine that Wittgenstein was not fundamentally concerned with perception in the sense developed in Part II of this dissertation. It is also difficult to imagine that Wittgenstein was not close to the sort of ethical views proposed in Part II. Although it has not been widely recognized, two of the most famous points Wittgenstein makes in the _Investigations_ arise naturally out of his perceptual concerns.

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[1] von Rintelen, p. 2.

(1) The notion of family resemblances, insofar as it is a "look and see" method (PI I 66) and involves the "seeing" of networks of over-lapping similarities (PI I 66), is a natural extension of the method of looking at the data or fact-materials, "seeing the connections," noting internal relations, and forming synoptical representations.

(2) Secondly, the ability to follow a rule or to go on to new problems ultimately involves the acceptance of certain pictures and a particular way of seeing things (PI I 144). In addition, the problems which the pupil works will themselves form a series of examples related in terms of family resemblances. The ability to handle the various relationships in new problems as they appear or fail to appear will in large measure be equivalent to the pupil's mathematical ability. This ability will be based on his skill in forming and dealing with synoptical represen-tations.

Although Wittgenstein did not develop the ethical position of Part II, it would not have been difficult for Wittgenstein to have moved on from his observations concerning mathematics to the sort of position I have developed in Part II with regard to practical ethics. Although Wittgenstein failed to make this move, it should not prevent us from considering that sort of ethical position to be fundamentally Wittgen-steinean in nature, nor should it deter us from beginning a reexamination of Wittgenstein's entire philosophy which may, through more careful attention to his perceptual concerns, lead to a more consistent, unified and satisfying picture of Wittgenstein and his work. After such a review we may wish to call him a radical phenomenologist or, in line with English-speaking terminology, a perceptual analyst instead of "positivist," "linguistic analyst," or "conceptual analyst." We may also wish to make

the same sort of connection between his later philosophy and ethics that he strongly felt characterized his early work.

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